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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of modality and, in particular, of conditional statements within
the framework of possible world semantics. I argue that in order to understand what the
meaning of a modal sentence is we need to look closely at the internal composition of
accessibility relations. Accessibility relations are shown to be complex relations
involving both a world and a time of evaluation, and it is shown that temporal and
aspectual operators can be interpreted in the modal domain, and may not occur inside the
scope of the modal operator. When interpreted in this position, temporal and aspectual
operators contribute to the selection of the possible worlds by defining the relevant notion
of accessibility. Capitalizing on work by Irene Heim, David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker,
I show that this proposal allows us to develop a semantic analysis of those conditionals
that are traditionally called subjunctive conditionals, and to provide an answer to how to
select the worlds that the modal operator quantifies' over. Finally, ' argue that the
semantic analyses of counterfactuals discussed by Lewis (1979) - Analysis 1 and
Analysis 2 - cannot be maintained in that neither of them accounts for the contrast
between the felicity conditions of different types of subjunctive conditionals. Instead, I
will argue that our theory based on a time-dependent notion of accessibility can.
Thesis Supervisor: Irene Heim
Title: Professor of Linguistics
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I. Modality and the selection of possible worlds
What is the meaning of a modal sentence? In possible world semantics, modal sentences
are quantified structures: a modal operator quantifies over possible worlds, its restriction
being provided either linguistics or contextually, and its nuclear scope being the
proposition expressed"by the sentence below the modal operator. For example, the modal
sentence Charlie must play tomorrow will have the structure below where the modal
operator must is a universal quantifier over possible worlds.
(1) Vw' [R(w',w) - Charlie plays tomorrow in w']
The nuclear scope of the operator will be the proposition expressed by the sentence
(without the modal), i.e. the proposition that Charlie plays tomorrow. Because must
allows both an epistemic and a deontic readings, the restriction of the modal operator will
depend on the value of the variable R, which is assigned an accessibility relation by the
context of utterance. Here, assume (simplistically) that an accessibility relation is a binary
relation between possible worlds. The second argument of R, w, is the evaluation world,
whose default value is the actual world. To go back to our example, if R is assigned a
deontic accessibility relation, the sentence in (1) will assert that in all the possible worlds
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where the current (contextually salient) laws hold, it is true that Charlie plays tomorrow.
If R is assigned an epistemic accessibility relation, then the sentence means that in all the
worlds where all that the speaker actually knows is true, it is true that Charlie plays
tomorrow.
Conditional statements are modal sentences too. A possibly covert modal operator
quantifies over possible worlds: the antecedent of the conditional is interpreted in its
restriction, the consequent is its nuclear scope (Kratzer 1981b). A great deal of research
both in philosophy and in linguistics has highlighted the complexities of giving the
correct truth-conditions for conditional sentences. Consider the case of counterfactuals:
viewed as material implications, all counterfactuals are true, because their antecedents are
false. It follows that not only does If Charlie had played yesterday, his team would have
won come out true, but the opposite conditional If Charlie had played yesterday, his team
would have lost would come out true too. Something else must be intended. To put it with
Nelson Goodman, the problem of counterfactual is "to define the circumstances under
which a given counterfactual holds while the opposing conditional with the contradictory
consequent fails to hold"' (Goodman 1983: 4). But when you try to list these
circumstances, i.e. a set of true sentences such that the antecedent together with this set
entails the consequent, you run into insurmountable problems (see also Kratzer 1981a).
This is the selection problem: how to select the worlds that will be quantified over
by the modal operators. Stalnaker's and Lewis theories provide a way to approach the
problem that avoids the difficulties that caused Goodman to abandon the enterprise of
solving the problem of counterfactuals. Stalnaker appeals to the selection function which
is crucially left undefined: it is a function that takes a proposition (the antecedent) and a
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world (the actual world) into a possible world (the world as it would be if the antecedent
were true). This world is maximally similar to the actual world, but not much more can
be said about the selection function: conditionals are affected with vagueness, and their
vagueness is the vagueness of the selection function. What counts as most similar is a
matter of context and different contexts will impose different requirements on the
function. Lewis talks about a similarity function and, again, only some general
indications of what counts as most similar are given. One aspect of the similarity that
Lewis is explicit about, though, is that the relevant similarity among worlds is overall
similarity, i.e. what is compared when evaluating whether two worlds w and w' are more
similar to each other than w' and w " are, is the whole history of these worlds.
This dissertation is an investigation of these concepts. More specifically, it is a
study of what it means to be an accessible world, that is to say, of how we define
accessibility relations. I will make a proposal and show that Lewis' overall similarity
cannot be maintained. So, what does it mean to be an accessible world?
Inspired by Iatridou (2000), I will answer this question by looking at the form of
subjunctive conditionals. In particular, I will focus on some odd property of modal
sentences: the occurrence of past tense morphology in sentences about hypothetical
future situations. The hypothesis that this thesis develops is that the once we explain what
the role of this temporal (and aspectual) elements is we will have a better understanding
of what it means to be an accessible world.
To phenomenon of unaccounted temporal morphology is found in conditionals as
well as main clauses. (2) illustrates this fact for conditionals.
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(2) If Charlie played baseball tomorrow, his team would lose.
As Iatridou (2000) already observed, the occurrence of the past tense played when talking
about the hypothetical situation of Charlie playing tomorrow is puzzling because it would
not be felicitous to utter the sentence in (3) if both the past tense and the future adverb are
locating the event of playing baseball in time.
(3) Charlie played baseball tomorrow.
However, there is an interpretation of the sentence in (3) which makes the sentence
felicitous and meaningful (Dudman 1983). And in this interpretation, the sentence means
that Charlie was supposed to play baseball tomorrow. In (2) the mismatch between the
tense and the temporal adverb occurs in a modal sentence and does not give rise to
infelicity; in (3), the temporal mismatch occurs in a regular main clause and, as a result,
the modal interpretation is forced. As the paraphrase of the example in (3) shows, the past
is not interpreted in the proposition that-Charlie plays tomorrow, but in the modal
domain. This dissertation offers a semantic analysis of what it means for a temporal
element to be interpreted in the modal domain.
To sum up, the questions we will ask are the following:
(i) What is the definition of "accessible worlds"?
(ii) What can temporal mismatches tell us about the internal composition of the
accessibility relation?
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(iii) How does the temporal dimension of modality affect the truth-conditions of
modal sentences?
II. Subjunctive conditionals
Traditionally, conditionals are classified in two types: indicative and subjunctive. This
dissertation is about the nature and form of subjunctive conditionals and, in the end,
about the essential difference between the two types. Iatridou (2000) has shown that,
despite the labels that we will be using, the mood difference between these two types of
conditionals in some languages is not an essential aspect of this distinction and that the
occurrence of the subjunctive mood is entirely due to language-specific morphological
rules. However, I have decided to be conservative and keep the traditional terminology
because, although subjunctive conditionals are not subjunctive, they do share a common
property: the ultimate objective of this dissertation is to understand what this common
element is and what the nature of the indicative/subjunctive partition is.
Consider the following pair of conditionals. The difference between the indicative
conditional in (4) and the subjunctive conditional in (5) is that the latter is infelicitous if
uttered in a context where the situation described by the antecedent is known to be likely
to happen (cf. (6)).
INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL
(4) If Charlie plays tomorrow, his team will lose.
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SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL
(5) If Charlie played tomorrow, his team would lose.
(6) Charlie will probably play tomorrow.
a. #If he played tomorrow, they would certainly lose.
b. If he plays tomorrow, they will certainly lose.
For a subjunctive conditional to be felicitous, the speaker must not assume that the
antecedent is true; if he does, then he should use the indicative conditional. Stalnaker
(1968, 1975) argues that indicative and subjunctive conditionals should be given the
same semantic analysis as possible-world conditionals and that the difference between
these two types has to be explained in terms of different pragmatic constraints on the
selection function, which may result in the two types of conditionals having different
truth-conditions. In this dissertation, I maintain with Stalnaker that the same semantic
analysis should be given to all conditionals, and that the difference is elsewhere. Where?
Recall what we have observed in the previous section: as pointed out in Iatridou (2000),
what is special about subjunctive conditionals like (5) is the unaccounted occurrence of a
past tense.
The central question of this dissertation is the following: What is the role of the
temporal and aspectual morphology that we see in subjunctive conditionals and that is
interpreted neither temporally nor aspectually? Once we answer this question, we will be
in a position to offer a systematic account of the truth and felicity of subjunctive
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conditionals and we will have an answer to the question about the essential difference
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.
We will begin with a kind of subjunctive conditionals that I have called
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals. In order to present the puzzle, though, let me
give the reader a brief survey of the possible kinds of subjunctive conditionals.
Subjunctive conditionals may talk about future, present or past hypothetical situations.
SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
(7) If Charlie were sick now, he would be at home.
(8) If Charlie played baseball tomorrow, they would lose.
(9) If Charlie had played baseball yesterday, they would have lost.
All these conditionals, regardless of when the hypothetical eventuality is supposed to take
place, have a past tense morpheme in both the antecedent clause and the consequent
clause (morphologically, would is analyzed as the modal verb woll plus past tense
morphology). If the supposition is about a past time, two layers of past are required to
occur (had played in (9)), as shown by the unacceptability of the following sentence.
(10) #If Charlie played yesterday, they would lose.
However, although one layer of past cannot occur with a past adverb (see the example
above), two layers of past can unexpectedly occur with a future adverb. Thus, the label
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals.
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(11) If Charlie had played tomorrow, they would have lost.
Even assuming with Iatridou (2000) that in subjunctive conditionals one layer of past is
never interpreted temporally, how are we going to explain the occurrence of two layers of
pasts in (11)? In a regular past subjunctive conditional like (9), it seemed natural to say
that - whatever the one layer of past necessary in subjunctive conditionals is doing - the
reason why a second layer of past occurs is because the supposition that Charlie plays
baseball is about a past time. But, if so, shouldn't (11) be nonsense? To sum up, we will
ask the following question: What is the role of the second layer of past that occurs in
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals?
Conditionals like (11) are interesting for another reason as well. They are future
counterfactuals. After Anderson (1951), the counterfactuality of a regular past
subjunctive conditional is viewed as an implicature. Mismatched past subjunctive
conditionals are counterfactual as well: however, if we try to cancel the counterfactuality
using Anderson's kind of examples, the result is infelicitous, thus suggesting that the
counterfactuality of a mismatched past subjunctive conditional is of a different nature.
The objective of the proposal that I develop in this dissertation is to explain both
these aspects of mismatched past subjunctive conditionals (i.e. their temporal mismatches
and their counterfactuality) and show that they are two sides of the same phenomenon.
Once we have a theory about mismatched past subjunctive conditionals, we will
be in a position to ask the question of why the past tense morphology is the hallmark of
subjunctive conditionals in general. My proposal is inspired by Heim (1992)'s discussion
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of counterfactual conditionals in a framework of context change semantics, in turn
inspired by Stalnaker's work on presuppositions (Stalnaker 1973, 1974).
My main thesis is that the temporal and aspectual information we see in
subjunctive conditionals plays a crucial role in the construction of the modal
interpretation by contributing to the internal composition of the accessibility relation and,
consequently, to the definition of what it is to be an accessible world. I will claim that we
cannot maintain Lewis' notion of overall similarity and that we need the notion of a time-
dependent similarity among worlds.
III. Overview of the dissertation
Leaving aside the Introduction, the dissertation consists of five chapters.
In Chapter 2 1 introduce the puzzle of mismatched past subjunctive conditionals. I
discuss previous accounts of these conditionals in the literature, their valuable insights
and their problems.
In order to solve the puzzle of mismatched past subjunctive conditionals, I will
first develop a semantic analysis of subjunctive conditionals, looking at simpler cases.
This is the content of chapter 3. I analyze the puzzle of presupposition projection in
subjunctive conditionals in light of new data and argue that the solution to this puzzle
comes from the proper analysis of the temporal elements in subjunctive conditionals. The
proposal is that the structure of a subjunctive conditional is that of an existential perfect
(cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2002).
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In Chapter 4, we will go back to the mismatched cases and I offer a solution. I
build my proposal of the role of past in constructing the modal interpretation and show
how the special felicity conditions for these conditionals follows from my analysis of the
past together with a principle about maximizing presupposition, independently argued for
in Heim (1991). Moreover, I discuss Lewis' theory of counterfactuals and show that it
cannot account for the facts presented here.
In Chapter 5 I address the question of the mapping between the semantic and the
morphological structures, more specifically, how the arrangement of temporal and modal
heads in the syntax is reflected in the morphology.
Finally, in chapter 6 I present some remarks about so-called inverted conditionals,
and briefly discuss the question of the mapping between syntax and semantics, and the
question of which clause (antecedent or consequent) is semantically interpreted.
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CHAPTER 2
TEMPORAL MISMATCHES IN SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS:
THE PUZZLE
I. Future Counterfactuals
Past subjunctive conditionals do not always talk about the past. Sometimes they may talk
about the future, despite the overt past verbal morphology. This chapter is a study of
these cases, which have been left unaccounted for by most theories of conditionals or
have been given what I will argue, is the wrong analysis. Before I give the background
for the discussion and clarify the terminology that I will be using, let me introduce the
relevant examples. Both the conditionals in (1) and (2) talk about a future hypothetical
event, that is to say the event of them playing tomorrow. However a number of
differences set these two examples apart.
(1) If they played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would win.
(2) If they had played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would have won.
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The first difference is morphological. The subjunctive conditional in (1) has one
morpheme expressing past (the -ed on the main verb play), whereas the subjunctive
conditional in (2) has two morphemes expressing past (the -ed on the auxiliary have and
the auxiliary itself). The second difference between (1) and (2) has to do with their
conditions of use. In order to illustrate this difference, imagine the following scenario.
The last game of the baseball season had been scheduled for yesterday, but, having heard
about a furious storm that was approaching, it was decided to postpone it to a sunny day.
It is now raining and I have heard that it will stop later today. In these circumstances, I
can utter (1) but I cannot utter (2). Now consider a modification of this scenario. Suppose
that Charlie's team did in fact play the last game last night and, because of the rain, lost.
In these circumstances, I can felicitously utter (2) but not (1). The situation is thus
reversed. The first conclusion that these facts suggest is that morphologically complex
subjunctive conditionals such as (2) are felicitous just in case the eventuality described in
the antecedent is impossible.
There are two questions that pairs like (1) and (2) raise. The first question is why
the morphologically simpler conditional in (1) cannot always be used to talk about future
hypothetical events. The second question is why the morphologically more complex
conditional in (2) must be understood as a future counterfactual. The objective of this
chapter is threefold: (i) to develop a general theory of subjunctive conditionals; (ii) to
argue that one essential piece of the modal interpretation is contributed by the tense; (iii)
to map morphology to meaning. In order to answer the questions we have laid down
above, we need to provide the terminological background for our discussion.
Conditionals are traditionally divided into two categories: subjunctive conditionals and
22
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indicative conditionals.: The sentences in (3a) and (3b) are examples of indicative
conditionals.
(3) Indicative conditionals
a. If Charlie plays tomorrow, they will win.
b. If Charlie played yesterday, they won.
Subjunctive conditionals are morphologically marked. They owe their name to the fact
that in several languages with rich verbal morphology, they are marked by the
subjunctive mood. In English, however, where subjunctive conditionals only show past
tense morphology. Here, I will call subjunctive conditionals that talk about future (or
present) hypothetical situations like (4a) one-past subjunctive conditionals, and
subjunctive conditionals that talk about past hypothetical situations like (4b) non-
mismatched two-pasts subjunctive conditionals.
(4) Subjunctive conditionals
a. If Charlie played tomorrow, they would win.
b. If they had played yesterday, they would have won.
In this dissertation, I have nothing to say about why the subjunctive mood occurs in some
languages to mark the distinction shown above. Following Iatridou (2000), I will assume
that mood is not a necessary ingredient of counterfactuality and that language-specific




The sentence in (5) sounds unacceptable, and the reason seems at first obvious.' An event
cannot be said to be both past relative to the utterance time and to be occurring tomorrow.
(5) #Charlie flew his kite tomorrow.
Things are not so simple, though. In fact, there are cases where the temporal mismatches
do not give rise to non-sensical interpretation like the one generated by the sentence in
(5). Consider the conditional sentence in (6). Here the past tense is allowed to co-occur
with the future adverb tomorrow, without making the sentence non-sensical. Clearly, the
past tense is not locating the event in the past, because of that event we are saying
without contradiction that it will take place tomorrow. What is the role of past?
(6) If Charlie flew his kite tomorrow, Lucy would not call him wishy-washy.
1 What I mean when I say that these simple sentences sound unacceptable is that it is the case that when we
are locating an event in time the tense and the temporal adverb must agree in their temporal content.
However, as I pointed out in chapter 1, when a temporal mismatch occurs, the sentence becomes acceptable
if it is interpreted modally. The sentences below illustrate this phenomenon (examples (i) and (ii) are taken
from Dudman 1983):
(i) The conference began next Monday.
(ii) She returned the ticket tomorrow.
(iii) Didn't they play tomorrow?
Sentence (i) is not an English sentence in the interpretation in which it is just temporally locating the time
of the conference. However, the sentence does have a modal meaning, according to which the conference
was scheduled for next Monday, but the speaker has some reason to believe that it will not actually happen.
Sentence (iii) is similar: there existed some plan of playing tomorrow, but the speaker has reason to believe
that the plan will not be realized (this meaning component does not come form the question, however, as
shown by the fact that the question "Are we playing tomorrow" does not suggest that the speaker has
reason to doubt that they will play tomorrow). See Ippolito (2002) for more discussion of these examples.
Let me mention here that not every English dialect accepts these sentences; most dialects seem to prefer the
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As the examples in (4) show, when the hypothetical eventuality is located in the future
(or in the present, in the case of states), one layer of past occurs. When the eventuality
described in the antecedent is located in the past, then two layers of past occur but the
tense is not interpreted as a past perfect (pluperfect). The following example is from
Iatridou (2000). Tall is not a stage-level predicate, because being tall is a property that an
individual gains at some point during puberty and has throughout his adult life. Keeping
this sense of being tall, the sentence in (a) is deviant. 2 However, when this very sentence
is part of a past subjunctive conditional like (c), it is acceptable. In both non-past
subjunctive conditionals and past subjunctive conditionals there is one layer of past that
does not seem to be interpreted temporally, i.e. it does not seem to locate the eventuality
described in the antecedent in the past.
(7) a. #Napoleon had been tall.
b. Napoleon was tall.
c. If Napoleon had been tall, he would have defeated at Wellington.
Not only do we find an unaccounted past in any kind of subjunctive conditional in
English, but, even more surprisingly, the past tense seems to mark "subjunctive
conditionals" in several, completely unrelated languages: Indo-European languages
(English, Italian, Greek, etc.), Papago (Hale 1969), Japanese, Korean (Han 1996, Cho
past progressive version of the sentences given above (cf. Dowty 1977, Copley 2000). However, this is not
problematic because the past progressive has a past component too.
2 The sentence would become acceptable if we were to start thinking of being tall as a temporary property
of human being in such a way that somebody could grow and shrink several times (thanks to Bob Stalnaker
for bringing this point up). However, this interpretation of the predicate tall is irrelevant for the present
discussion.
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1997), Hebrew, Turkish, Basque, etc. (James 1982, Fleischman 1989). Based on these
facts, Iatridou argues that the hallmark of subjunctive conditionals is not the subjunctive
mood but the past tense. This idea had already been suggested in informal analyses of
subjunctive conditionals. For example, according to Palmer (1986, 2001), the past tense
in the antecedent of (4a) (and, presumably, the past on the modal would in the
consequent) is a modal past, the intuition being that the past tense does not locate the
event of Charlie's playing in the past but removes the speaker from the actual situation
and places her into an unreal one. Consequently, in a past subjunctive conditional like
(4b), past is marked once for 'unreality' and once for past time since we are talking about
yesterday's hypothetical playing. Iatridou exploits this intuition as well but her objective
is to account for why the past can be employed in modal context with this distancing
effect. In her proposal, the past tense morphology instantiates what she calls the exclusion
feature. This feature can either be interpreted in the domain of time or in the domain of
worlds. In the former case, a sentence with past will be interpreted as talking about a time
different from the time of the utterance; in the latter case, a sentence with past will be
interpreted as talking about worlds different from the actual world. In a simple sentence
such as John left, the past is interpreted temporally and the sentence talks about a past
time at which an event of John's leaving took place. The possibility of interpreting past
modally (i.e. as excluding the actual world) is exploited in conditionals like (4a) or (4b).
The difference between (4a) and (4b) is that, in the latter, two layers of past occur, the
one instantiated by the auxiliary have and the one instantiated by the past -ed. Iatridou's
proposal is fundamentally similar to Palmer's: one layer of past is interpreted modally,
thus contributing to the modal interpretation of the structure; the other layer of past is
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interpreted temporally, i.e. as expressing a relation of anteriority between the hypothetical
event and the utterance time.
Notice that this has an important consequence. The layer of past that is interpreted
temporally locates the hypothetical event in time and, as such, must be interpreted inside
the proposition expressed by the antecedent. This is exactly parallel to what happens in a
simple sentence with the past tense: in (8), the past tense locates the event of playing in
the past, which is the reason why it is compatible with the past adverb yesterday but not
with tomorrow.
(8) Charlie played with Lucy (yesterday/#tomorrow).
As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, though, morphologically past subjunctive
conditionals do not always talk about the way the past could have been. Sometimes they
talk about the future, despite their two layers of past morphology. I will call this kind of
two-pasts subjunctive conditionals mismatched past subjunctive conditionals (MPSC).
(9) If they had played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would have won.
Examples like (9) are problematic for theories about the morpho-semantics of subjunctive
conditionals, as Iatridou acknowledges in her paper. 3 If the reason why there is a
pluperfect in (9) is that one past is locating the hypothetical event of playing baseball in
the past, we are left with no understanding of why two pasts occur in a MPSC, where the
hypothetical event is located in the future by some future adverb. In this chapter, I will
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abstract away from the question of what the one layer of past in a one-past subjunctive
conditional like (6) does and whether Iatridou's proposal is correct. This will be the
content of chapter 3. What I will concentrate on in this chapter is the role of the second
layer of past in MPSCs. The second layer of past raises two puzzles. The first puzzle
should by now be familiar and I will call it the past puzzle: given that the hypothetical
eventuality is said to occur in the future, what is the role of the second layer of past? How
is the mismatch between the past and the future adverb resolved? The second puzzle is
the felicity puzzle and has two parts. We are already familiar with the first part or this
puzzle, which concerns the difference between the felicity conditions of one-past
subjunctive conditional and those of MPSCs: differently from one-past subjunctive
conditional, in MPSCs the hypothetical eventuality described in the antecedent is
understood as impossible (cf. (1) and (2)). The second part is about the difference
between the conditions of use of MPSCs and those of non-mismatched two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals: more precisely, differently from non-mismatched two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals, MPSCs seem to resist the cancelability test. Consider the non-
mismatched two-pasts subjunctive conditional below.
(10) If it had rained yesterday, Charlie would not have flown his kite.
Out of the blue, the antecedent would be understood as false. But, as shown by Anderson
(1951), the falsity of the antecedent is not entailed since it is possible to construe contexts
where it cannot be assumed that the antecedent is false. Thus, it is argued that the
counterfactuality of a past subjunctive conditional is an implicature.
3 Iatridou (2000: 252), footnote 26.
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(11) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown exactly those symptoms
which he does in fact show. Hence, he must have taken arsenic.
The reasoning above is valid and plausible. Because no argument can be valid if it
assumes the negation of the thesis that it is supposed to show, the speaker of our example
cannot be assuming that the antecedent is false. When applied to MPSCs, though,
Anderson's test does not result in a felicitous piece of reasoning. Consider the following
incoherent example.
(12) #If Charlie had gone to Boston by train tomorrow, Lucy would have found
in his pocket the ticket that she in fact found. So, he must be going to Boston
by train tomorrow.
The deviance of this example shows that non-mismatched two-pasts subjunctive
conditionals and MPSCs have different conditions of use. It may be suggested that the
reason why the sentence above is infelicitous is that the time of the consequent precedes
the time of the antecedent, and that as other cases of backwards causation, this is
disallowed.4 If this were the case, the sentence above would be odd for the same reason
why Lewis' sentence If Jim asked Jack for help today, there would have been no quarrel
yesterday is (Lewis 1979). However, I don't think this is the case. First of all, there are
conditionals where the time of the consequent precedes the time of the antecedent and
that are good. For example, I can say If Charlie had gotten married with Sally tomorrow,
he would have had his bachelor party last night, meaning that Charlie will not get
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married tomorrow and he did not have his bachelor party last night. So, what makes the
example above infelicitous is the attempt to cancel its counterfactuality.
How are the PSCs and the MPSCs different and where does this difference come from?
This is the second part of the felicity puzzle.
To sum up, MPSCs like (2) raise two puzzles, the past puzzle and the felicity
puzzle. We have two goals: one goal is to solve both puzzles, the other goal is to show
that these two puzzles are intimately connected and that, in fact, they have a common
explanation. As we just saw, the felicity puzzle has to do with the conditions of use of
MPSCs, which were shown to be different from the conditions of use of both one-past
subjunctive conditionals and non-mismatched two-pasts subjunctive conditionals. The
past puzzle has to do with the co-occurrence of the pluperfect with a future adverb, and
the resolution of the temporal mismatch. We showed above that theories about the
morpho-semantics of subjunctive conditionals discussed above cannot in principle
account for the occurrence of a pluperfect in a MPSC. In the next section, I will discuss
the proposal in Ogihara (2000), which explicitly addresses the puzzle of MPSCs.
III. A theory of mismatched past subjunctive conditionals: Ogihara (2000)
Suppose Mary's birthday is tomorrow but John, who was her boyfriend, mistakenly gave
her flowers yesterday. She became very upset and left him. In this scenario, a MPSC is
felicitous, but a one-past subjunctive conditional is not. That John could give flowers to
Mary tomorrow does not rescue the one-past subjunctive conditional. I use capital letters
to indicate what has been focused.
4 Thanks to Bob Stalnaker and an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
30
(13) If John had given flowers to Mary TOMORROW, she would not have left
him.
(14) If John gave flowers to Mary TOMORROW, she would not leave him.
In this section, I present Ogihara's proposal and show why it cannot be maintained: it
does not account for the data he considers, and it is refuted by new facts that I will
consider.
In Ogihara's proposal, focus is essential to the interpretation of mismatched past
subjunctive conditionals. Assuming Rooth (1985) and subsequent work, focus is
associated with a focus operator and a variable that gets introduced as a sister node to an
expression that contains a focused constituent in the syntactic representation. Thus, the




John give flowers to Mary TOMORROWS
The focus semantic value of John gives flowers to Mary TOMORROW is the set of
temporally indeterminate propositions of the form that-John give flowers to Mary at x,
where x is a variable ranging over times. The relevant propositions are temporally
indeterminate, that is to say they are tenseless. This is because the tense in the antecedent
(and the consequent) of the conditional is employed to constrain the focus variable C by
making a past time contextually salient. As a result, only past alternatives are relevant,
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i.e. only propositions where x is assigned a past time as its value (e.g. that-John give
flowers to Mary yesterday, that-John give flowers to Mary two days ago, etc.). According
to Ogihara, the second layer of past in a MPSC does not locate the hypothetical event in
the past, but indicates the time at which some similar event took place in the actual world.
The proposition that is contrasted with the hypothetical one is obtained by focus. Note
that Ogihara maintains that some proposition in the set of alternatives must be true. His
proposal does solve both the past puzzle because the second layer of past is not
interpreted in the proposition expressed by the antecedent but as the restriction of the
focus variable. Unfortunately, as we will see in a moment, Ogihara's proposal does not
solve the felicity puzzle.
Ogihara's proposal claims that in MPSCs the past restricts the focus variable C
and, consequently, makes some relevant (past) proposition salient. Moreover, he claims
that for a MPSC to be true one proposition in the set of alternatives must be true.
However, in the case of MPSCs (as well as in the case of any other subjunctive
conditionals), there needs to be no true past proposition contrasted with the antecedent.
Suppose Charlie died a month ago before ever going to Boston and both Lucy and Sally
know it. Lucy and Sally are now talking about Charlie and Lucy says that she believes
that if Charlie had gone to Boston tomorrow, he would have seen the Red Sox play.
Sally, who knows that the Red Sox are not playing tomorrow but the day after, disagrees
and can felicitously utter the following MPSC.
(16) No. If Charlie had gone to Boston THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW,
he would have seen the Red Sox play.
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By hypothesis, no proposition of the form that-Charlie goes to Boston at x is true because
he never went to Boston. A fortiori, there is no past proposition of the form that-Charlie
goes to Boston at x, where x ranges over past times. The alternatives that are considered
are themselves hypothetical and they do not have to hold in the actual world.
The requirement that there be a true proposition in the set of past alternatives
made salient by the focus on the temporal adverb does not seem to follow from any other
part of Ogihara's proposal. In general, focus on one element of a conditional does not
force any alternative to be true, so we do not expect focus to force a proposition to be true
in the case of MPSCs either. For example, suppose that Lucy and Sally know that Charlie
suffers from some food allergy, and that he did not eat anything at the party because he
did not want to fall sick. They are now arguing about what would have made Charlie
sick, had he eaten it. Lucy has just said that she thinks that Charlie would have gotten
sick if he had eaten strawberries. Sally disagrees and says If Charlie had eaten
CHOCOLATE, he would have gotten sick. Here, it is by hypothesis not true that
something made Charlie sick, i.e. there is no true proposition of the form that-Charlie ate
x, where x ranges over kinds of food. Yet, the sentence is felicitous.
However, if in light of examples such as (16) above and what we know in general
about focus in conditionals, we drop that requirement that some past proposition among
the relevant alternatives is true, we run into problems too. In particular, we cannot
account for the difference we began with, i.e. the difference between a MPSC and a one-
past subjunctive conditional. Without that requirement, Ogihara's theory predicts that the
MPSC and the one-past subjunctive conditional below should both be felicitous in the
situation imagined above, i.e. a situation in which John mistakenly thought that May's
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birthday was yesterday instead of tomorrow, and gave her flowers yesterday. However,
we know this is not true.
(17) If John had given flowers to Mary TOMORROW, she would not have left
him.
(18) If John gave flowers to Mary TOMORROW, she would not leave him.
The variable C introduced by the focus on the temporal adverb will be the set of
alternative proposition of the form that-John give flowers to Mary at x, where x ranges
over times. Now, because there is not second layer of past in the NPSC, the set of
alternatives will contain both proposition where x is replaced by a past time, as well as
propositions where x is replaced by non-past (future or present) times. Still, this set will
contain past alternatives and one of them - that-John give flowers to Mary yesterday - is
true. The NPSC should be felicitous, but it is not. Why? The difference between (17) and
(18) would seem to be that the MPSC in (17) requires a past alternative to be true, but we
saw above that this is not true (cf. (16) and also (19) below). Furthermore, we still would
not have any explanation for why (18) is infelicitous if a past alternative is true, unless
we stipulated that if a past alternative is true, then you must have a second layer of past.
But this would just be a mere stipulation.
A further argument against Ogihara's proposal is that a MPSC is felicitous even
when no relevant alternative is past. This is an argument that focus should not play an
essential role in the theory of MPSCs. Imagine that Lucy has just told me that Charlie is
going to Rome to meet my sister, who actually lives in Milan. He has already bought a
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ticket and there is no way to reach him to make him change his plans. There is nothing I
can do: Charlie will go to Rome.
(19) If he had gone to MILAN tomorrow, he would have met my sister.
Suppose I utter the conditional in (19). All the alternatives are propositions of the form
that-Charlie goes to x tomorrow, that is to say, propositions that will only vary depending
on the value assigned to the variable x, which ranges over places and not over times.
Therefore, it cannot be true that the perfect tense is interpreted as constraining the set of
alternatives, because the alternative propositions all talk about tomorrow.
To conclude, Ogihara's proposal cannot be maintained for the following reasons.
First, it claims that some proposition in the set of the relevant alternatives has to be true
in the actual world. We saw that this is incorrect for MPSCs. Without the claim that a
past proposition in the set of relevant alternatives must be true, though, his theory cannot
account for why MPSCs are counterfactuals. Second, since the focus story does not seem
to be correct, the role of the (second layer of) past in a MPSC is also left unaccounted for:
it cannot be interpreted within the proposition but there is no variable C to constrain.
Nonetheless, it is important to realize that Ogihara's insight was correct. I take the
idea that the (second layer of) past in a MPSC is not interpreted inside the proposition
expressed by the antecedent but is constraining something else, to be fundamentally
correct. In this respect, Ogihara's proposal and mine are similar in spirit. In chapter 3, I
will argue for a different answer to the question about what the past constrains in a
MPSC: what we see in MPSCs is a temporal mismatch, but what we understand is the
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impossibility of the antecedent. What is the mapping between the morphological pieces
(what we see) and the semantic structure (what we understand)? My objective is broader,
though: it is to develop a theory of MPSCs that sheds light on the nature of subjunctive
conditionals in general, their truth conditions and felicity conditions, a topic that has
interested and puzzled linguists and philosophers for decades. In order to make the
exposition easier and clearer, I will begin with a semantic analysis of NPSCs, i.e.
subjunctive conditionals with one layer of past only. Once we have a theory for these
simpler cases, we will be in a position to solve the puzzle of MPSCs and, at the same
time, we will have a general theory of subjunctive conditionals.
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CHAPTER 3
A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
PART I: SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
I. Theories of conditionals
In this dissertation, I have adopted the traditional terminology for conditionals and I have
called conditionals like if , v4 "subjunctive conditionals" if they displayed language-
specific morpho-syntactic features which distinguish them from their indicative
counterparts. In English, the characteristic feature of a subjunctive conditional is the
presence of past morphology in both the antecedent and the consequent clauses, together
with an overt modal verb in the consequent. To illustrate the contrast between indicative
and subjunctive conditionals, consider the examples. in (1) and (2).
(1) INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL
If Charlie plays tomorrow, we will lose the baseball game.
(2) SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL
If Charlie played tomorrow, we would lose the baseball game.
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Because subjunctive and indicative are the terms used in the philosophical literature on
conditionals and because we have referred and will refer to that literature throughout this
dissertation, I have decided to keep these terms in the current discussion. The original
source of these labels is the observation that languages that marked the distinction
between indicative and subjunctive mood, employed the subjunctive for the conditional
in (2) but the indicative for (1). Italian is a relevant example: only the subjunctive
conditional is marked by the subjunctive mood.
(3) INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL
Se Carlo giocherh domani, perderemo la partita di calcio.
If Carlo play-fut,ind tomorrow, (we) lose-fut,ind the soccer game
'If Carlo plays tomorrow, we will lose the soccer game'
(4) SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL
Se Carlo giocasse domani, perderemmo la partita di calcio.
If Carlo play-imp,subj tomorrow, (we) lose-pres,cond the soccer game
'If Carlo played tomorrow, we would lose the soccer game'
However it turns out that there is not much substance behind these labels. Iatridou (2000)
has shown that it is cross-linguistically false that the essential mark of "subjunctive
conditionals" is the subjunctive mood: some languages that have a true subjunctive mood
(e.g. French) do not use it in "subjunctive" conditionals. Iatridou argues that what is
cross-linguistically always present instead is the past morphology. Consider the case of
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English (2): as for the antecedent, we see a clear past tense (played); as for the
consequent, the past component is embedded in the modal verb would, which is analyzed
as WOLL + past. As for the Italian example in (4), it is possible to show that the
conditional mood does in fact incorporate a past component (latridou 2000: 266, for this
argument applied to French). I believe the same can be shown for the imperfect
subjunctive that occurs in the antecedent.5 The generalization that emerges form
Iatridou's work is that it is past morphology and not subjunctive morphology that cross-
linguistically marks conditionals like (2). This generalization is our starting point.
Despite this classification of conditionals into subjunctive and indicative, often
theories about the semantic analysis of conditionals have not directly addressed the
question about what the differences and similarities between these two types of
conditionals are. Often, theories have focused on one kind of conditional or the other, and
have not approached the difference between these two types in a systematic way. Lewis
(1973) analyzes counterfactual conditionals, a subset of the subjunctive conditionals, and
develops a theory according to which counterfactuals are possible-worlds conditionals.
However, little is said about indicative conditionals. In Lewis (1976), he claims that
indicative conditionals are not possible-worlds conditionals and should be given the same
truth-functional account as material implications. Certainly, counterfactuals and
indicative conditionals are different, but giving them a completely different semantics
seems unpalatable: we would like to understand what the similarities are, and where the
differences come from. Moreover, subjunctive conditionals are not necessarily
5 The tense that occurs in subjunctive conditionals is the imperfect subjunctive. On most analyses of the
imperfect in Romance, whether indicative or subjunctive, the imperfect is analyzed as an imperfective past
(Giorgi and Pianesi 1997, Bonomi 1997, among others). Hence, one component (feature) of the imperfect
subjunctive we see in subjunctive conditionals is past.
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counterfactuals, but in Lewis' theory there is no room for a general account of the
contrast between indicative and subjunctive. Kratzer (1981, 1991) analyzes all
conditionals as having the same structure, one in which the if-clause is the restriction of a
(possibly covert) modal operator: thus, for any world w, the if-clause has the function of
restricting the set of worlds accessible from that world w. However, like Lewis, Kratzer
too distinguishes between indicative conditionals on one hand and counterfactuals on the
other, where counterfactuals are a special kind of conditionals characterized by an empty
modal base and a totally realistic ordering source (see references cited above). Again,
where does this difference come from and what is the place of subjunctive conditionals in
general? Other scholars simply do not raise the issue of what the truth-conditions of these
two types are: for example, Karttunen and Peters (1979) propose that different
presuppositions are associated with indicative and subjunctive conditionals but remain
agnostic as to what their truth-conditions are. To conclude, the theories that address the
issue of what the semantic analysis for conditionals should be seem to regard the
distinction between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals as the relevant
distinction, rather than the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.
Nevertheless, there exist differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals
regardless of the latter being counterfactuals: if I say If Charlie played tomorrow, we
would lose the game, I suggest that Charlie is likely not to play (regardless of whether
Charlie will play or not), but if I say If Charlie plays tomorrow, I do not. If I say If the
butler had done it, the police would have found a knife I may still believe that the butler
did it and it may be true. Still, if I utter that sentence, I am suggesting something different
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from what I would suggest were I to utter If the butler did it, the police found a knife. The
distinction subjunctive /indicative is real, regardless of counterfactuality.
In this scenario, Stalnaker (1975)'s proposal points precisely in the direction of a
systematic account of the difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.
According to Stalnaker, both kinds of conditional statements have the same semantics but
different pragmatic constraints, and these different pragmatic constraints affect the truth-
conditions, so that subjunctive and indicative conditionals may actually express different
propositions. This difference is said to be reflected in the different mood (indicative
versus subjunctive). Examples of indicative and subjunctive conditionals are given
below.
(5) Indicative conditional
If Charlie plays tomorrow, his team will win.
(6) Subjunctive conditional
If Charlie played tomorrow, his team would win.
The semantic analysis of conditionals as possible-worlds conditionals is developed and
defended in Stalnaker (1968) and Stalnaker and Thomason (1970), and Lewis (1973) (not
for indicative conditionals). For the purpose of this discussion, the differences between
Stalnaker's and Lewis' theories do not matter, and - as we shall see below - my
formulation of the truth-conditions for conditionals will be closer to Lewis.
The central idea of Stalnaker's analysis is that a conditional statement of the form
If , yt"is an assertion that the consequent is true, not necessarily in the world as it is, but
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in the world as it would be if the antecedent were true" (Stalnaker 1999: 68). Formally,
this is accomplished by means of a function f that takes a proposition (the antecedent) and
a world (the actual world) into a possible world (the world as it would if the antecedent
were true). The possible world that is the value of the function is the world where the
antecedent is true and which is maximally similar to the actual world (one of the
arguments of the function). The semantic rule is given below.
(7) Semantic Rule for Conditionals (Stalnaker 1975)
A conditional if 0, yJ is true in a possible world w just in case y is true in
f(O,w).
The rule above gives the form of the truth-conditions of conditional statements but says
nothing about how the possible worlds are selected. In this respect is simply avoids
Goodman's problem of how antecedents select counterfactual worlds. The only property
of the selection function above is that it will select the world most similar to the actual
world, but not much more can be said to specify what the criteria for similarity are
without running into all those problems that Goodman ran into and that made him
conclude that there is no non-circular way to define the selection function. In this theory,
the vagueness of conditionals is the vagueness of the selection function. And if the
specification of the selection function cannot be part of the semantics of conditional
statements, it will part of their pragmatics. What we can say is what the domain of the
function is, but in order to explain his proposal, it is necessary to introduce a few related
notions.
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The context set C is the context as defined in the possible worlds framework. The
context set is the set of possible worlds not ruled out by the presupposed background
information, i.e. the set of possible worlds where all the presupposed information is true.
This presupposed information is the common knowledge or presumed common
knowledge and assumption of the participants in the conversation. The presupposed
information is what the speaker believes it is the case in the actual world. 6 It is not even
necessary that the speaker believes what she is presupposing. More important is that she
believes that the presuppositions are shared by her and her audience.
Stalnaker appeals to the notion of context set in order to specify how the selection
function works in conditionals. The idea is that if the conditional is evaluated at a world
that is a member of the context set, then the world that is selected (the value of the
function) must be a member of the context set too. The intuition behind this constraint is
that when a speaker utters a conditional statement, everything that she is presupposing in
the actual world is presupposed to hold in the hypothetical situation in which 0 is true.
The selection function can also reach outside the context set to select a counterfactual
world. With respect to this latter point, Stalnaker views the subjunctive mood in English
as well as other languages as a conventional device "for indicating that the
presuppositions are being suspended, which means in the case of subjunctive conditional
statements that the selection function is one that may reach outside of the context set"
(Stalnaker 1999: 70). Indicative conditional statements are only appropriate if the
antecedent is compatible with the context. Thus, counterfactual conditionals must be
subjunctive conditionals, but it does not follow that all subjunctive conditionals are
6 This presumed common ground is the speaker's presuppositions, which do not have to be shared by all
the participants in the conversation: what is necessary is that the speaker believes that these presuppositions
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counterfactual. The examples below show the contrast between indicative and
subjunctive conditional statements.
(8) # Charlie will not play tomorrow, but if he plays tomorrow, he will win.
(9) Charlie will not play tomorrow, but if he played, he would win.
In this dissertation I will make use of the notion of accessibility relation instead of
Stalnaker's similarity function. Hence, it may be useful if I couch Stalnaker's proposal
presented above in the same terms that I will be using in the rest of the discussion.
Consider the indicative conditional If Charlie plays tomorrow, his team will win. This
conditional will be true if all the worlds accessible from the actual world and such that it
is true that Charlie plays tomorrow, are worlds where his team wins. The constraint at
work in indicative conditional is that the set of accessible worlds is restricted to
epistemically accessible worlds, i.e. worlds in the context set. However, this is not true
for the subjunctive conditional If Charlie played tomorrow, his team would win: here the
set of accessible worlds is not restricted to worlds epistemically accessible from the
actual world but can include worlds inconsistent with the speaker's presuppositions, i.e.
worlds outside the context set. Thus, the subjunctive conditional above is true if all the
accessible worlds in which Charlie plays tomorrow are worlds where his team wins. And
among these worlds, there may be worlds outside of the context set. We will see later that
the notion of similarity among worlds will still play a role in addition to the notion of
accessibility relation.
are common to her and her audience.
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I will adopt the core of Stalnaker's analysis of conditional in terms of possible
worlds, the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics and the role played by
the context set. However, the bipartition of the realm of conditional statements in
indicative and subjunctive conditionals, central in the literature on conditionals, is the
first claim that I would like to challenge. Although correct, this simple bipartition into
subjunctive and indicative conditionals is insufficient: subjunctive conditionals are not a
homogeneous category.
The question that we want to answer in this nad the next chapter is the question
that any semantic theory of conditionals must address: What is the set of worlds that the
modal operator quantifies over? For indicative conditionals it seems correct to say that
the worlds that the modal operator quantifies over must be epistemically accessible
worlds, that is to say, worlds compatible with the speaker's epistemic state (Stalnaker
1975). My proposal in this chapter, and chapter 4, is heavily inspired by the discussion
and insights in Heim (1992). However, her claim that for any subjunctive conditional, the
context at the utterance time may be incompatible with the antecedent, but it must entail
the presuppositions of the antecedent, will be argued to be incorrect in light of some facts
that we will observe. In fact, once we show that not all subjunctive conditionals obey
Heim's generalization, we will also have shown that the bipartition into indicative and
subjunctive conditionals is not sufficient because different subjunctive conditionals
satisfy different constraints.
Presuppositions play a crucial part in the definition of the felicity conditions for
conditional statements in both Stalnaker's and Heim's theories, as we will see below. My
proposal is in the same spirit as my two predecessors. It is precisely about the correct
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definition of the felicity conditions for conditional statements and about what is the set of
possible worlds that modal operator quantify over.
II. Presuppositions and context sets
The claim that I will defend is that the felicity conditions of subjunctive conditionals
depend on the tense of the conditional itself, in particular on whether a second layer of
past occurs or not, independently of whether the hypothetical eventuality is located in the
past or in the future. What we must recognize is the contribution of tense to modality.
More specifically, I argue that the felicity condition for subjunctive conditionals requires
that the antecedent be compatible with the context but that what counts as the context
depends on the tense of the conditional itself. We will discuss this in more detail later in
the chapter, but to facilitate exposition, let me roughly state what my proposal is.
(10) Felicity conditions for subjunctive conditionals
The antecedent of a subjunctive conditional must be consistent with the
context of evaluation. The context of evaluation is determined by the tense
of the antecedent (past/non-past).7
7 Recall that in this chapter when we talk about there being a past or not in the antecedent of a subjunctive
conditional we refer to the second layer of past that occurs in a MPSC. In this chapter, we are no concerned
with the one layer of past that occurs in a NPSC like If Charlie played tomorrow, his team would win. Why
we have a past in a NPSC co-occurring with a future adverb (e.g. tomorrow) and what is role is will be
discussed in chapter 3.
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If we show that (10) is correct, we will have shown the inadequacy of the traditional
theory of subjunctive conditionals, and we will be in a position to provide a theory for
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals.
II.1 The puzzle of subjunctive conditionals revisited
Heim (1992) develops her ideas about conditionals within the context change semantics
framework, an elaboration of Stalnaker's theory of what it is to make an assertion. The
central idea of context change semantics is that the meaning of a sentence is its context
change potential (CCP), a CCP being a function from contexts to contexts. Both matrix
and embedded clauses have context change potentials. The second idea is that the
presuppositions of a sentence are requirements on the context, that is to say, they
determine which contexts its CCP can be applied to. Third, the phenomenon of
presupposition projection follows from the way the CCP of complex sentences is
composed from the CCPs of its parts.
In Heim's framework, Stalnaker's insight that in an indicative conditional the
selection function will reach inside the context set becomes the requirement that the CCP
of the antecedent be applied to the main context, which in turns requires that all the
presuppositions in the antecedent hold in the main context. This is intended to capture the
fact that if I utter the indicative conditional below and it is part of the common ground
that Mary is in the phone booth, then the hypothetical situation that I am considering is
one in which both John and Mary are in the phone booth, and not a situation in which
John but not Mary is in phone booth. The example is modified from Helm (1992).
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(11) If John is in the phone booth, the door will not close.
As Heim points out this is not a property of the similarity relation because the worlds in
which both John and Mary are in a phone booth together may be more far-fetched than
the worlds where John is in the phone booth alone. It follows from the fact that the
similarity function applies to a proposition that contains all the information in the context
plus the information contributed by the antecedent. To see how this works, consider the
CCP definition of an indicative conditional. Sim is the similarity function from
propositions to propositions that maps each proposition into the set of worlds maximally
similar to w in which the proposition is true.
(12) c + ifq, w= w c: Simw(c + ) + yr = Simw(c + ±)}
(13) Simw(p): = {w'e W: w'e p and w' resembles w no less than any other world in p}
As (12) shows, the similarity function Sim applies to the proposition c+q, which is the
intersection of the c worlds and the 0 worlds, i.e. the set of worlds where the propositions
in c and 0 are true.
Clearly, the definition in (12) works for indicative conditionals, as we illustrated
with the phone booth example: all the propositions in c (e.g. that Mary is in the phone
booth) are true in the worlds selected by the selection function Sim (in which that John is
in the phone booth is true too). But now, let us ask the question of whether the definition
above can be applied to subjunctive conditionals. The antecedents of subjunctive
conditionals can be known to be inconsistent with the common ground. If we apply the
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CCP of 0 to c when c is inconsistent with O's presuppositions, the whole conditional will
come out undefined, contrary to fact. Therefore, the question we need to ask is the
following: what is the argument to which the CCP of the antecedent of a subjunctive
conditional applies? Heim argues that it cannot be W, the set of all possible worlds,
because counterfactuals whose antecedents have presuppositions would never be
felicitous since the modal base (W) would never entail the presuppositions in the
antecedent. However - Heim argues - this is not desirable because subjunctive
conditionals whose antecedents are known to be false but have presuppositions in their
antecedents are felicitous, which means that the context to which the antecedent is added
does entail the antecedent's presuppositions. Consider again two examples adapted from
Heim (1992).
(14) If John attended too, there would be too many people.
(15) If John had attended too, there would have been too many people.
The presupposition triggered by the particle too is that somebody other than John will or
did attend the contextually salient event, and this presupposition has to hold in the
context even though it is known that John will or did not attend the relevant event. In
Heim's terminology, the modal base must have the right entailment (i.e. it must entail
that somebody other than John will or did attend), and consequently cannot be W.
Heim's proposal is to add the antecedent neither to the empty context (W) not to
the main (utterance) context but to a revised context, i.e. a context where some
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assumptions have been suspended (in order to apply the CCP of the antecedent to it) but
where the presuppositions in the antecedent have remained.
(16) For any context c, LF 0:
rev&(c), the revision of c for , is U{XcW: cX and X + is defined
The set that is obtained after the operation above is the largest set such that the
presuppositions in the antecedent are entailed. Thus, the CCP of a subjunctive conditional
will be as follows.
(17) c + if $, wouldy= {we c: Simw(revp(c) + t) + = Simw(rev,(c) + ))}
This time, the similarity function applies to rev(c) + b, i.e. the set of worlds where the
propositions in the revised context (which include the presuppositions of 0 and does not
include --iq) and 0 are true. This solves the puzzle of presupposition projection in
subjunctive conditionals. However, it does so by stipulating the right constraint on the
revision process, i.e. by stipulating that the presuppositions of the antecedent stay despite
the revision. The stipulation that Heim made seemed inescapable because once you move
outside the context set, nothing guarantees that the modal base will have the right
entailments.
In the discussion that follows, I will argue that the generalization that the
presuppositions in the antecedents of subjunctive conditionals have to hold in the main
context (the context at the utterance time) is incorrect. If we replace the context of
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utterance with the context of evaluation, and once we have a theory of what the context of
evaluation is in each case, we come to realize that there is no conflict between the fact
that the antecedent may be counterfactual and the requirement that its presuppositions be
true. Let us then consider some relevant examples.
Suppose that Charlie quit smoking three years ago, and never started smoking
again. The non-past subjunctive counterfactual in (a) below is infelicitous, as we would
expect given the generalization above.
(18) Charlie quit smoking three years ago.
a. #If Charlie quit smoking tomorrow, he could participate in the
experiment.
b. If Charlie had quit smoking tomorrow, he could have participated in the
experiment.
The proposition that Charlie smokes is presupposed by the antecedent of the conditional,
and, according to the definition of the revision process above, this proposition will be
entailed by the revision set. Because the revision of c can entail the presuppositions
required by 0 only if c entails them, it follows that the actual context set c must entail the
proposition that Charlie smokes: since it is not true in the actual context that Charlie
smokes, the sentence is correctly predicted to be infelicitous. What does not follow from
Heim's theory of the revision of the context set is the felicity of the conditional in (b): the
proposition that Charlie smokes is incorrectly predicted to be entailed by the main
context.
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One question that needs to be addressed is what exactly this relevant
presupposition is. Consider (a) above. The simpler presupposition could be that Jack
smokes immediately before the time of the quitting: in our example, the presupposition
would have to be that Jack smokes until some time tomorrow when he quits. Now, this
presupposition does not have to include the utterance time, i.e. it is not the case that what
(a)'s antecedent requires is that Jack smokes now and until tomorrow. For example,
suppose today is Monday and, as of today, Jack has never smoked. However, I know that
he will start smoking next Monday as part of an experiment about the effects of smoking.
I can still say If Jack quit smoking in two months, he would receive $1000. Hence, the
presupposition seems to be that Jack smokes immediately before the time of the quitting.
Now consider the following scenario. Jack is one of the subjects of the experiment and
his reward will depend on when he decides to quit smoking. He could think to himself: If
I quit smoking in two months, I would receive 1000; however, if I quit smoking in six
month, I would receive, $4000. Clearly, when Jack considers the possibility that he might
quit smoking after six month, he is not presupposing that he will be smoking until then:
he does not know until when he will be smoking, and this is precisely the reason why he
is entertaining all these suppositions.8 However, there seems to be something that he must
be presupposing, i.e. that there is a future time (precisely, a time after next Monday) at
which Jack smokes. Although this presupposition is weaker than smoking in two months
or smoking in six months, it is sufficient to trigger accommodation each time a
supposition is made. I will go back to this important issue later in this chapter.
To strengthen this point, consider another conditional statement with a
presupposition-triggering item. Suppose that Charlie died last year. Again as in the case
8 Thanks to Irene Heim for bringing this point to my attention.
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of the verb quit, the MPSC in (b) is felicitous, contrary to the generalization that for any
subjunctive conditional, the presuppositions of the antecedent have to hold in the main
context c.
(19) Charlie died last year.
a. #If he came to the ceremony tomorrow, he would be proud of Sally.
b. If he had come to the ceremony tomorrow, he would have been proud of
Sally.
Let us assume with Musan (1997) that most predicates trigger a presupposition that their
subject be in existence or alive at the time at which the predicate is said to hold of it.9
Both the antecedent in (a) and the antecedent in (b) presuppose that Charlie is alive
(tomorrow), which is inconsistent with the common ground. Unexpectedly, though, only
the conditional statement in (a) is infelicitous. Both the subjunctive conditional in (a) and
the subjunctive conditional in (b) are future counterfactuals. Both antecedents express the
same proposition, i.e. that-Charlie comes to the ceremony tomorrow. Hence, the
difference between (a) and (b) must lie in the number of morphemes expressing past in
both antecedents and consequent clauses: in (a) only one layer of past morphology occurs
(the -ed on the main verb come in the antecedent and the past on would (woll+past) in the
consuquent); in (b) two layers of past (the -ed on the auxiliary and the auxiliary itself in
the antecedent and the past on would and the auxiliary have in the consequent). The
generalization that examples like (18) and (19) require is the following.
9 Exception to this generalization are the "existence independence" predicates like be famous, which do not
contain a lifetime presupposition (Musan 1997: 283).
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(20) New Generalization
The restriction that the presuppositions in the antecedent of a subjunctive
conditional must be consistent with the main context only holds for non-past
subjunctive conditionals.
Our working hypothesis is that whether the presuppositions in the antecedent have to be
entailed by the context depends on whether a second layer of past occurs or not.10
The examples discussed above showed that it is not true that all subjunctive
conditionals are subject to the same appropriateness conditions and, consequently, that it
is not true that subjunctive conditionals form a homogeneous class. Above I have the new
generalization. In what follows, I will propose a theory that accounts for it.
III. Felicity Conditions for subjunctive conditionals
I will follow the ideas proposed by Stalnaker (1973, 1974), Karttunen (1974), and Heim
(1988, 1992), according to which for a sentence 5 to be felicitous in the context c, c must
entail the presuppositions required by 0. In the common ground theory of presuppositions
developed by Stalnaker, the common ground is the set of the speaker's presuppositions,
i.e. the set of propositions that the speaker's believes are assumptions shared by her and
her audience. Assertions are meant to update the common ground. If an assertion is made
and accepted, the common ground expands and the context set shrinks. Thus, if a
1o Helm's generalization, though, was based on examples where the presupposition triggering item was the
particle too, and for those examples it was in fact correct that no difference arises between non-past
subjunctive conditionals and mismatched past subjunctive conditionals. My proposal is based on the
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sentence 0 presupposes p, then asserting 0 requires that the common ground entails p,
that is to say, it requires that the speaker assume that it is true in the common ground that
p (modulo accommodation).11 It is explicit in Helm's context change semantics, and
implicit in Stalnaker's idea of a derived context, that a clause (precisely, the structural
description of a clause at the level of Logical Form) is not always evaluated with respect
to the utterance context. The context with respect to which a structure is evaluated
depends on the level of embedding of the clause, the most unembedded clause being
interpreted with respect to the main (utterance) context. The principle above can then be
reformulated as follows: what is responsible for the felicity of a sentence q is not whether
its presuppositions are entailed by the main context but whether they are entailed by the
evaluation context (which may be identical to the utterance time in some cases). Let us
call this principle PREP.
(21) Presupposition Principle (PREP)
For a sentence q to be uttered felicitously, the presuppositions of 0 have to
be entailed by the context of evaluation.
Let p be the set of worlds where O's presuppositions are true, and cn the context set at
time tn; then PREP requires that c,cp. Because PREP is true of any sentence 0, it will be
true of the antecedent of a conditional too. Once we have a theory of how to derive the
context of evaluation in each case, we come to realize that there is no conflict between
examples with lexical presuppositional items such as quit, and I will argue later that examples such as
Heim's seem to be counterexamples to my generalization for independent reasons.
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the fact that the antecedent of subjunctive conditional can be counterfactual and the fact
that the presuppositions of the antecedents have to hold.
Let 0 be the antecedent of a conditional and suppose that the felicity conditions
for the two types of subjunctive conditionals that we are studying have the following
structure.
(22) Felicity Conditions
A. Non-past subjunctive conditionals
0nc.? #•0
B. Mismatched past subjunctive conditionals
n C?, 0
What are the contexts relevant for these felicity conditions? Given that one-past
subjunctive conditional and MPSCs are felicitous in very different circumstances (in fact,
in the opposite circumstances), the contexts in A and B above must be different.
Answering this question is the objective of chapter 3 and chapter 4. I will start with the
one-past subjunctive conditional because they are a simpler case: once we have an
analysis of truth- and felicity- conditions on one-past subjunctive conditional, we will be
able to propose a semantic analysis for MPSCs.
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" Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1998, Stalnaker 2000). Karttunen (1974), Lewis (1979), Heim (1982,
PART II: WHAT LOOKS LIKE PAST IS PERFECT
I. Subjunctive Conditionals
The objective of this section is to understand what the past is the morphological
realization of in subjunctive conditionals and what it contributes to the composition of the
meaning of a subjunctive conditional. As Iatridou observes and as we discussed earlier in
this chapter, the past morphology is not interpreted temporally, as the event of playing
baseball in (2) is supposed to take place in the future (tomorrow). What follows in this
chapter is inspired by her work and by the intuition behind it, i.e. that the temporal
morphology we see in modal constructions actively contributes to the construction of the
modal meaning. However, I depart from her idea that tense morphology has a "core
meaning" that can apply to different kinds of entities (i.e. her idea that if it applies to
times, we have the temporal meaning of the piece of tense morphology; if it applies to
worlds, then we have the modal meaning of that very piece of morphology). My claim is
that tense (or aspectual) morphology has a single, definite interpretation: the temporal
one. The way tense morphology contributes to the composition of modal meaning is by
being interpreted in diferent positions in the structure of a modal sentence, i.e. either in
the restriction or in the nuclear scope of the modal operator.
Here, I argue that the past we see in the conditional above If Charlie played
tomorrow, we would loose the baseball game is the morphological realization of a perfect
operator interpreted in the modal domain. I will develop an analysis of the meaning of
.1983, 1992), Thomason (1990) and von Fintel (2000) also contributed important worl in the tradition of the
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subjunctive conditionals and show how it solves the puzzle of the presupposition
projection for subjunctive conditionals (Heim 1992).
II. The puzzle of subjunctive conditionals revisited
I have already presented the puzzle and the new presupposition data that called for a new
formulation of the puzzle in the preceding chapter, but for sake of clarity I will briefly
summarize it here. What is the set of worlds that the modal operator quantifies over? For
indicative conditionals it seems correct to say that the worlds that the modal operator
quantifies over must be epistemically accessible worlds, that is to say, worlds compatible
with the speaker's epistemic state (Stalnaker 1975). Restricting the quantification to
epistemically accessible worlds accounts for why the presuppositions of the antecedent
have to hold in the worlds quantified over and why the antecedent itself has to be
consistent with what the speaker knows. However, subjunctive conditionals turn out to
be more complicated. On one hand, we do not want the modal operator to quantify over
epistemically accessible worlds because typically the antecedent of a subjunctive
conditional is known to be inconsistent with the speaker's epistemic state. This is shown
below where that Charlie is alive is inconsistent with what is being assumed (that Charlie
is dead).
(23) Charlie is dead. If he were alive, he would come to the ceremony.
common ground theory of presuppositions.
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On the other hand, if we do not restrict the modal base to those worlds that are
epistemically accessible, i.e. if the modal base is empty (W), it is a mystery why
conditionals whose antecedents have presuppositions are felicitous at all, since W does
not have the right entailments. The following example shows that subjunctive
conditionals whose antecedents have presuppositions are indeed felicitous.
(24) Charlie smokes. If he quit smoking tomorrow, which he won't, he would run
the marathon.
In fact, not only can the presuppositions be entailed by the set of worlds we want to
quantify over, but they must be entailed. In the following example, the presupposition of
the antecedent - that Charlie smokes - is inconsistent with the background assumption
(that Charlie no longer smokes), and as a result the subjunctive conditional is infelicitous.
(25) Charlie quit smoking last year. #If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would not
run the marathon.
Heim (1992) discussed this puzzle and concluded that the only way to reconcile these two
requirements of subjunctive conditionals is to stipulate that the modal base is neither the
set of epistemically accessible worlds (the main context) nor the totally empty modal
base W, but the largest set of worlds obtained by suspending all the speaker's
assumptions except the presuppositions of the antecedent, which remain entailed. The
dilemma is the following. The set of worlds we need seems to have two irreconcilable
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properties: (a) it must be a set of worlds such that the (epistemically inaccessible)
antecedent can be consistent with it and (b) it must be a set of worlds such that the
presuppositions of the antecedent must be entailed by it.
Above, however, we discovered that the generalization that the presuppositions of
the antecedent must be entailed by the context holds for non-past subjunctive conditionals
but not for mismatched past subjunctive conditionals: in the latter ones, the
presuppositions of the antecedent can be inconsistent with the context. Thus, we have
three cases: first, the case of indicative conditionals, where the antecedent must be
consistent and its presuppositions must be entailed by the context; second, the case of
non-past subjunctive conditionals (one layer of past) where the antecedent can be
inconsistent but its presuppositions must be entailed by the context; third, the case of past
subjunctive conditionals (two layers of past) where neither the antecedent nor its
presuppositions must be compatible with the context. The objective of this chapter is to
account for all three cases.
III. Felicity Conditions for Conditionals
As we already explained, it seems correct to hold that for a sentence 0 to be felicitously
uttered in the context c, c must entail the presuppositions of . In the common ground
theory of presuppositions developed by Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1975), the common
ground is the set of all the propositions known or assumed to be true by all the
participants in the conversation, and the context set is the set of worlds where all the
propositions in the common ground are true. Assertions are meant to update the common
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ground. If the assertion is made and accepted, the common ground expands and the
context set shrinks. Thus, if a sentence 0 presupposes p, then asserting 0 requires that the
common ground entail p, i.e. it requires that the speaker assume that it is true in the
common ground that p, modulo accommodation. 12 It is explicit in Heim's context change
semantics (and implicit in Stalnaker's idea of a derived context) that a clause (that is to
say, the structural description of a clause at the level of Logical Form) is not always
evaluated with respect to the context of utterance: the context with respect to which a
structure is evaluated depends on the level of embedding of the clause, the most
unembedded clause being interpreted with respect to the main (utterance) context. We
can then reformulate the principle above: what is responsible for the felicity of a sentence
0 is not whether its presuppositions are entailed by the utterance context but whether they
are entailed by the evaluation context (which may be identical to the utterance time in
some cases). This is the principle that in chapter 2 we called 'Prep'.
(26) Presupposition Principle (PREP)
For a sentence 0 to be uttered felicitously, the presuppositions of 0 have to be
entailed by the context of evaluation.
Because Prep is true of any sentence e, it will be true of the antecedent of a conditional
too. 13 Because this will be true of the antecedent of any conditional, the difference
12 Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1988, 1998). Kartunnen (1974), Lewis (1979), Heim (1982, 1983,
1992), Thomason (1990) and von Fintel (2000) also contributed important work in the tradition of the
common ground theory of presuppositions.
"~ The claim that the presuppositions of the antecedent of a conditional have to be entailed by the context is
a standard claim of a dynamic approach tomeaning (Heim 1992). However, we will see later that the issue
is more intricate and I will have more to say on this topic later in this chapter.
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between the felicity of an indicative conditional and that of a subjunctive conditional
must be accounted for in some other way. In chapter 2 we already discussed Stalnaker
(1975)'s proposal: in indicative conditionals, the value of the selection function is
required to be an antecedent-world inside the context set, i.e. the value of the selection
function when applied to the actual world is required to be an epistemically accessible
world. As for subjunctive conditionals, the selection function may reach outside the
context set, i.e. the antecedent-world chosen by the selection function may be
epistemically inaccessible. Karttunen and Peters (1979) proposed a stronger constraint,
that is to say, that subjunctive conditionals are felicitous just in case the worlds in which
the antecedent is false are epistemically possible. However, this seems to strong, as
argued by von Fintel (1998). He considers sequences of conditionals like the following,
where it is not true that it is epistemically accessible that the antecedent is false because it
is not epistemically accessible that Uli did not make the amount of food that he made.
(27) If Polly had come to dinner tonight, we would have had a good time.
If Uli had made the same amount of food that he in fact made , she would
have eaten most of it.
Von Fintel proposal accounts for this sequence by requiring that a subjunctive conditional
is felicitous just in case the domain of quantification (and not the antecedent worlds) is
partly outside the context set. Others have suggested different constraints on the felicity
of subjunctive conditionals: Portner (1992) for example argues that a subjunctive
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conditional is felicitous only if there are no antecedent-worlds in the current context set,
allowing there to be multiple context sets to accommodate counterexamples.
My proposal is that the skeleton of the felicity conditions for the three kinds of
conditionals we are considering is the same, but what changes is the context set. In all the
three cases, the antecedent q is required to be compatible with some set of worlds. The
felicity condition for indicative conditionals is the easiest: it requires that the antecedent 0
be compatible with the main context (i.e. the context at the utterance time). The felicity
condition for non-past subjunctive conditionals (which from now on I will call one-past
subjunctive conditionals) requires that the antecedent be compatible with some context,
call it C3. Finally, the felicity condition for mismatched past subjunctive conditionals
(which from now on I will call two-pasts subjunctive conditionals) requires that the







In this picture, the context of evaluation of a subjunctive conditional is never the main
context. Furthermore, whether a subjunctive conditional has one layer of past
morphology or two layers of past morphology correlates with the selection of the context
of evaluation. It is therefore a pressing question what exactly these contexts are, and in
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order to answer this question, I will propose a compositional analysis of the meaning of
subjunctive conditionals. The point of the following discussion is to show that once we
replace the context of utterance with the context of evaluation, and once we have a theory
of what the context of evaluation is in each case, we come to realize that there is no
conflict between the fact that the antecedent can be counterfactual and the fact that the
presuppositions of the antecedents have to hold.
IV. What looks like past is perfect
I propose that the past morphology that we see in both the antecedent and the consequent
clause of a one-past subjunctive conditional is the morphological realization of a perfect
operator. The English perfect, especially the present perfect, has received a lot of
attention in the linguistic literature because of the properties that distinguish it from both
the present and the simple past tense. McCoard (1978) offers a survey of possible
theories of the perfect: the current relevance theory, the indefinite past theory, the
embedded past theory and, finally, the theory that he argues to be the best, the Extended
Now theory. Very briefly, the extended now theory is an analysis of the perfect as the
marker of prior events which are nevertheless included within the overall period of the
present, the "extended now".
The analysis of the perfect that I will assume here is a version of the Extended
Now theory (McCoard 1978, Dowty 1979, among others) suggested in Iatridou,
Anagnostopoulou and Izvorski (2001) and implemented and extended in von Fintel and
Iatridou (2002), and Iatridou (2002). According to this theory, the perfect sets up a time
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span (their version of the extended now), whose left boundary (LB) is determined by the
adverbial, and whose right boundary (RB) is determined by the tense of the perfect
(present for the present perfect, past for the past perfect, future for the future perfect).
Consider the two examples below, Existential and Universal perfect respectively.
(29) Since 1997, Lucy has been to NY once. (E)
(30) Lucy has been happy since Charlie gave her flowers. (U)
The universal interpretation of the perfect requires a predicate of which the subinterval
property holds (these could be stative predicates, or predicates that have been turned into
predicates with the subinterval property by operators like the progressive). The LF for the
universal sentence above will look as follows.
(31) LF for U-perfect
PRES
PERF
Since Charlie gave her flowers
Lucy be happy
The universal sentence will be true just in case there is an interval whose right boundary
is the utterance time and whose left boundary is the time at which Charlie gave Lucy
flowers, and Lucy is happy throughout that interval. This requires the perfect operator,
the left boundary and the right boundary to be defined as follows. The o symbol in the
entry of the present tense means 'overlap'.
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(32) [[PERF]] g c = XP<i,t. t.3t': RB(t, t') & P(t')=l
(33) LB(t,t') iff tnt'•0 & --,3t": t"< (tnt') & t''E t'
(34) RB(t,t') iff tnt'•# & -,3t": (tnt') >t" & t"'' t'
(35) [[PRES2]]g'c = g(2), defined only if g(2) o to
In the existential perfect, the right boundary of the time span will be the utterance time,
since the tense is present. The since-adverbial, on the other hand, determines the left
boundary of this interval. Informally, the sentence is true if there is a time during this
interval at which Lucy was in NY. The LF for Since 1997, Lucy has been in NY once will
be the following.




Lucy be in NY
The 3, operator will have the entry below.
(37) [[3=]] t = Xp<st.3t': tt' & p(t')=l
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, I suggest that the past morphology that
we see in both the antecedent and the consequent clause of a subjunctive conditional is
the morphological realization of the perfect operator introduced above. As I said earlier in
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this dissertation, temporal elements can be interpreted below a modal operator (in the
proposition expressed by the sentence without the modal) or in the modal domain. My
claim is that the perfect that occurs in subjunctive conditionals is interpreted in the modal
domain. The next sections will address the question of what it means for a perfect to be
interpreted in the modal domain.
IV.1 The semantic analysis of Subjunctive Conditionals
I shall assume the structure of a conditional sentence argued for in Kratzer (1981), (1986)
and (1991). In the same vein as Lewis (1975)'s treatment of adverbs of quantification,
Kratzer does not analyze the connective if as a two-place operator taking the antecedent
and the consequent as its arguments. Instead, a conditional sentence is analyzed as a
tripartite structure: the if-clause is interpreted as the restriction of a possibly covert modal
operator, whereas the consequent is interpreted in the nuclear scope. Thus, the structure
determined by a modal operator is similar to any other quantificational structure. This
applies to conditionals sentences as well as any other modal structure. To illustrate this
proposal, consider the following modal sentence.
(38) Charlie must be here
As the semantic structure of this sentence shows, the accessibility relation R restricts the
quantification over worlds: R is a relation between worlds that determines which worlds
arethe relevant worlds. 14' 15
14 Here I am assuming a structure where world variables are syntactically present at the level of logical









According to the most conservative view of the inner structure of the accessibility
relation, R is just a binary relation between worlds. For example, assuming that the modal
must is interpreted epistemically, the accessibility relation will have the entry in (39). If w
stays free, it will be interpreted as referring to the actual world.
(40) R = Lw.Xw'. w' is compatible with that the speaker knows in w.
The modal must has the lexical entry in (41). At the end of the semantic composition, the
modal sentence will have the truth-conditions in (42).
(41) [[must]] = kpe D<s,t>.Xqe D<s,t>.Vwe W[p(w)= 1 - q(w)= 1]
(42) [[Charlie must be here]]w =1 iff for all the worlds w' compatible with what
the speaker knows in w, Charlie is here in w'.
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15 s is the type of a world; <s,t> is the type of a proposition (a function from possible worlds to truth-
values); t is the type of a truth-value.
However, for reasons that will become clearer as the discussion proceeds, we have to
assume that accessibility relations are not binary relations between worlds but ternary
relations between worlds and time, so that the lexical entry for the accessibility relation R
is as follows.
(43) R = Xw.Xt.Xw'. w' is relevantly accessible from w at t.










The structure below shows the compositional analysis of a conditional structure where a
past tense has been interpreted inside the accessibility relation. The node labeled a is the
antecedent, which combines with the (already saturated) accessibility relation by












Now, my proposal is that the perfect operator is not interpreted within the proposition
expressed by the consequent clause but it provides the time argument of the accessibility
relation. We could implement this proposal by generating the perfect operator inside the
accessibility relation (where x occurs in the structure above), and then adjoining it to the
top of the structure for reason of interpretation (the perfect operator being a quantifier








However, this does not seem a very attractive operation, as the nature of this movement is
syntactically obscure. Instead, I will choose a second option in which the perfect operator
is base-generated at the top of the structure, while still being interpreted as the argument
of the accessibility relation. The structure and the semantic computation is shown in the
tree below. I will explain the structure in greater detail below. Here, I would like to draw
the reader's attention to the close parallelism between the structure of a subjunctive
conditional below and the structure of the Existential-perfect we gave above. In both
structures, a perfect operator occurs below tense, and the existential quantifier 3, occurs
lower in the structure and takes the relevant proposition as it argument (in the case of the
E-perfect, the proposition was that one expressed by the tenseless sentence; in the case of
the subjunctive conditional, the proposition is more complex as it includes accessible
worlds where 0 is true). The variable x argument of the accessibility relation R ranges
over times. The world argument of R is the actual world w, by default.
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(47)
3t3: RB(tc,t 3) & Vw[3ti: t3Dtl & w is accessible from wc at t1 and 4 is true in w
and w resembles w, no less than any other world - >y is true in w ]
tc Xt6.3t3: RB(t 6,t3) & Vw[3tl:t3tl & w is accessible from we at tl and 4 is true in
w and w resembles w0 no less than any other world --> is true in w ]
[[Perf]]g,c -
XP.Xt6.3t3: RB(t 6,t3) & P(t3)=1
Xt2- Vw[3tl: t2rtl & w is accessible from we at tl and 4 is true in w
and w resembles w. no less than any other world -- > i is true in w ]
Xt2 [...] Vw[3:t1:t2t & w is accessible from w, at tl and 4 is
true in w and w resembles we no less than any other
world - is true in w ]
Xq.Vw[3tl:t2ptl & w is accessible from w, at tl [[y]]g'C = Xw6. w6 E
and 4 is true in w and w resembles we no less
than any other world ->q(w)]
[[Modall]]g,•
Xp.Xq.Vw[p(w) ---q(w)]
Xws. B3t:t 2 Dt & w5 is accessible from we at tl and 4 is true in w5
and w5 resembles wc no less than any other world accessible
from w, at some subinterval of t2 and in which 4 is true.
[[Sim]]gc -
Xp.Xws. ws•ep and w5 resembles w, no
less than any other world in p XW4.3tl: tQtl & [Xt5s.w 2. w2 is
accessible from wc at t5 and 4 is true
in W2](tl)(W4)=
=Xw 4.tl 1:t2 rt 1 & w4 is accessible
from w, at tl and 4 is true in w4
[[3]]g = kP<i<s>>.w 4.3ti: t22tl & P(tl)(w4) Xt5-. w2. w2 is accessible from
w0 at t5 and is true in w2.
Xts.[...] kW2.w 2 is acc. from w, at x5
and 0 is true in w2
Xw2. w2 is accessible from we at x5  [[=]]g' = Xw3. W3 E•
Lt4.Xw2. w2 is accessible from we at t4  x5
[[R]]g.c = wa
,wl..t4.W2. W2 2 iS accessible from wl at t4
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Given an evaluation world w and time t, the relevantly accessible worlds are those worlds
that are compatible with what is still possible in w at t: as time goes by and as the set of
propositions true in the actual world expands, possibilities get foreclosed which means
that the set of worlds compatible with the actual world shrinks over time. Thus, the kind
of notion of accessibility that we are interested in is time-dependent. I shall go back to a
discussion of this notion in chapter 4. Let us go over the structure above in more detail.
Now, as the reader can see from the structure above, since the variable which saturates
the time argument of the accessibility relation gets bound by the 3, operator and because
of the definition of the 3,, which worlds are accessible is evaluated not with respect to
the whole interval (introduced by the perfect operator) but with respect to each
subinterval of this interval. Moreover, the antecedent 0 is added not to the set of all
worlds accessible from the interval, but is added to each set of worlds accessible at
subintervals of this interval. Thus, whatever requirements need to be satisfied when
adding the antecedent to the set of accessible worlds, they will need to be satisfied at the
subinterval level. This point will be important later in the discussion. As for the perfect
operator, it builds an interval whose right boundary is determined by the c-commanding
tense. In the structure above, it was the utterance time.
(48) t3
t IlllI lll lllIlill lll1-tl •
Informally, the truth-conditions of a one-past subjunctive conditional will require that it
be true just in case there is an interval t3 whose right boundary is the utterance time and
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such that in all the possible worlds w such that there is a subinterval of this interval at
which w is accessible and such that the antecedent 0 is true in w and w is maximally
similar to the actual world, the consequent yis true in w.
(49) [[If would y]]C = 1 iff 3t3: RB(tc,t3 ) & Vw[3tl: t3ptl & w is accessible
from w, at tl and 4 is true in w and w resembles we no less than any other
world - is true in w ]
I will go back to what it means for a world to be accessible in chapter 4: briefly, a world
is accessible if it is compatible with what is possible in the actual world at some"
particular time.
Before turning to the issue of the felicity conditions of subjunctive conditionals
and before showing that this proposal accounts for the facts without stipulations, let me
give an analysis of two-pasts subjunctive conditionals, i.e. the mismatched kind we began
with in chapter 2.
We can put the present proposal as follows: the perfect operator is the hallmark of
subjunctive conditionals. Thus, two-pasts subjunctive conditionals will have to have the
perfect operator too. But what is the role of the second layer of past morphology? Is the
past real or fake?
(50) If Charlie had quit smoking tomorrow, he would not have run the marathon.
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My proposal is that the past tense is real and it modifies a time, but, as we just saw, this
time cannot be the time at which some eventuality took place (since it is possible to have
a future adverb locating that eventuality in the future). Hence, the past must modify some
other time. Which time? The conditional above will have the structure here below.





The perfect operator - the hallmark of subjunctive conditional - occurs in usual position
but this time the right boundary of the interval built by the operator will be a past time
since the tense above the operator is past. Hence, we have the answer to the question we
asked above: the role of past is to set up the right boundary of the interval.
I adopt a variant of the referential analysis of tense developed by Partee (1973),
En§ (1987) and Kratzer (1998). Heim (1994) suggested that tense be interpreted as a
presupposition, in a way analogous to the interpretation of gender features for pronouns
(Heim and Kratzer 1998). For example, a sentence in the past tense will be defined only
if there is a contextually salient past time.
(52) [[PERF]] g c' = XP. 2t. ±t4: RB(t,t4) & tct4 & P(t4)=l
[[PAST2]] g' -= defined only if g(2)<te; if defined, [[PAST]] g' c = g(2)
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(53) t4
t, t2  tu
Thus, what we have in the modal domain of a two-pasts subjunctive conditional is a real
past perfect. The truth-conditions for a two-pasts subjunctive conditional are shown
below.
(54) [[If would have y]] = 1 iff 3t 4 : RB(tc,t 4) & Vw[3tl: t4 _tl & w is
accessible from w, at t, and c is true in w and w resembles w, no less than
any other world - ~y is true in w ]
To sum up my proposal, I have proposed that the essential component of subjunctive
conditionals is a perfect operator interpreted at the top of the modal structure and
contributing to the interpretation of the accessibility relation. In one-past subjunctive
conditional, where the only past you see is in fact the perfect in disguise, the right
boundary of the interval is set to the utterance time by default. However, in two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals, what you see is in fact a past perfect, where the past sets the
right boundary to a time before the utterance time.
We know that the past tense can be interpreted as part of the proposition
expressed. If I utter the sentence Charlie flew his kite, I am saying that what is past is the
flying of the kite. However, it does not follow that the past tense must be interpreted that
way. Consider the modal sentence below. This sentence is ambiguous. In one reading, the
sentence means that it is possible now that Charlie left or has left. This is the epistemic
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reading. 16 In the other reading, the sentence means that it was possible at some past time
that Charlie would leave. This is the metaphysical reading.
(55) Charlie could have left.
(i) It is possible now that Charlie (has) left. (EPI)
(ii) It would have been possible for Charlie to leave (META)
As the paraphrases are meant to show, the difference between the epistemic and the
metaphysical readings that we want to focus on lies in the scope relation between the
modal and the past tense (I take the auxiliary have to be the realization of the past
tense)." In the epistemic reading, the modal takes scope over the past. In the
metaphysical reading, it is the past to take scope over the modal. Because in the epistemic
reading the past is interpreted in the proposition, a future adverb like tomorrow is only
compatible with the metaphysical reading of the sentence.
16 Actually, the epistemic reading should not be paraphrased as we did above ("It is possible now that
Charlie left") and it does not talk about what is possible now: as the presence of two payers of past
indicates, even when one layer of past is interpreted below the modal, one is still the realization of the
perfect above the modal, exactly like a one-past indicative conditionals. Thus, the correct epistemic
paraphrase for the modal sentence above would be "It could be that Charlie left".
17 We will go back to this point in chapter 3, but for the time being notice that the auxiliary have generally
instantiates the perfect. However, there are many cases where the perfect morphology is actually
interpreted as past. For example, consider the following sequence-of-tense example:
(i) Yesterday, Charlie told me that Sally had left last Monday.
Charlie: "Sally left last Monday"
Charlie: # "Sally has left last Monday"
The pluperfect (past perfect) in the indirect speech can only correspond to a use of the simple past tense in
the direct speech, as shown by the incompatibility of the present perfect with the adverb lastMonday. See
chapter 5 for more on past and perfect and their morphological realization.
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(56) Charlie could have left tomorrow. (META; *EPI)
It would have been possible for Charlie to leave tomorrow.
In other languages, the two readings of the sentence above are actually expressed by
different forms, which transparently show where the past is interpreted with respect to the
modal. Consider the case of Italian:
(57) a. Carlo sarebbe potuto partire. (META)
Carlo be-cond can-past part leave-inf
'Carlo could have left'
b. Carlo potrebbe essere partito. (EPI)
Carlo can-cond be-inf leave-past part
'Carlo could have left'
In the (a) sentence, only the main verb in its infinitival form partire 'to leave' occurs in
the scope of the modal. Both the auxiliary 'to be' and the past (realized by the conditional
mood) occur above the modal, which - being a main verb in Italian - is realized as past
participle (as happens to main verbs in English when they occur in the scope of have).'8
Thus, we have the metaphysical reading. On the other hand, in the (b) sentence, the past
(realized, as in English, by an auxiliary) occurs in the scope of the modal, and no
auxiliary occurs above it. Thus, we only have the epistemic reading. Interestingly, if we
now add a future adverb to the Italian epistemic sentence in (b), we get nonsense. This is
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shown in (a) below. However, the future adverb is perfectly compatible with the
metaphysical sentence in (b).
(58) a. #Carlo potrebbe essere partito domani.
#It's possible now that Carlo left tomorrow
b. Carlo sarebbe potuto partire domani.
It would have been possible for Carlo to leave tomorrow.
The paraphrase and the compatibility with the future adverb tomorrow clearly show that
in the metaphysical reading, the past is not interpreted in the complement of the modal
verb (as in the epistemic reading, where the future adverb cannot in fact occur).
IV.2 Context sets and felicity conditions
I am now in a position to spell out the felicity conditions for the three types of
conditionals, which I repeat here for convenience. For all conditionals, it is required that
the antecedent 0 be compatible with the context set. The difference among the three cases






18 This will become much clearer in chapter 3. For the present discussion, it is enough to say that the past is




The context sets c,, c3 and c4 are sets of worlds w such that there is a time during a certain
interval such that w is epistemically accessible at that time and such that the antecedent 0
is true in w. In other words, context sets c (whether it is c,, c3, or c4) are sets of all the
worlds accessible at any time during a certain interval. The piece of structure that
corresponds to these sets is the following.
(60) Xw4-3tl:t2 tl1 & w4 is accessible
from we at tl and 0 is true in w4
[[3=]] g C = Xts5.Xw. w2 is accessible from
XP<i<st>.Xw4.3tI: t2-tl & P(tl)(W4) Wc at t5 and 0 is true in w2.
Xts.[...] XW2.W 2 is acc. from w, at x5
and 0 is true in w2
Xw2. W2 is accessible from w, at x5  [[ý]]gc = Xw 3. w3 e
Xt4 .w2.- w2 is accessible from wc at t 4  x5
[[R]] g' c = Wc
Xwl .Xt4.Xw2. w2 is accessible from wl at t4
When no perfect and 3 , operators occur, the time argument of the accessibility relation is
the utterance time by default. In this case, the context set is c, (current context), i.e. the
set of all theworld compatible with what the speaker knows at the utterance time. This is
what happens in indicative conditionals since there is no perfect or past that contributes to
complicated.
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the interpretation of the accessibility relation. As for one-past subjunctive conditionals,
the perfect and the 3 , operators are interpreted as part of the accessibility relation: hence,
C3 must be the set of worlds compatible with what the speaker knows during the interval
t3 built by the perfect, whose right boundary is the utterance time. Finally, in two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals, a perfect operator and a past occur, both contributing to the
definition of an accessible world: thus, c4 must be the set of worlds compatible with what
the speaker knew during the interval t4 whose right boundary is a time earlier than now.
This is summarized below.
(61) Context of evaluation
c, = { wW: w is compatible with the speaker's knowledge at t }
c3 = {wE W: 3t1 :t•ct 3 & w is compatible with the speaker's knowledge at t, }
c4 = {wE W: 3t,:tlCt4 & W is compatible with the speaker's knowledge at ti}
Given the structure of a conditional, the felicity requirement that the antecedent be
compatible with the relevant context set is basically the requirement that the restriction of
the modal operator not be empty, which we may view as a particular case of the more
general restriction that quantifiers not have an empty domain.' 9
During our discussion in the previous and current chapters, it has become clear
that any good theory of subjunctive conditionals must be able to account for two facts: (i)
the puzzle of subjunctive conditionals and (ii) the felicity difference between one-past
subjunctive conditionals and two-pasts subjunctive conditionals. Let us start with the first
fact.
19 Thanks to Irene Heim for pointing this out.
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V. The puzzle of subjunctive conditionals solved
Whereas the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional can be inconsistent with the
speaker's epistemic state, the presuppositions of the antecedent cannot. This was the
dilemma we described at the beginning of this chapter. The set of worlds we need seems
to have two irreconcilable properties: (a) it must be a set of worlds such that the possibly
epistemically inaccessible antecedents can be consistent with it and (b) it must be a set of
worlds such that the presuppositions of the antecedent must be entailed by it. The pair
below exemplified this puzzle: in the first conditional, that Charlie is alive is known to be
false, but the subjunctive conditional is felicitous; however, the fact that it is known that
Charlie does not smoke (and will not smoke tomorrow) causes the infelicity of the second
subjunctive conditional.
(62) Charlie is dead. If he were alive, he would come to the ceremony.
(63) Charlie quit smoking last year. #If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would not
run the marathon.
The proposal presented above solves this dilemma. Consider again the piece of the
structure corresponding to the context set.
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(64) XW4.3t 1:t2 tl1 & w4 is accessible
from we at t1 and 0 is true in w4
[3,11]]g,c = t5s.w 2.- 2 is accessible from
XP<i<s<>>.XW4.3t 1: t2 rt1 & P(tl)(w 4) wc at t5 and 0 is true in w2.
t 5.[...] XW 2.W2 is acc. from wc at x5
and 4 is true in w2
Xw2. w2 is accessible from w, at x5  [[fl]] gc = Xw3. w3 eC)
Xt4.•w 2. W2 is accessible from w, at t4  X5
[[R]] gc w = We
kwl1 .t 4.Xw 2-w2 is accessible from wl at t4
The time argument of the accessibility relation is not the interval itself but a variable that
will range over subintervals of the interval and will be existentially closed by the 3,
operator. In the end, the outcome will still be the set of worlds accessible at any time
during the interval, but merging the antecedent before merging the 3, operator means
that the antecedent is added to the set of worlds accessible at each subinterval of the
interval and, consequently, it requires that for this operation to be well-defined the
presuppositions of the antecedent must be entailed by each set of accessible worlds. 20 It
follows that the presuppositions of the antecedent must be entailed throughout the
interval. 21 Hence, the left boundary of the interval cannot precede the time at which the
presuppositions of the antecedent became true.
Now we have the tools to account for one of the examples in the pair we gave
above.
20 Later we will see that something needs to be said about the entailment requirement. See section VII.
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(65) Charlie quit smoking last year. #If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would not
run the marathon.
The presupposition of the antecedent - that Charlie smokes tomorrow - must be entailed
by each set of worlds epistemically accessible at some time during the interval. Because
in one-past subjunctive conditionals the right boundary of the interval is the utterance
time, the set of worlds accessible at the utterance time will be one of them. Thus, it is
required that what the speaker knows at the utterance time entails the presupposition that
Charlie smokes tomorrow. But in our example below, it does not. Hence, the sentence is
infelicitous.
The felicity of the example below also follows from our account. The antecedent
does not carry presuppositions, so PREP, the principle that requires that the
presuppositions of the antecedent be entailed by c3, is vacuously met (c3 ;CW). In this case,
the left boundary will be some time immediately before Charlie's death.
(66) Charlie is dead. If he were alive tomorrow, he would come to the ceremony.
These observations about the presuppositions and the interval created by the perfect help
us strengthen the comparison between the standard interpretation of the perfect and the
modal one. This is why. We said above that the right boundary of the interval is set by the
tense of the perfect construction (the utterance time in the present perfect, some past time
in the past perfect). We did not say much about the left boundary. In the perfect sentence
21 This point (that the presuppositions must be entailed throughout the interval) needs some clarification.
See below for more.
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Since 1997, Lucy has been to NY once the left boundary is determined by the since
adverbial, i.e. it is going to be some time within the year 1997, so that the interval will be
the time span between this time and the utterance time. However, there may be no overt
adverbial setting the left boundary of the interval, as in the following sentence.
(67) Lucy has visited Boston once.
As observed by IAI (2000), this sentence means that during her lifetime, Lucy was once
in Boston. Thus, the left boundary of the interval is Lucy's birth. Because the right
boundary of the interval is set by the present tense, the sentence requires that Lucy's
lifetime include the utterance time, i.e. that Lucy be still alive now. We can put this
differently. Recall that, following Musan (1997), I assume that most predicates carry the
presupposition that their subject is alive or in existence at the time at which they are said
to satisfy the predicate. Hence, we may think of the interval created by the perfect
operator as the interval throughout which the presupposition of the sentence in question
holds, and whose left boundary cannot precede the time at which the presupposition held
for the first time. In Lucy has visited Boston, this gives us an interval such that it is true
throughout it that Lucy is alive (Lucy's existence). In a sentence like The meteor has hit
the earth once, the interval will be determined by the meteor's existence. The contrast
below (Chomsky 1970) also follows.
(68) #Einstein has visited Princeton.
(69) Princeton has been visited by Einstein.
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Consider the infelicitous sentence first. The presupposition of this sentence is that
Einstein is alive and this presupposition must be true throughout the interval created by
the perfect. Because the interval includes the utterance time (its right boundary is the
utterance time), it follows that the presupposition has to be true now too, which is
inconsistent with what we know, i.e. that Einstein is dead now. As in the case of
subjunctive conditionals the presuppositions of the antecedent must hold throughout the
interval whose left boundary is the time at which they were first entailed by the context,
in standard perfect sentences the presuppositions of the sentence have to hold throughout
the interval introduced by the perfect operator whose left boundary is the time at which
these presuppositions first held.
Notice that the requirement that the presuppositions hold throughout the interval
raise one issue having to do with the presence of the existential quantifier. We expect the
presuppositions of the proposition under an existential quantifier not to be universal: so in
the sentence A woman was talking to her sister, the presupposition is only that a woman
has a sister (and not that every woman has a sister). However, in the conditional cases
that we are considering, the presuppositions have a universal force. I do not know why
this is so, but notice that this is true of all the uses of the perfect, that is to say, it is true
not only of the modal (high) uses that I have suggested but also of the normal (low)
interpretation of the perfect in Lucy has been to Boston: this sentence requires that Lucy
be alive throughout the interval, and not just at some time, differently from the sentence
In 1990 Lucy went to Boston, where the only requirement is that she was alive at some
point in 1990. Therefore, although it is somewhat mysterious why such a requirement
holds of the perfect, that fact that it holds in subjunctive conditionals and in perfect
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sentences is further support for the claim that a perfect operator occurs in the structure of
subjunctive conditionals.
To conclude, I have proposed a theory that accounts for the puzzle of one-past
subjunctive conditionals. The set of worlds we needed seemed to be epistemically
accessible worlds since the presuppositions of the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional
had to be entailed by it. However, the set of worlds we needed could not possibly be the
set of epistemically accessible worlds since often the antecedent itself is known to be
false. The theory that I have argued for here solves this dilemma by appealing to the
work of a perfect operator interpreted as part of the definition of an accessible world. The
perfect operator builds an interval of time whose right boundary is the utterance time.
Thus, quantification will be restricted to 5-worlds accessible from the actual world at any
time during the interval. Crucially, O's presuppositions must be entailed by each set of
worlds epistemically accessible at some time during the interval: because the set of
worlds accessible at the utterance time is one of them, it follows that O's presuppositions
must hold at the utterance time as well. On the other hand, qi itself only has to be
compatible with this big set of worlds: it is sufficient that there be some world accessible
at some time during the interval, for the conditional to be felicitous; it is not required that
that time be the utterance time, though, which accounts for the fact that 0 could be known
to be false by the speaker, while the subjunctive conditional is still felicitous.
Let us now turn to the second fact we need to explain, i.e. the difference between
one-past and two-pasts subjunctive conditionals.
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VI. The felicity difference: one versus two layers of past
The question that we are now urged to answer is the following: given the infelicity of the
one-past subjunctive conditional we discussed above, why is the two-pasts subjunctive
conditional appropriate in the very same circumstances?
(70) Charlie quit smoking last year. #If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would not
run the marathon.
(71) Charlie quit smoking last year. If he had quit smoking tomorrow, he would
not have run the marathon.
As it should be by now familiar given the discussion above, the presuppositions of the
antecedent have to be checked at each time during the interval, i.e. they are required to be
entailed by each set of worlds epistemically accessible at some time during the interval. If
a second layer of past occurs, we have the structure of a past perfect, where the past is
higher than the perfect operator and provides the value for the right boundary of the
interval. More precisely, the right boundary will be the contextually salient past time, i.e.
the time immediately before which Charlie quit smoking last year. Because the right
boundary is a past time, the whole interval lies in the past. It follows that the
presuppositions of the antecedent do not have to be entailed by the set of worlds
accessible at the utterance time, since the utterance time is not a subinterval of c4: in our
example, what is required is that the presupposition that Charlie will smoke tomorrow is
entailed by the set of worlds accessible throughout the interval whose right boundary
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precedes the time when he quit smoking; it is not required that it be entailed by the set of
worlds accessible now.22 This explains why the mismatched past subjunctive conditional
is appropriate even if the speaker knows that the presupposition in the antecedent is false.
As for why it is appropriate only if the speaker knows that the presupposition is false
(modulo cancellation), we will explain it in the next chapter.
VII. Entailment and Accommodation: what you can and cannot accommodate
Let us go back to our familiar two-pasts subjunctive conditional, repeated below. As we
said before, the presuppositions need to be checked at each point during the interval, i.e.
they are required to be entailed by each set of worlds accessible at some time during the
interval. The right boundary of this interval is the time immediately before the time at
which Charlie quit smoking last year. Thus, at each time during the interval, Charlie
smokes.
(72) Charlie quit smoking last year. If he had quit smoking tomorrow, he would
have not run the marathon.
22 There is an issue here about this entailment requirement that I am assuming, which will be resolved
below when I will talk about accommodation. Properly speaking the set of worlds accessible at some time t
will include the set of worlds accessible at any time later than that. Thus, if some proposition is not entailed
by the set of worlds accessible now, then it could not have been entailed by the set worlds accessible at
some time earlier than now, contrary to what I have said above. What is crucial here is that at each time
what we consider is not really the totality of the worlds accessible then, but a subset of those worlds,
precisely the subset of worlds that entails the proposition in question. Because at time t we are considering
a subset of the accessible worlds then, if a proposition is entailed by this subset it may not be entailed by
the set of worlds accessible at any time later, because these worlds may not have been members of that
subset.
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However, there is problem. Although at each point in the interval Charlie smokes, it is
still not entailed by the set of epistemically accessible worlds at each time during the
interval that Charlie will be smoking tomorrow: in fact, at each subinterval of that past
interval, it was epistemically possible that Charlie would quit smoking last month or
maybe tonight. In other words, at each time during this past interval there are
epistemically accessible worlds where Charlie does not smoke tomorrow. Does this force
us to abandon the entailment requirement? Are we going to replace it with the weaker
compatibility requirement? I will first give an argument that we may keep the entailment
requirement. Then, I will give an argument that we must.
Let us begin with the 'may' argument. What can help us is accommodation.
Remember that each time during the interval is an evaluation point: the presuppositions
of the antecedent must be checked then. However, as we pointed out above, each set of
epistemically accessible worlds will include worlds where Charlie quits smoking after the
evaluation time (the subinterval) but before tomorrow. These are the worlds that need to
be eliminated if we want to keep the entailment requirement. Once we eliminate them,
what we are left with are worlds where Charlie smokes at the evaluation time and still
smokes tomorrow. If accommodation takes place, the set of accessible worlds will shrink
in the desired way. Indeed, we know that precisely this kind of accommodation must take
place in other more familiar subjunctive conditionals: suppose Charlie smokes now
(August), but it is not entailed by the context that Charlie will smoke this Christmas
because it is epistemically possible that Charlie will quit smoking in September. It is
nevertheless appropriate to utter the following subjunctive conditional.
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(73) If Charlie quit smoking this Christmas, he would please his grandmother.
All those worlds where he quits smoking between now and Christmas are de facto
eliminated, something that we can account for by assuming that accommodation has
taken place.
I believe that accommodation is in fact what goes on and that we should not give
up the entailment requirement in favor of the weaker compatibility requirement. The
reason is the following. Suppose that Charlie does not smoke now, and that I do not know
enough about him to have an opinion about whether he will or will not start smoking at
some point in the future. Even though it is compatible with what I know that there is
future time between now and Christmas when he will start smoking, if I do not know that
he will start smoking, I cannot appropriately say If he quit smoking this Christmas, he
would please his grandmother. Hence, a mere compatibility relation is not enough.
Furthermore, notice that it is important that accommodation is performed at each
point during the interval and not over the whole set of accessible worlds. As pointed out
to me by Irene Heim, if accommodation where allowed to be performed globally over the
whole set of worlds w such that there is a time during the interval at which w is
accessible, so as to eliminate all the unwanted worlds in the set, then the same kind of
global accommodation should be allowed to take place in one-past subjunctive




(74) Charlie quit smoking last year. #If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would not
run the marathon.
We argued that the problem with it is that the worlds epistemically accessible now are
worlds in which Charlie does not smoke tomorrow, even though c3 can contain
(epistemically inaccessible) worlds where 4 and its presuppositions are true. Now, if the
global accommodation we referred to above were possible, it would apply here, thus
eliminating all the epistemically accessible worlds where Charlie does not smoke
tomorrow, and only leaving in the context set worlds where he does smoke tomorrow. So,
if global accommodation occurred, the one-past subjunctive conditional would be
felicitous. But it is not. Hence, global accommodation cannot apply.
By merging the antecedent lower than the 3, operator, the structure proposed in
(47) allows accommodation to be performed precisely where we need it to be performed,
i.e. over each set of worlds accessible at some time during the interval and not over the
whole set of accessible worlds. This requires that at each time during the interval (which
in the example above includes the utterance time), there are some worlds where the
presuppositions of the antecedent are true.
VIII. A classification of conditionals
The proposal defended above is that the past and the perfect may contribute to the truth
and felicity conditions of conditional statements. Assuming that the absence of past is
interpreted as present, this picture allows for four combinations: (1) perfect but no past;
92
l__sqi~44(P~3~j~~_____LqBlbs/~b~p~ds~
(2) perfect and past; (3) no perfect and no past; (4) past but no perfect. My claim is that
all four possibilities are instantiated, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
When the perfect operator is present- but there is no past we have the structure of a one-
past subjunctive conditional, which I repeat below. When no past occurs the value of the
time argument of R will be the time of the context by default.




When both the perfect operator and the past are present, we have the structure of a two-
pasts subjunctive conditional, repeated below.
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1PastSC 2PastSC IndC ?
PERF YES YES NO NO
PAST NO YES NO YES
f





When neither the perfect nor the past occurs, we have the structure of an indicative
conditional. As shown in the structure below, the time argument of the accessibility
relation will be tc by default, and nothing else is needed. Thus, what distinguishes
indicative conditionals from subjunctive conditionals is that in indicative conditionals,
whatever time occurs in the antecedent (or consequent) is never interpreted outside the
proposition expressed by the clause; that is to say, it is never interpreted in the
accessibility relation. As a result, the value of the time argument of R is always tc, and




When the past but no perfect operator occurs, then we have the structure in (78). The
value of the accessibility relation is a (contextually salient) past time, thus, both the truth
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and the felicity conditions of this mysterious type of conditional will make reference to
this past time, and consequently, they will actually resemble the truth and felicity
conditions of two-pasts subjunctive conditionals. The question is whether there exists any
conditional whose structure looks like (78). I suggested elsewhere that the answer is yes
and that (78) is the structure of what I have elsewhere called imperfect conditionals, i.e. a
type of Italian conditionals where the imperfect tense occurs in both the antecedent and







Iatridou (2000) suggested that the presence of the past morphology in subjunctive
conditionals is not accidental and that past is the essential ingredient of counterfactuality.
Her idea is that the past that we see in a normal sentence such as Charlie played the game
yesterday and the past that we see in a subjunctive conditional such as If Charlie played
the game tomorrow, he would lose share some feature which is realized in the
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morphology by the past morpheme. This feature is abstract and is neither temporal nor
modal, even though it will be interpreted in either way.
My work is inspired by latridou's view. Like her, I take the past that occurs in
subjunctive conditionals to play an essential role by being what distinguishes a
subjunctive from an indicative conditional. However, my proposal is different from
Iatridou's in the following respects: temporal and aspectual morphemes used in modal
sentences are interpreted in the only way they could be interpreted, i.e. temporally or
aspectually. What is the difference between standard and modal uses of the
temporal/aspectual morphology? My proposal was that when tense, as well as aspectual
operators, can either be interpreted inside the proposition that is expressed by a sentence
as locating some eventuality in time or it can be interpreted as the time argument of the
accessibility relation, thus contributing to the restriction of the modal operator. This
analysis offered a way to solve the puzzle of presupposition projection on subjunctive
conditionals. Let us now move to mismatched past subjunctive conditionals and offer a
solution to the felicity puzzle we began with.
96
CHAPTER 4
TEMPORAL MISMATCHES IN SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS:
THE SOLUTION
I. Mismatched past subjunctive counterfactuals
Suppose that the future can semantically be analyzed as a modal and not as a tense. Thus,
tense can only be past or present. We can further simplify this picture by assuming that
the only real tense is past, present being the (default) interpretation given to a T node
marked as non-past. Given the quantificational structure that we are assuming for modal
sentences, the past can either be interpreted above the modal and its restriction or below
it. When it is interpreted below it, the past tense will refer to the time at which some
event took place: drawing an analogy between quantified DPs and modal operators, this
will be the interpretation of tense in Every kid flew his kite yesterday ([Q Every [RESTR
kid]][Ns fly-PAST his kite yesterday]) or the epistemic reading of the modal sentence in
(1).
(1) Charlie could have left.
As we said before, the past can be interpreted above the modal. When it does, it
contributes to the composition of the accessibility relation. By adding the adverb
97
tomorrow to the sentence above, we force the metaphysical reading (as the epistemic one
becomes impossible): Charlie could have left tomorrow says that it was possible at some
past time for Charlie to leave tomorrow (although it may not be possible now for Charlie
to leave tomorrow). As we already observed above, in the case of the metaphysical
reading of (1) the past cannot be interpreted in the nuclear scope of the modal operator,
since it would clash with the future adverb tomorrow. Thus, it must be interpreted in the
restriction.
The proposal that I made in the previous chapter is that in subjunctive
conditionals the past is interpreted as contributing to the internal composition of the
accessibility relation by providing a value for the right boundary of the perfect operator






Thus, the two-pasts subjunctive conditional If they had played the last game tomorrow,
Charlie's team would have won will have the structure below. As you can see, the only
difference between a two-pasts subjunctive conditionals and a one-past subjunctive
conditional is the presence versus absence (respectively) of a past tense above the perfect
operator, i.e. the temporal location of the right boundary of the perfect operator.
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(3)
3t4: RB(t2,t4) & Vw[3tl: t4 rtl & w is accessible from w, at tl and 4 is true in w
and w resembles w, no less than any other world - v is true in w ], defined only if g(2)<t,.
[[PAST 2]]g'e  Xt6.3t4: RB(t6 ,t3) & Vw[3tl:t 4 2Dt & W is accessible from w, at tl and ) is true in
w and w resembles w, no less than any other world -- W is true in w ]
[[Perf]]g c
XP.-t 6.3t 4: RB(t6,t4) & P(t4)=l
Xt2. Vw[3t•: t2 zt1 & w is accessible from w, at t1 and 4 is true in w
and w resembles wc no less than any other world -- i is true in w ]
Xst2. [...] Vw[3tl:t 22tl & w is accessible from wc at tl and 4 is
true in w and w resembles wc no less than any other
world -> is true in w ]
Xq.Vw[3tl:t2,?t & w is accessible from w, at tl [[tl]]gc = Xw6. w6 6E
and 4 is true in w and w resembles w, no less
than any other world -- q(w)]
[[Modal]]g,
Xp.q.Vw[p(w) -•q(w)]
ws5 . 3t1 :t1ot1 & w5 is accessible from we at tj and 4 is true in w5
and w5 resembles we no less than any other world accessible
from w, at some subinterval of t2 and in which 4 is true.
[[Sim]]gc=
4p.ws., W5E p and w5 resembles w, no
less than any other world in p Xw4 -3tl: t2ft1  & [Xt5 .Xw2. w2 is
accessible from w0 at t5 and 4 is true
in W2](tl)(W4)=
=Xw 4.3t1 :t2zDt & W4 is accessible
from wc at tl and 4 is true in W4
[[3_]] g' c = XP<i<st>>.Xw 4.3t1: t2ztl & P(tl)(w 4) ts5.-w;. w is accessible from
wc at t5 and 0 is true in w2.
t5-.[...] XW2.w 2 is acc. from w, at x5
and 4 is true in W2
Xw2. w2 is accessible from we at x5  [[1] ' - Xw3. w3 e
Xt4-hw2. w2 is accessible from we at t4 x5
[[R]] gt'  = wa
w •.1t4.•w2. w2 is accessible from wl at t4
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The truth-conditions for the two-pasts subjunctive conditional will be as follow.
(4) [[If they had played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would have
won]] g' c = 1 iff 3t4: RB(t 2 ,t4 ) & Vw[3t 1: t4 Dtl & w is accessible from wc at tl
and 4 is true in w and w resembles wc no less than any other world --+ y is
true in w ], defined only if g(2)<t,.
Informally, the truth-conditions above say that the two-pasts subjunctive conditional
above is true just in case there is an interval of time whose right boundary is some
contextually salient past time such that in all the possible worlds accessible from the
actual world at some time during the interval and such that it is true that they play the last
game tomorrow, it is also true that Charlie's team wins. This is all the semantics gives
you. For a world to be accessible from the actual time at some past time means that that
world is in the set of worlds compatible with what is still possible in the actual world at
that time: at each point in time, possibilities get foreclosed and, consequently, some
worlds that were compatible with the actual world at some time may become
incompatible with it at any later point.
In the next section I shall argue that this notion of accessibility is necessary and it
constitutes an argument against Lewis (1979)'s analysis of counterfactuals and in favor of
an analysis that Lewis himself discussed and dismissed. In doing so, I will also justify the
use of the notion of similarity that in the truth-conditions for subjunctive conditionals.
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II. Worlds and the direction of Time: Lewis (1979)
Lewis (1979) is concerned with the question of how the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence can be explained by a semantics analysis of counterfactual conditionals. By
the expression "the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence", Lewis refers to his view
according to which there is a counterfactual dependence in one direction of time (from
the past to the future) and counterfactual independence in the other direction (from the
future to the past). In other words, whereas it is reasonable to imagine that if the present
were different, the future would be different too, it is not as reasonable to suppose that if
the present were different, then the past would be different too.
The objective of a good semantic analysis of subjunctive conditionals must
account for this asymmetry. The first semantic analysis that Lewis considers builds this
asymmetry into the analysis itself.
(5) ANALYSIS 1. Consider a counterfactual "If it were that A, then it would be that
C" where A is entirely about affairs in stretch of time tA. Consider all those
possible worlds w such that:
(1) A is true at w;
(2) w is exactly like our actual world at all times before a transition period
beginning shortly before tA;
(3) w conforms to the actual laws of nature at all times after tA;
(4) during tA and the preceding transition period, w differs no more from our
actual world than it must to permit A to hold.
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The counterfactual is true if and only if C holds at every such world w.
Analysis 1 guarantees that the worlds you will be considering are worlds as close as the
actual world as possible up to (shortly before) tA, the time at which the situation
described in the antecedent is supposed to take place. If tc follows tA, then C may be false
at our world, since the actual world is like the possible worlds in which A is true only up
to tA. However, if tc precedes tA, then because of point (2) of Analysis 1, C will have to
be true in the actual world too. Thus, the counterfactual asymmetry is guaranteed.
Lewis has some arguments against Analysis 1. For example, one argument is that
Analysis 1 is built for a special case, that is to say, for cases where the hypothetical
situation is about a particular time. However, there are suppositions that are not about
particular times, i.e. the examples below.
(6) If kangaroos had no tails ..
(7) If gravity went by the inverse cube of distance ..
I will not have anything to say here about the case of timeless suppositions illustrated in
the examples above.23
The semantic analysis that Lewis considers to be correct is one which is based on
comparative similarity of possible worlds.
23 Actually, I may have something to say about examples like (102)-(103), but I will postpone presenting
my remarks to the next chapter.
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(8) ANALYSIS 2. A counterfactual "If it were that A, then it would be that C" is
(non-vacuously) true if and only if some (accessible) world where both A
and C are true is more similar to our actual world, overall, than is any world
where A is true but C is false.
Overall similarity among worlds is clearly a vague notion. And in fact Lewis takes this to
be a good aspect of the theory since counterfactuals are vague. However, something has
to be said about what sort of similarity relation can be combined with Analysis 2 to
obtain what Lewis calls he standard resolution of vagueness: "one that invalidates back-
tracking arguments, one that yields an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence except
perhaps under special circumstances, one that agrees with Analysis 1, our asymmetry-by-
fiat analysis, whenever it ought to" [Lewis 1986: 42-43].
"If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over" seems true. Still, if kangaroos
had no tails but used crutches, they would not topple over. "If Nixon had pressed the
button there would have been a nuclear holocaust" also seems true. But, again, if Nixon
had pressed the button but the fatal signal had vanished on its way from the button to the
rockets, there would not have been a nuclear holocaust. Which worlds are to count as the
most similar worlds to the actual world in order for the conditionals above to come out
true? Lewis' recipe comes in four points, in order of priority.
(9) SIMILARITY FUNCTION.
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations
of law.
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(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.
The claim that I would like to argue for here is twofold. The first part of the claim is that
Lewis' Analysis 2 cannot account for the meaning of mismatched past subjunctive
conditionals. More generally, it cannot account for the difference between non-past
subjunctive conditionals and mismatched past subjunctive conditionals. The second part
of the claim is that Analysis 1 can and, as such, it to be preferred.
II.1 Overall similarity is not enough
Charlie's team won the final game yesterday. They say it is because Charlie did not pitch.
Imagine a world wj in which Charlie's team plays the final game tomorrow. We don't
want w, to be a world where the actual laws are violated: for example, we do not want wj
to be a world in which you can actual play the same game twice. Thus, w, had better be a
world in which they did not play yesterday. Good. So, we now have the closest possible
world to the actual world that meets the priorities listed in (9).
(10) If Charlie's team had played the final game tomorrow, they would have lost.
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Analysis 2 seems correct for the mismatched past subjunctive conditional above: the
conditional is true just in case Charlie's team loses in the world wl most similar to the
actual world where they play the final game tomorrow. The definition of the similarity
function guarantees that the conditional above comes out true by excluding worlds where
they (also) played the final game yesterday (worlds where you can do the same action
twice are worlds that do not obey the actual laws), as well as worlds where they play
tomorrow but - say - the other team best pitcher is ill and does not play (and so Charlie's
team wins).
The problem is that the existence of this world w, which is the world closest to the
actual world according to the right weighs and priorities, does not account for the felicity
difference between the two types of subjunctive conditionals we have been investigating
in this chapter, i.e. mismatched past subjunctive conditionals and non-past subjunctive
conditionals. Below is the non-past version of the subjunctive conditional above: as we
are familiar from the previous discussion, in the scenario described above, the non-past
subjunctive conditional is infelicitous.
(11) #If Charlie's team played the final game tomorrow, they would lose.
Lewis' Analysis 2 does not account for the difference in appropriateness. It predicts that
the two subjunctive conditionals should pattern alike. After all, what is the difference if
all there is to consider is overall similarity between worlds?
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11.2 The time of the divergence
We need our modified Analysis 1, pace Lewis. Consider the two subjunctive conditionals
discussed above. Recall that the problem Analysis 2 faces is that it does not seem to be
able to distinguish between the two types of subjunctive conditionals below.
Consequently, it does not seem to be able to account for why one but not the other is
infelicitous, let alone correlate this difference with the different tense morphology that
they employ.
(12) If Charlie's team had played the final game tomorrow, they would have lost.
(13) #If Charlie's team played the final game tomorrow, they would lose.
As it stands, Analysis 1 does not do much better: if we keep Lewis' definition - which I
repeat below - both conditionals are predicted to pattern alike. This is because the time of
the divergence between the actual world and the possible worlds being considered is the
time at which the situation described in the antecedent is supposed to take place. In both
conditionals, this time is tomorrow. Thus, in both cases the possible worlds most similar
to the actual world are identical to the actual world up to (some time) tomorrow, when
they diverge from the actual course of events. But, then, again we predict both types
(two-pasts and one-past subjunctive conditionals) to be true and felicitous.
(14) ANALYSIS 1. Consider a counterfactual "If it were that A, then it would be
that C" where A is entirely about affairs in stretch of time tA. Consider all
those possible worlds w such that:
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(1) A is true at w;
(2) w is exactly like our actual world at all times before a transition period
beginning shortly before tA;
(3) w conforms to the actual laws of nature at all times after tA;
(4) during tA and the preceding transition period, w differs no more from our
actual world that it must to permit A to hold.
The counterfactual is true if and only if C holds at every such world w.
However, there is a way to amend Analysis 1 while keeping the core of the analysis, i.e.
the reference to a specific time in the semantics. My proposal is that the time of the
divergence should not be the time that the supposition is about (i.e. the time at which the
hypothetical situation is supposed to hold or take place) but the time argument of the
accessibility relation. In turn, the time argument of the accessibility relation is determined
by the tense of the subjunctive conditional, as I proposed in section VII and VIII. In the
two-pasts subjunctive conditionals (below), the second layer of past is interpreted outside
the proposition expressed by the antecedent and provides the value for the time argument
of the accessibility relation R.
(15) If Charlie's team had played the final game tomorrow, they would have lost.













(17) [[If they had played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would have
lost]]g. = 1 iff 3t 4: RB(t 2,t4) & Vw[3tl: t4Dtl & w is accessible from w, at tl
and 4 is true in w and w resembles we no less than any other world -4i is
true in w ], defined only if g(2)<tc.
Assume, as I did before, the referential analysis of tense. The past time in the
accessibility relation will be the contextually salient past time at which something
happened that foreclosed the possibility that they play the final game tomorrow, i.e.
yesterday, when they actually played the final game. This is the time at which the
possible worlds that we are quantifying over in the truth-conditions of the two-pasts
subjunctive conditional diverge from the actual world.
One consequence of this analysis is that which time is the time of the divergence
is determined by the tense of the subjunctive conditional: it is a past time only if there is a
pluperfect in the antecedent. It follows that a one-past subjunctive conditional, where
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there is no second layer of past (no pluperfect), will necessarily quantify over possible
worlds that diverge from the actual world at whatever time is the time argument of the
accessibility relation.
(18) If Charlie's team played the final game tomorrow, they would lose.
In my previous discussion, I have proposed that in one-past subjunctive conditionals the
right boundary of the interval of time that the perfect introduces is the utterance time.
Suppose that the time at which the possible worlds may have diverged from the actual
world is the left boundary of the interval. 24
(19) [[If they played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would win]]g~ =
1 iff VweW[ w is accessible from w, at g(2) and they play the last game
tomorrow in w - Charlie's team wins in w], g(2)=tc
If the worlds may have diverged at any time during the interval of time introduced by the
perfect, then we can account for the felicity of the following conditional in a situation in
which it is known that Zack is dead.
(20) Zack is dead. If he were alive, he would be eighty-six years old.
24 The requirement in this case has to be formulated negatively: it is required that the worlds have not yet
diverged from the actual world at the utterance time. It is not required that they diverge at the utterance
time: they may diverge any time between the utterance time and the future time of the supposition, or they
many not diverge at all (if the antecedent of the one-past subjunctive conditional turns out to be true).
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The actual world is such that Zack died as some point in the past. However, the set of
worlds we are quantifying over includes worlds accessible at any time during the interval:
because it is always possible to go back in time so as to find an antecedent-world, this set
will include worlds accessible at some time immediately before the time of the
divergence, i.e. the time at which Zack died. These are worlds where he did not die then
and is alive now.
In other words, quantifying over worlds accessible during the time span set up by the
perfect operator allows to quantify over worlds accessible before the time of the
divergence even in the case of one-past subjunctive conditionals.
However, if the subjunctive conditional above is felicitous why is the following
subjunctive conditional infelicitous in a situation in which it is known that Charlie
already quit smoking?
(21) #If Charlie quit smoking tomorrow, he would not run the marathon.
Because we can construe the left boundary of the interval as immediately preceding the
time of the divergence (i.e. the time at which Charlie quit smoking), the set of worlds the
modal operator quantifies over will include worlds in which Charlie did not quit smoking
at some point in the past and still smokes tomorrow. However, the sentence is
infelicitous. As we explained in chapter 3, the infelicity of the sentence is due to an
additional requirement, i.e. the requirement that the presuppositions of the antecedent be
entailed throughout the interval, i.e. be entailed by each set of worlds accessible at any
subinterval. Although there are worlds where he quits smoking tomorrow, it is not the
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case that that Charlie smokes tomorrow is entailed by the context now, i.e. by the set of
worlds compatible with what is possible now. For reasons that will become clear later,
the same is true for the conditional below.
(22) #If Charlie's team played the final game tomorrow, they would lose.
Before we move to the next chapter, I would like to say a few words on why we needed
to use the similarity relation in giving the truth-conditions for subjunctive conditionals. In
order to do this, consider this problem. Suppose the speaker utters the conditional below,
and suppose that Charlie died six months ago and that Sally decided to attend the
ceremony only a week ago.
(23) If Charlie had come to the ceremony tomorrow, he would have met Sally.
According to the analysis that I have argued for above, the conditional above is felicitous
if Charlie's coming to the ceremony tomorrow was compatible with what was possible in
the actual worlds at some past time. The contextually salient past time is the time at (or
immediately before) which Charlie died. In other words, all the worlds we are
quantifying over are worlds compatible with what was possible then. However, at that
past time, many possibility were open and not all entailing the truth of the consequent: for
example, although it was possible that Sally would come and that Charlie would meet
Sally, it was alsopossible that Sally would not come and that Charlie would not meet
Sally. The problem is that it is not true that Charlie will meet Sally in all the worlds that
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were compatible with what was possible in the actual world last year. The reason why the
speaker seems to be allowed to say that Charlie would have met Sally had he come to the
ceremony tomorrow, is that the speaker now knows that Sally is one of the invitees, i.e.
that the actual world is such that Sally will come to the ceremony tomorrow. Therefore,
what we want is not just the set of worlds accessible at a certain past time such that the
antecedent is true. What we want is the set of worlds compatible with what was possible
at some past time and such that they are maximally similar to the actual world. To
illustrate this point, reconsider the ceremony example. Call the proposition that Sally
comes to the graduation p, and the proposition that Sally does not come to the ceremony
--p: last year, the actual world was compatible with both p and --p. Thus, the set of
worlds accessible at that time included both p-worlds and -p-worlds. However, in the
actual world, only p is true, i.e. the actual world is a p-world. By requiring that the worlds
selected by maximally similar to the actual world, we actually eliminate all the -p-
worlds, and are left only with p-worlds in which Charlie comes to the ceremony
tomorrow. And in these worlds, it is true that Charlie meets Sally.
In order to restrict the modal operator to antecedent-worlds maximally similar to
the actual world, we need a similarity function. Which worlds are to be regarded as the
most similar to the actual world is relative to some proposition: thus, we will say that a
world w is maximally similar to the actual world with respect to a proposition p just in
case there is no p-world more similar to the actual world than w. In our case, we need the
set of worlds maximally similar to the actual world among those worlds that are
accessible at some past time and where the antecedent is true. The structure of a
conditional should look as follows.
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Sim is the function that takes a proposition (e) - i.e. the set of worlds that are accessible at
some past time and such that the antecedent is true - and gives in return the set of worlds
among them such that they are maximally similar to the actual world.
To conclude this section, I have shown that a semantic analysis of subjunctive
conditionals exclusively based on the notion of overall similarity cannot account for the
different types of subjunctive conditionals that we have been considering. Instead, what is
needed is an analysis where we have a time-dependent notion of accessibility and a
notion of overall similarity.
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III. Back to the felicity conditions
Let us go back to where we left before the digression on the notion of accessibility and
Lewis' Analysis 1 and 2. Given the truth-conditions we gave above, we are in a position
to spell out the felicity conditions for subjunctive conditionals given above. Recall that
the felicity condition for non-past subjunctive conditionals requires that the antecedent be
compatible with C3, where c3 is the set of worlds accessible at any time during the interval
whose right boundary is the utterance time. On the other hand, the felicity condition for
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals requires that the antecedent be compatible with
some other context, c4. The question we left open in the previous discussion and that we
are now in a position to answer is what c4 is.
(26) Felicity Conditions
A. Non-past subjunctive conditional
Sn C3 0
B. Mismatched past subjunctive conditionals
0rn C4 : 0
The intuition that we tried to account for with our truth-conditions is that a mismatched
past subjunctive conditional is felicitous if at some past time the non-past subjunctive
conditional would have been felicitous, had it been uttered.
(27) c4 = {weW: 3t1 :t ct 4 & W is compatible with the speaker's knowledge at t }
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The corresponding piece of structure is given below.
(28) Xw4.3tl:t2ptl & W4 is accessible
from w, at t, and 4 is true in w4
[[3]]gc = Xt 5.Xw 2. w2 is accessible from
XP<i<>st>.w 4.3tI: t2_tlI & P(tl)(W4) wc at t5 and 4 is true in w2.
ts.[....] ,W2.W 2 is acc. from we at xs
and 4 is true in W2
Xw2. w2 is accessible from wc at x5  [[ )]]g.c = Xw3. w3 E
Xt 4.kw 2. w2 is accessible from wc at t4  X5
[[R]] g c = We
•WI.Xt 4 .Xw 2. w2 is accessible from wl at t4
Recall that the perfect operator requires that the presuppositions of the proposition in
question be entailed throughout the interval, i.e. by each set of worlds accessible at some
time during the interval. Now consider again the contrast between a one-past subjunctive
conditional and a two-pasts subjunctive conditional. Although they are both about a
future hypothetical event, they have very different felicity conditions; in fact, they are in
complementary distribution.
(29) Charlie quit smoking three years ago.




b. If Charlie had quit smoking tomorrow, he could have participated in the
experiment.
The reason why the (a) sentence is infelicitous is that the antecedent's presupposition
(that Charlie smokes tomorrow) is not entailed throughout the interval because it is not
entailed by the set of worlds accessible at the utterance time, which is the right boundary
of the interval. Thus, PREP is violated.25 On the contrary, the (b) sentence is felicitous
because the interval throughout which the antecedent's presupposition has to be entailed
lies entirely in the past (its right boundary is a past time): thus, the presuppositions that
Charlie smokes tomorrow is not required to be entailed by the set of worlds accessible at
the utterance time: its incompatibility with the main context is irrelevant for the felicity of
the example. What is the (contextually salient) past time? It is the time at which (or
immediately before which) Charlie quit smoking: at that time the antecedent become
impossible. Notice that this also accounts for why the non-past subjunctive conditional
we began with (repeated below) was infelicitous in the scenario in which they had
already played the last game.
(30) #If they played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would win.
The antecedent is incompatible with the main (utterance) context in which they have
already played the last game. However, the mismatched past subjunctive conditional is
25 The issue is more complicated and in chapter 3 we discussed the issues related to entailment and
accommodation.
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felicitous in these very circumstances because its appropriateness does not depend on the
compatibility between the antecedent and the main (utterance) context.
So far, we have accounted for the infelicitous occurrences of one-past subjunctive
conditionals, and for those occurrences of two-pasts subjunctive conditionals that are
felicitous. What we have not accounted for yet is those occurrences of two-pasts
subjunctive conditional that are infelicitous. For example, we have not accounted for why
the following is inappropriate if they have not yet played the last game yet.
(31) If they had played the last game tomorrow, Charlie's team would have won.
This was what at the beginning of this chapter we labeled "the felicity puzzle":
differently from non-past subjunctive conditionals, the hypothetical eventuality described
by the antecedent of a MPSC is understood as being impossible.
If the truth-conditions only talk about worlds accessible from a past time and the
felicity condition only requires the antecedent to be compatible with the context at that
past time, where does the incompatibility with the current context stem from? My
proposal is that the impossibility of the antecedent is a scalar implicature. How this
implicature is generated is the topic of the next section.
IV. Deriving the impossibility of the antecedent
I take scalar implicatures to be derived from the competition between two propositions.
More precisely, given two propositions q and y --, is implicated just in case (i) q
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asymmetrically entails V and (ii) the speaker chose to use V. A context set is the set of
worlds compatible with what is assumed or presupposed to be the case. At each point in
time there is a set of propositions that are (taken to be) true in the actual world.
Moreover, at each time there is a set of possible worlds which are compatible with the set
of propositions true at that time: these are the worlds that the actual world could turn into,
i.e. worlds compatible with what is possible in the actual world at that time. With respect
to the actual world, the set of possibilities shrinks over time as the set of true propositions
(facts) expands. Thus, for any two times t and t', where t<t', in the actual world the set of
true propositions at t' is bigger than the set of true propositions at t (the history of the
world is bigger), but the set of worlds compatible with what is still possible at t' is
smaller than the set of worlds compatible with what is still possible at t. It follows that
being compatible with what is possible now entails being compatible with what was
possible at any time earlier, but not vice versa because the set of possibilities can shrink
over time but cannot expand. The following holds.
(32) For any n, n<t,:
CugCn
Recall the felicity conditions for subjunctive conditionals, repeated below, and recall that
c3 is built over the interval t3 and c4 is built over the interval t4. Now, the interval t3 is
later than the interval t4, which lies entirely in the past.
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(33) Felicity Conditions
A. Non-past subjunctive conditional
Sn c3  0
B. Mismatched past subjunctive conditionals
Sn c4 •
Given what we said above, it follows that 0 n c3 • 0 entails q n c4 • 0, but not vice
versa, as shown in the illustration below.
P2A\
Being compatible with what is possible at the utterance time entails being compatible
with what was possible at any time earlier than now. If 0 is compatible with what is
possible now, it means that it is not the case that --0. If it is not the case that -4 now,
then it is also not the case that --0 at any time earlier than now: because if it was the case
that -4' in the past, then 0 would not be compatible with what is possible now. But not
vice versa: being compatible with what is possible at some past time does not entail being
compatible with what is possible at any later time, because something may occur to the
effect that --70 is the case. Therefore, when the speaker chooses to utter a mismatched past
subjunctive conditional, she chooses to presuppose something weaker than what she
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would have presupposed, had she decided to utter a non-past subjunctive conditional.
Hence, the competition can take place.
(35) Competition:
a. You presupposed: Vnc4 #0 where C3CC4
b. You didn't presuppose: -Onc3 0
c. Hence: -( •nc3 0) - •c 3 =0
The implicature is that the antecedent is not compatible with the current context, that is to
say, the antecedent is either false or impossible.
The proposal that I have argued for above is an extension of the classical theory
of implicatures stemming from Grice (1975): not only can two assertions in a relation of
asymmetric entailment compete, but so can two presuppositions. There must be a
principle requiring that speakers maximize their presuppositions (in addition to their
assertions). Arguments along these lines were already given by Heim (1991)'s discussion
of indefinites. Heim considers the unexpected deviance of the sentence with the indefinite
article below.
(36) # I interviewed a father of the victim.
(37) I interviewed the father of the victim.
Heim reasons as follows. If we assume the 3-analysis of the indefinite article , the
definite and indefinite articles stand in an asymmetric entailments relation - [a r]$
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follows from [the Q]4 (under the Fregean analysis - and, consequently, we expect a scalar
implicature to be generated: the use of [a 5]( will conversationally implicate that the
speaker is not in a position to utter [the r](. But this is not sufficient to explain the
deviance of the sentence above: since it is known that each person has a father, the
sentence with the indefinite article conveys as much information as the sentence with the
definite article. Why is the former deviant then? In order to solve this puzzle, Heim
suggests that there may be a principle at work requiring the speaker to presuppose as
much as possible: if you can presuppose that p, then you must. Thus, the use of the
definite article to refer to the father of the victim would be forced. Further evidence in
favor of a "maximize presupposition" principle is the following, again due to Heim.
Suppose a man is sitting in a restaurant having coffee. If the waiter went to him and asked
"Would you like a coffee?", his utterance would be judge infelicitous, as the man is
already having a coffee. What we expect the waiter to say is something like "Would you
like another coffee?". As in the father of the victim's example, there is apparently no
reason to rule out the use of the indefinite article given that it is common knowledge that
the man in the restaurant has already had a coffee, unless we postulate the existence of
some principle requiring the use of the item that triggers the presupposition in question
(i.e. another) instead of the presupposition-neutral one (i.e. a).
V. Cancelability
I have argued that the implicature that the antecedent of mismatched past subjunctive
conditionals is not true is drawn because the speaker chose to make reference to what was
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possible at some past time rather than referring to what is possible at the time of the
utterance, which would have been more informative. What distinguishes implicatures
from both assertions and presuppositions is that they can be canceled, that is to say, that
there may be contexts where the conditions that force the implicature to be drawn are
missing, and, consequently, the implicature is suspended. In this section, I will show that
this is in fact the case for the implicature that the antecedent of MPSCs is not true. In
particular, I will show that the implicature will not be drawn in cases where it would not
have been relevant to talk about what is currently possible.
Suppose Charlie had to decide when to play the final game of the season. The last
time I saw him was a few days ago, and I am now reporting to you bits of the
conversation we had, and the thoughts that went through Charlie's mind before he
decided to play the day after tomorrow: "He was really torn: true, if they had played the
final tomorrow, they might have won. But if they had played the day after tomorrow, they
would have certainly won, because the other team's best pitcher will not be playing then.
So, he decided that it would be safest to play the day after tomorrow". The point of this
example is that I am reporting Charlie's words and thoughts at the moment of his
decision. What the speaker assumes to be the case at the time of the utterance is
irrelevant, and consequently, the implicature of falsity is suspended and the mismatched
past subjunctive conditional can be uttered in a context where the speaker believes that
the antecedent (that they will play the day after tomorrow) is true.
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VI. Presuppositions without presuppositions triggers
Recall how I derived the impossibility of the antecedent in a mismatched past subjunctive
conditional: the impossibility of the antecedent is an implicature drawn from the
competition between the mismatched past subjunctive conditional and the non-past
subjunctive conditional. Drawing this implicature requires evaluating whether the
antecedent of a non-past subjunctive conditional is consistent with the utterance context.
However, there are a number of problematic cases where the implicature is drawn
but the non-past subjunctive conditional is predicted to be felicitous. To illustrate this
case, consider a situation where Jack married Susan yesterday, July 15. In these
circumstances, the subjunctive conditional in (a) is felicitous, but the subjunctive
conditional in (b) is not.
(38) Jack got married with Susan yesterday (July 15).
a. If he had gotten married tomorrow, I would have gone to the ceremony.
b. #If he got married tomorrow, he would have gone to the ceremony.
As in the cases examined above, the intuition is that the two-pasts subjunctive conditional
in (a) is felicitous if the hypothetical eventuality described in the antecedent is
impossible, which is true in our scenario once we assume that someone can only get
married with the same person once.26 The non-past subjunctive conditional in (b) is
26 Of course, Jack and Susan can have several weddings: suppose Jack is American and Susan is Australian
and their families cannot travel long-distance. To make both families happy, Jack and Susan may decide to
have two weddings, one in the States and one in Australia. Thus, there is a sense in which Jack can get
married twice with the same person (Susan). However, this is not the sense of getting married that I mean:
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infelicitous, which seems to be expected given that in this scenario the antecedent is
impossible. However, the infelicity of (b) cannot be due to the incompatibility between
the antecedent and the common ground at the utterance time, because subjunctive
conditionals - differently from indicative conditionals - can have antecedents
incompatible with the common ground.
(39) Jack is dead. If he were alive, he would turn ninety tomorrow.
The proposition that Jack is alive is incompatible with what is assumed, that is to say that
Jack is dead. Still, the sentence is felicitous. 27 Therefore, the infelicity of the (b) example
before must have a different explanation, but which one?
What is the factor that distinguishes (b) and (39)? If we can point to this
difference, we will have found a good candidate for what causes (b)'s infelicity. I would
like to suggest that what distinguishes (b) and (39) is Prep, the principle requiring that the
presuppositions of a sentence 0 be entailed by the context with respect to which 4 is
evaluated. Let 0 be the antecedent of the conditionals we are investigating. Now, (39)
vacuously satisfies Prep because its antecedent does not have any presupposition; in this
case the following holds: cg,cW. However, I am going to argue that this is not the case for
(b): its antecedent does have a presupposition which is incompatible with the common
despite the fact that Jack and Susan get married twice (they say "yes" twice, in front of two different public
officers and according to the laws of two different states), they can only get married with each other once
because once they get married once, they are no longer in the unmarried state.
27 Chapter 3 is devoted to this issue, i.e. how to explain the fact that typically antecedent of subjunctive
conditionals are known to be false. We will go back to the felicity conditions we gave before and modify
them. For thepresent discussion, though, assume the felicity conditions for NPSCs I gave above.
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ground, and violates Prep. The task of the remaining part of this section is to find out
what this presupposition is.
I propose that the relevant presupposition is the presupposition that is triggered by
change-of-state verbs that the eventuality has not occurred yet: for example, the predicate
to get married is a change-of-state verb and the presupposition that it triggers is that
whoever gets married is in the unmarried state before the marriage. The problem with the
one-past subjunctive conditional If he got married tomorrow, he would have gone to the
ceremony uttered in a situation in which Jack and Susan got married yesterday is that the
presupposition in the antecedent - that Jack is in the unmarried state until tomorrow - is
inconsistent with the context in which it is known that he got married yesterday. Because
I am suggesting that the infelicity of the one-past subjunctive conditional If he got
married tomorrow, he would have gone to the ceremony is due to the change-of-state
nature of the predicate involved, we predict that predicates which are not change-of-state
should not cause affect the felicity of the conditionals. The subjunctive conditional below
shows that this is indeed the case.
(40) Jack was drunk last week.
If he were drunk tomorrow at the ceremony, Susan would be upset.
To sum up, for a subjunctive conditional to be felicitously uttered, the antecedent's
presupposition must be consistent with the context of evaluation. In cases where there
seemed to be no presupposition in the antecedent of the one-past subjunctive conditional,
I suggested that a presupposition is generated by the change-of-state predicate, i.e. the
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presupposition that the event has not occurred yet. This presupposition is required to be
entailed by the context, a requirement that is clearly violated in our wedding example,
where it was known that Jack is not in the unmarried state.
Somebody might object that if this were the case, the (a) sentence below should
be infelicitous since the antecedent's presupposition that Jack is in the unmarried state
next week is inconsistent with what is known, i.e. that Jack will get married tomorrow.
The sentence is predicted to be infelicitous. However, it is not.
(41) Jack will get married with Susan tomorrow.
a. If he got married next week, I would go to the ceremony.
b. If he had gotten married next week, I would have gone to the ceremony.
The generalization seems to be that when the "foreclosing" event occurs in the past, the
one-past subjunctive conditional is infelicitous, but when it occurs in the future (like in
the example above), the conditional is felicitous. In (41), both the one-past and the two-
pasts subjunctive conditionals are felicitous. However, they are different: when the
speaker utters (b), but not when she utters (a), she suggests that she knows that for Jack to
get married next week is impossible. The presupposition that Jack is in the unmarried
state until next week does not have to be incompatible with the common ground if it is
part of the common ground that the wedding has merely been scheduled for tomorrow
(although it might). Schedules do not have to be viewed as foreclosing possibilities, in
that events that have been scheduled may still not happen when they were scheduled to.
Thus, the difference between the (a) and (b) examples above seems to follow from the
fact that we can think about the future as open and indeterminate. An utterance of (a)
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suggests that the speaker regards the question of when Jack gets married as an open
question. However, if she utters (b), the implicature will be drawn that the presupposition
of the antecedent is incompatible with the common ground, i.e. that in the common
ground it is no longer an open question when Jack did or will get married. In this case,
the speaker is conveying that she views the schedule as foreclosing any other future
possibility.
We have been talking about the wedding being still possible. However, people
may get married more than once, maybe even with the same person if they have divorced
before. What we need in order to explain the example we began with (which I repeat
below) is a way to make sure that the relevant presupposition is about the contextually
salient wedding.
(42) Jack got married with Susan yesterday (July 15).
a. If he had gotten married tomorrow, I would have gone to the ceremony.
b. #If he got married tomorrow, I would have gone to the ceremony.
This is the topic of the next subsection. I will argue that, as in the case of regular noun
phrases, the antecedent of a counterfactual can either be a definite or an indefinite
description of an event.
VI.1 Definite descriptions of events
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So far I only used the word event informally, but here I will use the technical word event,
a particular kind of entity that words and phrases can refer to. According to Davidson
(1967)'s analysis of action sentences, verbs of action (eventive predicates) contain a
place for a variable ranging over events. Thus, the predicate kick should be thought of as
a three-place predicate, rather than a two-place predicate, as shown below. The sentence
Shem kicked Shaun will be true just in case there is an event of kicking Shaun by Shem.
(43) [[kick]] = Xx.ky.Xe. e is a kicking of x by y.
(44) [[Shen kicked Shaun]] =1 iff 3e [e is a kicking of Shaun by Shem]
The advantage of this theory over previous ones is that it derives the correct entailments.
That the sentence I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star entails I flew my spaceship
follows from the logical form of this sentence, in much the same way in which that the
proposition that I saw a red fish entails that I saw a fish follows from the logical form of
these two sentences. Below are the logical forms, according to Davidson (1967).
(45) a. 3e [flew (I, my spaceship, e) & to(the Morning Star, e)]
b. 3e [flew (I, my spaceship, e)]
(46) a. 3x [saw(I, x) & fish(x) & red(x)]
b. 3x [saw(I, x) & fish (x)]
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In the tree that follows, I assume both event and time variables, so that tense can be given
a uniform treatment when it is interpreted in the proposition and when it is interpreted in
the accessibility relation: in both cases, tense will be (generally) interpreted referentially.
(47)
3o [[TP]]c= Xe. [e is a flying of my spaceship
to the MS by me at g(2)],g(2)<tC
[[PAST2]]C'g= g(2) [[VP]]= XtXe.[e is a flying of my spaceship
defined iff g(2)<to to the MS by me at t]
[[PP]]=Xe.[e is to MS at t]
I [[VP]]
ly.Xt.Xe. [e is a flying of [[to]] DP=MS
my spaceship by y at t] Xx.Xt.Xe. [e is to x at t]
V DP
[[fly]] my spaceship
Xx.Xy.XtXe. [e is a flying of
x by y at t]
In this modified Davidsonian logical form, an existential quantifier binds the event
variable introduced by the verb. There is a strong analogy between the logical form of an
action sentence and the logical form of a sentence with the indefinite article a, according
to the Fregean analysis of the indefinite article a as an existential quantifier of predicate
logic (cf. Heim 1991, 2.1.3, for an overview and discussion of different analyses of the
definite and indefinite article).
(48) A woman is at the door.
(49) 3x [woman(x) & at-the-door(x)]
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An action sentence refers to an event (e.g. a kicking event) in the same way an indefinite
noun phrase refers to an individual (e.g. a woman).
Now, the correspondence between referring to individuals and referring to events
would be strengthened if there existed an analogue in the event domain of a definite noun
phrase referring to an individual. What (if anything) refers to an event the way the
definite noun phrase the woman refers to a specific individual in the woman is drinking a
Martini? I would like to suggest that there are indeed examples of definite descriptions of
events too. Recall that, in order to solve the puzzle of one-past subjunctive conditionals
we discussed above, we had to interpret the antecedent of the conditional as talking about
some relevant, contextually salient eventuality. Once we did this, we were able to explain
the infelicity of one-past subjunctive conditionals in the cases we considered. Now, in
light of the present discussion, that result gains a further advantage: it provides evidence
for a complete parallelism between reference to individuals and reference to events.
Reconsider the two subjunctive conditionals uttered in the context in which it is
known that Jack got married with Susan yesterday.
(50) Jack got married with Susan yesterday.
a. If he had gotten married tomorrow, I would have gone to the ceremony.
b. #If he got married tomorrow, I would go to the ceremony.
Suppose the antecedent is interpreted as supposing that the contextually salient event of
Jack getting married occurs tomorrow. The antecedent also presupposes that this event
has not occurred yet. Because the context entails that that event took place yesterday, the
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antecedent's presupposition and the context are inconsistent, and the sentence is
infelicitous. We can then conclude that the antecedent must be interpreted as a definite
description whose referent is the contextually salient event satisfying the predicate. 28




[[f]]]= Xw. [the unique event of Jack getting
[[Modal]]' [[R]]C married occurred tomorrow in w]
Xw. the unique e is a getting
married by Jack in w]
[[]]w=
=Xf.,w[the unique e s.t.
f(e) = 1 in w]
[[tomorrow]]f= Xw.Xe.[e is tomorrow in w]
[[VP]]w=Xe.Xw.[e is a getting married by Jack in w]
Jack [[get married]]l
Xx.Xe.Xw[e is a getting married in w]
(53) 3we W[R(w,wc) & the unique event of Jack's getting married occurs
tomorrow in w & I go to the ceremony in w]
The reason why the antecedent must be interpreted as referring to the contextually salient
event (i.e. the reason why it must be interpreted as containing a definite description) is
that it is part of the common ground that there is (or can be) a unique event of getting
28 1 am abstracting away from the time argument in the entry of the predicate getting married. In the tree
below, I only put the event variable since it is relevant for the present discussion. However, a time variable
should be there too. As I said in the text, my general claim is that tense can either be interpreted at the
proposition level or within the accessibility relation. For this to be possible, though, there must be a time
variable in the predicate that the tense will saturate. Thus, properly speaking the type of a proposition is not
<s,t> but <i,<s,t>>.
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married by Jack. We are already familiar with this idea: Heim (1991) suggested that to
account for some infelicitous uses of the indefinite article in English, it seems necessary
to assume a principle requiring the speaker to maximize his presuppositions. Hence, if the
definite article can be used, it must (see section X in this chapter for examples). To
pursue the analogy with events, if in the context it is known that there exists a unique
event of the relevant kind, then the antecedent must be interpreted as if [the event g7.
Indeed, consider the following example.
(54) Susan gave birth to Charlie last month.
#If she gave birth to Charlie tomorrow, it would have to be a Cesarean
section.
Because it is known that you can give birth to the same child only once, the antecedent
has to be interpreted as supposing that "the unique event of giving birth to Charlie by
Susan" takes place tomorrow. But because that very event is known to have already taken
place, the presupposition of the antecedent (that it is an open question when Susan gives
birth to Charlie) is inconsistent with the utterance time. Prep is violated, and the sentence
is infelicitous. The parallelism between reference to individuals and reference to events is
strengthened.
To conclude, whether the antecedent is interpreted as talking about an event or the
event depends generally on the utterance situation, i.e. on the background assumptions
the participants in the conversation make. In fact, if the common ground is such that it
does not entail that there is (or can be) a unique event of getting married, the sentence If
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he got married tomorrow, I could go to the ceremony would be felicitous, even if Jack
did get married yesterday.
(55) Jack, the polygamist, got married yesterday.
If he got married (again) tomorrow, I could go to the ceremony.
Because the context in this example is such that getting married is not a unique event,
nothing forces us to interpret the antecedent as involving a definite description of an
event. The antecedent of the conditional can be analyzed as an existential sentence.
(56) If there is an e such that e is an event of getting married by Jack and e occurs
tomorrow, I could go to the ceremony.
Notice that the conditional above improves if the word again is added to the antecedent.
This is exactly what happens with indefinite noun phrases when an object satisfying the
relevant predicate already occurs in the context. For example, consider the following
example, due to Heim.
(57) (I am sitting in a restaurant and I have already had a coffee. My waiter comes
and I say:)
#I would like to have a coffee, please.
I would like to have another coffee, please.
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Further evidence that in the temporal domain, as well as in the nominal domain, it is not
possible to use an indefinite to refer to something that it is known to be unique, can be
found in Iatridou (2002). In her analysis of the present perfect as containing an indefinite
description of an event, she suggests that the present perfect should be infelicitous when
it is known that the eventuality in question is unique.
(58) I have painted the house (many times) since 1990.
(59) a. # She has written this paper since 1990.
b. #The dictator has assassinated his opponent since 1990.
Verbs of destruction and creation like the ones above create unique eventualities.
Extending Heim (1991)'s hypothesis to the temporal domain, it follows that we can only
refer to these eventualities by means of definite descriptions. Because the perfect contains
an indefinite description of the eventuality, verbs of destruction and creation are
infelicitous in the present perfect.
Let me sum up here my proposal for those cases that contain "presuppositions
without presupposition-triggers". If the antecedent If Jack got married tomorrow with
focus on the temporal adverb tomorrow, were to suppose that an event of Jack's getting
married occurs tomorrow, and were to presuppose that it is an open question when an
event of Jack's getting married has not happened yet, an utterance of that antecedent
would be compatible with a context in which it is known that Jack and Susan got married
yesterday, because the only thing that is required is that a marriage not have occurred yet.
Thus, the infelicity of the one-past subjunctive conditional in (a) would be a mystery.
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(60) Jack got married with Susan yesterday.
a. #If he got married tomorrow, I would go to the ceremony.
b. If he had gotten married tomorrow, I would have gone to the ceremony.
In order to account for the infelicity of (a), we must suppose that the antecedent If Jack
got married tomorrow supposes that the contextually salient event of Jack's getting
married occurs tomorrow, and presupposes that that event has not occurred yet. Because
in the scenario described above, it is not an open question when Jack gets married, the
presupposition of the antecedent is inconsistent with the utterance context. Hence, Prep
(ccp) is violated.
The felicity of the (b) example follows too. This time Prep requires that the
presupposition of the antecedent be entailed by the context at some contextually salient
past time, for example the time immediately before the speaker learned that Jack got
married with Susan yesterday, making the presupposition of the antecedent inconsistent
with the actual world now. Choosing to utter (b) instead of (a) will implicate that it is no
longer an open question when Jack gets married with Susan.
We can reason similarly for the example we used at the very beginning of this
chapter. Suppose Charlie's team played the last game of the baseball season yesterday
and they lost: I can felicitously utter (b), but not (a).
(61) a. If they played the last game tomorrow, they would win.
b. If they had played the last game tomorrow, they would have won.
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It is part of the meaning of last that, for any x, the last x is unique. Thus, the antecedent of
the subjunctive conditional in (a) has to be interpreted as containing a definite description
of an event, i.e. the event of Charlie's team playing the last game. Focus on the adverb
tomorrow in the antecedent of (a) creates the presupposition that is an open question
when the event of Charlie's team playing the last game occurs. Because it is in fact
known when they played the last game (yesterday), the presupposition is inconsistent
with the context and the conditional is infelicitous.
VII. Differences among presuppositions triggers
The analysis that I have proposed here accounts for the differences between mismatched
past subjunctive conditionals and non-past subjunctive conditionals for the cases we have
considered with respect to the generalization that whereas the presuppositions in the
antecedent of a NPSC cannot be inconsistent with the context, the presuppositions in the
antecedent of a MPSC do not have to. However, Heim (1992)'s examples seem to be a
counterexample to my generalization. Consider a modified version of her examples.
(62) If John attended too tomorrow, there would be too many people.
(63) If John had attended too tomorrow, there would have been too many people.
The particle too requires in both conditional sentences that somebody other than John
attend the relevant event. However, according to my proposal we would expect the
mismatched past subjunctive conditional to be felicitous even if the presupposition in the
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antecedent (that somebody other than John attends) is not entailed by the context. In our
examples with presuppositions triggering items like sell, quit, stop, the contrast between
MPSCs and NPSCs did exist. Here, I would like to maintain that the unexpected behavior
of the pair above must be reduced to the difference between different presupposition-
triggering items. In fact, the particles too or again contain an anaphoric element, and they
roughly mean "in addition to x", where x can range over different kinds of entities in the
case of too, but only over times (or occasions, eventualities) in the case of again. Now,
going back to our example above, for the anaphora to be resolved, there must be
somebody other than John who is contextually salient and who is going to attend
tomorrow. If these conditions are not met, anaphora cannot be resolved and the sentence
is infelicitous. And because this follows from the property of too, this is true of both two-
pasts and one-past subjunctive conditionals.
VIII. Conclusion
In this chapter I have solved the puzzle of mismatched past subjunctive conditionals: the
second layer of past morphology that clashes with the future temporal adverb in the
antecedent is interpreted in the "modal domain", where by "modal domain" I mean that it
contributes to the internal composition of the accessibility relation. More specifically, I
have shown that once we have a general theory of subjunctive conditionals (i.e. a theory
of the role of the first layer of past morphology), the role of the second past in
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals follows. What we see is a real past perfect, and
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the second layer of past sets the right boundary of the perfect time span, exactly what
happens in non-modal occurrences of the past perfect.
Furthermore, I have argued that neither Lewis' Analysis 1 nor Lewis' Analysis 2
can account for the contrast between a one-past subjunctive conditional and a two-pasts
subjunctive conditional. I suggested that only a modification of Analysis 1 can: such a
modified analysis is what I am proposing in this thesis and it crucially employs a time-
dependent notion of accessibility.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PERFECT IN DISGUISE
I. High and Low Perfects
By this time, you must be already asking yourself: If the hallmark of a subjunctive
conditional is the perfect operator, why do we see a past tense? In what follows, I shall
answer this question by appealing to semantic, syntactic and morphological
considerations. Consider again a one-past subjunctive conditional. Following Heim
(1992) and von Fintel (1998), I have been assuming that what drives the interpretation of
the whole conditional is the consequent clause and that the mood/tense marking in the
antecedent clause is semantically redundant, i.e. just the realization of an agreement
relation between the matrix and the subordinate clause.
(1) If Jack left tomorrow, he would meet my sister.
Morphologically, what we see in both the antecedent and the consequent clauses is a past
(the past on left [leave+ed] in the antecedent and the past on would [WOLL+ed]).
However, if my proposal is right, a perfect operator is interpreted as the time argument of
the accessibility relation. Thus, we seem to have a case where what looks like a past is in
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fact semantically a perfect. We already know that the reverse occurs: some occurrences
of the perfect are interpreted as past. For example, in the sentence (a) below the present
perfect has left could not have been part of Charlie's original utterance because the
present perfect is incompatible with adverbs like on Monday. Thus, the past perfect had
left must be interpreted as two pasts, one "agreeing" with the matrix past and one part of
the original utterance. Similarly for the sentence in (b), where what Charlie confessed is
"I left at 3pm'.
(2) a. On Saturday Charlie told me that Sally had left on Monday.
Charlie: "Sally left on Monday"
Charlie: # "Sally has left on Monday"
b. Yesterday, Charlie confessed to having left at 3pm.
Charlie: "I left at 3pm"
Charlie: # "I had left at 3pm"
What I am suggesting is that in the semantics there are two objects, the past and the
perfect, and that their morphological realization is not always transparent in either way:
as there are occurrences of the perfect interpreted as past, there are occurrences of past
interpreted as perfect. As for the reported speech examples above, the reason why we
have a past perfect is that there is no other way in English to morphologically realize two
pasts in the same clause. So now the question is: why does the perfect appear as a past in
conditional sentences? Consider the might-conditional below.
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(3) If Charlie left tomorrow, he might meet Sally.
If, as I claim, a perfect operator occurs in subjunctive conditionals, why can't we see it?
That is to say, why can't the conditional below be interpreted as the one above? For some
reason that needs to be explained, the perfect must appear in disguise as a past: a
conditional like (4) where the perfect occurs overtly in the consequent (have met) can
only be interpreted as an indicative conditional. In other words, if the perfect appears
overtly, it cannot be interpreted as taking scope over the modal but must be interpreted
below the modal.
(4) If Jack leaves tomorrow, he may have met my sister.
This is not an idiosyncrasy of conditionals but it is true of the interpretation of modals
and tense in general. Let me elaborate on this point. The sentence below is ambiguous
between an epistemic and a metaphysical interpretation.
(5) Jack might have left.
(i) It is possible that Jack has left/left. (EPI)
(ii) It would have been possible for Jack to leave. (META)
Going back to some remarks I made in chapter 2, I will extend my proposal for
subjunctive conditionals to matrix modal sentences. Let us suppose that the structure of
(5) in the epistemic reading is the one below. We have one perfect and either a past or a
141
perfect below it: the top perfect is the time argument of the accessibility relation (its RB
will be the utterance time by default); the other perfect or past is interpreted in the scope
of the modal, as the paraphrase for the epistemic reading above indicates. The only way
English has to spell out these two heads in the same clause is to spell out one as a past
(the past on the modal) and one as a perfect (the auxiliary have), thus obtaining the





In order to force the metaphysical reading, let us add the adverb tomorrow to the modal
sentence above, so that the paraphrase will be "It would have been possible for Jack to
leave tomorrow". As this paraphrase indicates, the metaphysical reading of (57) will have
a different structure. No past or perfect occur in the scope of the modal can, thus allowing
the future adverb to occur. Everything takes scope over the modal. As a result, the right







Although both the past and the perfect are interpreted above the modal, one piece - have
-surfaces in the scope of the modal ("Jack might have left"). The general observation is
that, whereas there is an intuitive mapping between the semantic structure and the
morphological pieces in the case of the epistemic reading, there is no clear
correspondence in the case of the metaphysical reading. In the epistemic reading, the past
(or the perfect) is interpreted in the scope of the modal, and have occurs in the
complement of can. On the contrary, the parallelism between the semantic and the
morphological structures breaks down because, although both heads are interpreted above
the modal, one of them actually surfaces below it. Let us try to account for the mapping
between (7) and the sentence Jack might have left.
Given the structure in (7), what we would expect is something like the sequence
*Had could leave, which is clearly ungrammatical. The reason why this sequence is
ungrammatical is simply that English modal verbs are not main verbs. The only option
available to English is for the modal to realize one head (and be spelled out as might) and
for the auxiliary have to realize the other. We expect languages where modals are main
verbs to allow the sequence that English disallows, and indeed this is the case in Italian.
Potere is the infinitival form of the modal verb 'can'. Partire is 'to leave'. The past and
the perfect are realized in the same way they would in a pluperfect: an auxiliary is
inserted to realize one of them and the past on the auxiliary realizes the other (the main
verb, the modal verb potere 'can', is realized as a past participle, as usually happens in
both English and Italian past perfects). The lexical verb partire 'to leave' appears in its
infinitival form.29
29 I should say here that, following Iatridou (2000)'s analysis of the French conditional mood, I take the







(9) Gigi sarebbe potuto partire domani.
Gigi be-cond can-past participle leave tomorrow
'Gigi could have left tomorrow'
Let us go back to the sentence Jack might have left (tomorrow) with the metaphysical
interpretation. The reason why the past has to take scope over the modal is because it
could not be interpreted inside the proposition without clashing with the future adverb
tomorrow. However, if there is no clash, the past should potentially be able to be






Indeed, this is a possibility but notice that, because can is not a main verb, the only way
this possibility can be realized is again as Jack might have left (yesterday): the perfect is
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realized on the modal (= might) and the auxiliary have is inserted in order to support the
past. The same is true in Italian: the only way to realize the structure above is again by
means of the same sentence we analyzed above Gigi sarebbe potuto partire (ieri) 'Gigi
might have left (yesterday)', with the difference that the modal potere is a main verb.
The second part of this discussion will be focused on the fact that the sentence
below cannot have the metaphysical reading, i.e. that the auxiliary have cannot be the
morphological realization of a perfect above the modal, as it was in the metaphysical
reading of Jack might have left.30
(11) Jack may have left.
(i) It is possible now that Jack left/has left. (EPI)
(ii) *It would have been possible for Jack to leave. (META)
The only possible structure for (11) is one in which the perfect/past is in the scope of the
modal, which is in the scope of nothing else. This is shown below.
30 For some reason, while Charlie could have left is ambiguous between an epistemic and a metaphysical
reading (on a par with Charlie might have left), according to some speaker I have consulted the counterpart
of the example in the text above with can does not even have an epistemic reading and it is simply bad.
(i) *Charlie can have left already.
Surprisingly, though, the sentence becomes good again with the metaphysical reading if negation is
inserted, as shown in (ii).





The time of the modal (properly speaking, the time argument of the accessibility relation)
will be the utterance time by default. If - as I have just argued - when the modal sentence
Jack might have left is interpreted metaphysically, the sequence might have is the non-
transparent realization of the structure [perfect [modal]] necessary for the metaphysical
reading, what prevents the sequence may have in (11) from being the non-transparent
realization of the structure [perfect [modal]] necessary for the metaphysical
interpretation? In other words, why can the following structure not be realized as Jack




The correct generalization is the following. If no past takes scope over the whole
structure, then if the modal is in the scope of a perfect, the perfect must be spelled out in
that c-commanding position. However, if a past takes scope over the whole structure,
then whether the modal is in the scope of the perfect or takes scope over the perfect, the
perfect must always be spelled out lower that the modal. In order to explain this
generalization, I will appeal to a general principle according to which the morphology
I do not know why.
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must mirror the syntactic order of the inflectional heads as close as possible.
Consequently, if the perfect can be realized on the modal (because no past occurs above
it), it must, which accounts for why the structure above in (13) can only be spelled out as
might have. This also accounts for the fact that if a perfect gets spelled out in the scope of
an untensed modal, then that perfect must be actually interpreted in that position, since no
switching could have occurred.
Before I turn to conditionals again, let me make a brief digression on the
epistemic reading of Jack might have left. As the structure in (6) shows, in the epistemic
reading the perfect is still interpreted above the modal. When the perfect is interpreted
above modals like, for example, may or can, these modals are spelled out as might and
could. When no perfect occurs above the modals, then these modals are spelled out as
may and can. The prediction is that whether or not a perfect occurs above the modal
should affect the meaning of the modal sentences in the same way in which the presence
or absence of a perfect above the modal operator distinguishes between indicative and
subjunctive conditionals. I was unable to find a perfect minimal pair that would illustrate
and confirm this prediction in English, and the closest pair I could find is the epistemic
must versus the epistemic should. To illustrate the difference between these two modals,
imagine Charlie is walking by Lucy's apartment and sees that the light is up. He could
utter (a), but it would not be felicitous to utter (b). The latter utterance suggests a higher
degree of uncertainty, which clashes with the fact that Charlie's current epistemic state
entails that Lucy is at home.
(14) a. Lucy must be home.
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b. Lucy should be home.
However, if the English pair we have just considered does not convince you, consider the
following Italian sentences uttered in the same situation described before.
(15) Lia deve essere a casa.
Lia must-pres,ind be-inf at home
'Lia must be home'
(16) Lia dovrebbe essere a casa.
Lia must-cond be-inf at home
'Lia should be home'
Recall that the morphology that we see in (15) is the morphology of an indicative
conditional, while the morphology that we see in (16) is what we see in (the consequents
of) subjunctive conditionals (see example (4) in this chapter). As expected, (16) cannot
be felicitously uttered in a scenario in which your current epistemic state entails that Lia
is at home.
Let us go back to our discussion, and consider the case of conditionals. If we go
back to the conditionals in (1) and (2), which I repeat below, we now have an answer to
the question why the latter conditional (where a perfect occurs) cannot mean what the
former conditional means. Recall that I have proposed that in a one-past subjunctive
conditional like (17), a perfect operator occurs above the modal but no past occurs above
the perfect. Thus, the structure of the consequent clause will be like (13). Now, because
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the perfect can be spelled out on the modal, it must. This generates the sequence could
meet in (17). Switching the order between the perfect and the modal is not required, thus
is disallowed. The only way the perfect can be spelled out below the modal is if it in fact
occurs there. But if the perfect occurs below the modal, then it cannot contribute to the
interpretation of the accessibility relation and the time argument of the accessibility
relation will have to be the utterance time (by default), which is the hallmark of indicative
conditionals (cf. (18)).
(17) If Jack left tomorrow, he could meet my sister.
(18) If Jack left/has left tomorrow, he can have met my sister.
In a two-past subjunctive conditional, the composition of the relevant features is
different. Consider the consequent clause in the following example.
(19) If they had played tomorrow, Charlie's team would have lost the game.
As explained above, in a two-pasts subjunctive conditional, a perfect operator occurs
above the modal and a past tense occur above the perfect. As explained above, because
the modal's slot for inflection is filled by the morpheme realizing the past tense at the top
of the structure, the only way to realize the perfect is by introducing an extra head, the
auxiliary have. 31
31 Suppose that we force a perfect tense to be interpreted inside the proposition expressed by either the
antecedent or the consequent of a subjunctive conditional by means of a since adverbial. Then, only a 2-
pasts subjunctive conditional is grammatical, as shown by (i).
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If the idea that the past morphology we see in subjunctive conditionals in English
is the realization of a perfect operator is correct and if it is correct that the reason why we
do not see it has to be traced back to the constraints of English morphology, we expect to
find a language whose language-specific morphological constraints do allow the perfect
to surface, i.e. a language in which the perfect does not have to (and therefore does not)
appear in disguise as a past. Bulgarian seems to be such a language. Bulgarian has both a
simple past and the perfect tenses. Now, the difference between an indicative conditional
and a subjunctive conditional is illustrated in the pair below.32' 33
(i) a. If the player had been carded twice since the beginning of the soccer game, he would not
be playing now.
b. *If the player were carded twice since the beginning of the soccer game, he would not be
playing now.
The ungrammaticality of the (b) sentence follows from the conflict between the need to interpret the perfect
as the argument of the accessibility relation (as required by the fact that this is a subjunctive conditional)
and the need to interpret the perfect aspectually, as required by the presence of the perfect adverb since the
beginning of the soccer game. It follows that two perfects are required, which explains the grammaticality
of (a). If a perfect were to be interpreted "temporally" in a 2-pasts subjunctive conditional, three layers of
perfect would in fact be needed: one layer of past would be interpreted 'modally', and two 'temporally'.
However, this is impossible in English, and the pluperfect has to be employed, as shown by the example
below which is in fact grammatical. This is what Iatridou calls a case of haplology (Iatridou 2000: 252,
fn.26).
(ii) If yesterday the player had (already) been carded twice since the beginning of the world-cup,
he would not have played today's game.
In fact, in light of some speculations that we will make later in this dissertation, (ia) too can be regarded as
a case of haplology. Briefly, I will suggest that in regular past subjunctive conditionals (past subjunctive
conditionals without temporal mismatches), the past can be interpreted in the modal domain as well (setting
the right boundary of the interval to some past time) and that, if it is so interpreted, the antecedent is
understood to be false. So, if (ia)'s antecedent is known to be false, then both the past and the perfect are
outside the proposition expressed by the antecedent. However, the since-phrase requires a perfect to be
interpreted lower. We would expect another layer of past/perfect morphology (thrre in total), but English
cannot have more than two.
32 I would like to thank Roumi Izvorski, Penka Stateva and Marina Todorova (in alphabetical order) for
these data.
33 There is a variant of the subjunctive conditional in (a) above where the antecedent is marked past:
(i) Ako Ivan trugneshe utre, bi sreshtnal sestra si.
If Ivan leave-past tomorrow, BE-3sg-subj meet-perfectparticiple sister refl




(20) a. Ako Ivan trugne utre, bi sreshtnal sestra si.
If Ivan leaves tomorrow, BE3sg,subj meetperf par sister refl
'If Ivan left tomorrow, he would meet his sister'
b. Ako Ivan trugne utre, shte sreshtne sestra si.
If Ivan leaves tomorrow, will meet3sg sister refl
'If Ivan leaves tomorrow, he will meet my sister'
The participle that occurs in the consequent of the subjunctive conditional in (a) is a
perfect participle, that is to say the same participle that occurs in the perfect in Bulgarian.
The difference between this occurrence of the participle and an occurrence in the perfect
is that whereas in the perfect the participle occurs accompanied by an auxiliary in the
indicative mood, in (a) we find the modal particle bi, which also occurs in wishes and
reported speech. (Does bi occur in other environments without the perfect participle?
According to one of my informants, bi+perfect participle is only found in conditionals).
The agreement on the auxiliary is not a default agreement but it actually agrees with the
subject. However, what we see in Bulgarian is not the perfect morphological realization
of the syntactic ordering of inflectional heads that we have in the consequent clause of
the subjunctive conditional in (a), which I repeat below. The perfect is above the modal,
but in Bulgarian it appears lower than the modal.
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The difference between (a) and (i) is unclear to me at the moment. Even for the speaker who would utter (i)
instead of (a) for a FLV conditional, (a) remains different from the indicative conditional in (b). In order to




So, Bulgarian seems to raise the complement problem of the problem that English raised:
in English we had to explain why the LF order [Perf [Modal]] could not be realized as
[Modal [Perf]]; in Bulgarian, on the other hand, we have to explain why the order [Perf
[Modal]] must be spelled out as [Modal [Perf]] (instead of [Perf [Modal]]). Our
explanation of the English case appealed to a principle according to which the order in
which the morphology spells out inflectional heads must be as close as possible to the
ordering of those heads in the syntax. Thus, this principle forced the perfect to be spelled
out on the modal itself. As for Bulgarian, the overt [Modal [Perf]] order is forced by the
impossibility to spell out the aspectual head on the modal particle bi: differently form
English woll, bi can be inflected for agreement features but not for tense. Assuming that
no finite verb can be spelled out above a modal, the perfect operator can only be spelled
out below the modal. Furthermore, as observed by Iatridou, Anagnostopoulou and
Izvorski (2000), in Bulgarian but not in English the perfect participle can occur without
the auxiliary, as shown by the possibility of having transitive, active reduced relative
clauses in Bulgarian but not in English.34 Therefore, because the modal particle bi in
whether she could utter (a) in a scenario in which she feels almost certain that Ivan will leave tomorrow. If
the answer is no, then - whatever the difference is between (a) and (i) -(a) is a subjunctive conditional.
34 Whereas English can only form reduced relatives with unaccusative and passive verbs, Bulgarian can
form reduced relatives with transitive active verbs. This is shown in the example below from Marvin
(2000).
(i) *The man bought the book is John.
(ii) Zaposnah se sas iena-ta napisala knigata. (Bulgarian)
met-REFL with woman-the written-PF book-the
'I met the woman who has written the book'
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Bulgarian can carry agreement features, and the perfect participle can occur without
auxiliary the morphology can closely mirror the hidden structure of the modal domain. 35
The hypothesis is that how languages spell out the perfect depends on language-
specific constraints. Above we have tried to account for the way the temporal and
aspectual elements of modal sentences are realized in English and Bulgarian. Now, I will
consider the case of Greek, which realizes the temporal and aspectual components of a
modal sentence in yet another way. In Greek subjunctive conditionals, the modal particle
Oa occurs in the consequent. The tense following Oa (and occurring in the antecedent)
may be past or non-past: if it is past, we have subjunctive conditionals; if it is non-past,
we have indicative conditionals. This is shown in the pair below.
(22) a. An pari afto to siropi Oc yini kala.
If take-pres-perf this syrup FUT become-pres-perf well
'If he takes this syrup, he will get better'
b. An eperne afto to siropi Oc yinotan kala.
If take-past-imp this syrup FUT become-past-imp well
'If he took this syrup, he would get better'
As we did in the case of English, I will focus on the consequent clause. What we find in
the consequent clause of the one-past subjunctive conditional in (b) is a finite past
imperfective verb. I'd like to show that what you see in (b) is the best Greek morphology
35 Notice that the fact that in English a perfect participle cannot occur without an auxiliary is another
possible argument for why [Modal [Perf]] must be spelled out as might leave and why the sequence might
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can do. As I said, what we expect is 6a+perfect. Instead, what we find is 0a+Vpast/imp.
Differently form Bulgarian, the particle Oc cannot carry agreement features and a finite
tense is thus required. Again, assuming that a finite tense cannot be realized above a
modal, we expect the finite tense in Greek to be realized below it. What prevents the
sequence Auxpres + Perfect participle (where the perfect participle would realize the
perfect operator and the present auxiliary would be inserted to satisfy the finiteness
requirement of the clause) to occur in the scope of O•? One tentative answer is that,
because there is no present tense above the modal (tc is in fact only a default), there is
nothing that could possibly be realized below the modal as a present tense. If a present
tense occurs under the modal, it will have to be interpreted where is occurs, i.e. inside the





However, if a past occurs above the perfect operator, then both the perfect and the past
will have to be realized below the modal Oca, thus explaining the occurrence of a
pluperfect in two-pasts subjunctive conditionals in Greek.
154
left (leave + past participle) is not a possible realization. Above we already discussed why [Modal [PerfJ]
cannot be realized by the sequence would have left.
(24) An iye pari to siropi Oc ixe yini kala.
if had taken the syrup FUT had become better
'If he had taken the syrup, he would have gotten better'
Are there other cases where the perfect operator is interpreted in the modal domain (i.e.
as the time argument of the accessibility relation)? One way to tell whether there are
other cases of the perfect being interpreted modally is to look at languages where the
morphology is transparent. Bulgarian is such a language. So, are there other modal uses
of the perfect in Bulgarian? As Izvorsky (1997) showed, the answer is yes. In the next
section, I shall present the relevant facts and show how they follow from and strengthen
my proposal.
II. The Perfect of Evidentiality
In Bulgarian (and other languages too) the perfect may be used to indicate that some
indirect evidence for the truth of a proposition is available to the speaker. Izvorsky calls
this phenomenon "the perfect of evidentiality". When a sentence occurs in the perfect, it
can have two interpretations: the report interpretation, where the evidence for p is having
heard that p, and the inference interpretation, according to which the evidence for p is
some fact allowing the speaker to make the inference that p.36 In both cases the evidence
is indirect, where 'indirect' refers not to the fact that the evidence is not perceptual, but to
the fact that the speaker does not have (and she knows he does not have) justification for
'36 See below for more on the two readings.
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believing that p, that is to say, she does not know that p.37 When glossing the Bulgarian
sentences, we will paraphrase the perfect of evidentiality with the adverb apparently,
which according to Izvorski's intuition is its best semantic counterpart in English.
The perfect of evidentiality (as well as the adverb apparently in English) is
different from the epistemic must, as shown by the contrast in (25). According to
Izvorski, the contrast in (25) is due to the fact that the perfect of evidentiality requires the
existence of some kind of evidence external to the speaker, since what the speaker knows
(or believes) is insufficient to use the perfect. The relevant kind of evidence may be of
different types: it may be the rumor that John got drunk yesterday, or it may be seeing
empty bottles of wine in John's living room.
(25) Knowing how much John likes wine...
a. ... toj triabva da e izpil vsickoto vino vcera.
he must is drunk all-the wine yesterday
'... he must have drunk all the wine yesterday
b. #... toj izpil vsikkoto vino vcera.
he drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday
'#... he apparently drank all the wine yesterday'
37 The notion of evidence or justification is relative to a knowledge (belief) system. I take Izvorski's
distinction between evidence and justification to be the following: a proposition p may be evidence for
another proposition q with respect to a given knowledge system even though p may not be justification for
q: normally, some evidence E, e.g. E=that-it appears to me that there are trees, counts as justification for
believing that there are trees; however, if I know that I am hallucinating (that is, with respect to a different
belief system), that very evidence (that is appears to me that there are trees) would not justify me in
believing that there are trees.
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The same point is made by the following example. In order to use the perfect of
evidentiality, it is necessary that the speaker has some (indirect) evidence.
(26) ivan izpil vsickoto vino vcera.
Ivan drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday
'... Ivan apparently drank all the wine yesterday'
#But I have no evidence for that.
Despite being a perfect, the perfect of evidentiality has none of the temporal and
aspectual features of the perfect. The perfect of evidentiality has the temporal and
aspectual meaning of its corresponding indicative form. The examples below illustrate
this point. The adverb vcera 'yesterday', snosti 'last night', to(dno v 3 dasa 'exactly at 3
o'clock', todno sega 'right now' and tocdno v toozi moment 'right in this moment' are
incompatible with the present perfect in its standard aspectual interpretation (sentences
(a) below). However, when the perfect is interpreted as the perfect of evidentiality, their
occurrence with the perfect is unproblematic, as shown in the (b) sentences.
(27) a. Te sa do'li (??viera)/ (??snosti)/ (??toino v 3 'asa).
They are come-PP yesterday/ last night/ exactly at 3 o'clock
'*They have come yesterday/last night/ exactly at 3 o'clock'
b. Te doili viera/ sno ti/ toino v 3 Casa.
They come-PE yesterday/last night/ exactly at 3 o'clock
'They apparently came yesterday/last night/exactly at 3 o'clock'
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(28) a. Toj e pi'el pismo (*tocno sega)/ (*to'no v toozi moment).
He is written-PP letter right now/ right in this moment
'*He has written a letter right now/right in this moment'
b. Toj pi'el pismo tocno sega/ to no v toozi moment.
He written-PE letter right now/ right in this moment
'He is apparently writing a letter right now/ at this very moment'
The fact that the present perfect does not clash with these adverbs in the evidential
interpretation suggests that the perfect is not interpreted in the same domain as the
temporal adverbs and, thus, suggests that it is the perfect itself the source of the evidential
meaning. The example in (29) shows again that the perfect of evidentiality does not
receive the temporal and aspectual interpretation of a present perfect.
(29) Ajnitajn (#e) posetil Prinstan.
Einstein (be-3sg) visited Princeton
'#Einstein has visited Princeton'
'Einstein apparently visited Princeton'
I believe that Izvorski's insight that these sentences are modal and that their evidential
meaning comes from the perfect is correct. The question that I will address in what
follows is how, in light of the analysis that I have developed for subjunctive conditionals
and modal sentences, the evidential meaning is constructed form the pieces of which the
sentence is composed.
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Izvorski (1997)'s analysis is based on Kratzer (1981), according to which there
are two coordinates that have to be considered in giving the truth-conditions for a modal
sentence: the modal base, and the ordering source. Izvorski takes the modal base to be the
function f which assigns to every possible world the set of all the propositions that
constitute the available indirect evidence in that world. The ordering source, on the other
hand, is the function g that assigns to every possible world the set of propositions that the
speaker believes in that world. (a) below is the set of propositions that the speaker regards
as indirect evidence in some possible world; (b) is the generalized intersection over the
set in (a), i.e. the set of all the worlds where all that the speaker regards as indirect
evidence in w is true; (c) is the set of the speaker's beliefs in w; and finally, (d) defines an
ordering relation on the set of possible worlds, where higher ranked worlds are worlds
where a greater number of the speaker's beliefs in w are true.
(30) a. f(w) = {p: the speaker considers p indirect evidence in w}
b. nf(w) = {w'e W: Vp[p is indirect evidence in w - w'E p])
c. g(w) = {p: the speaker believes p in w}
d. Vw',w"e W: w'<g(w)w" iff {p:pe g(w) A w"ep} c {p:pE g(w) A w'ep}
(31) [[Toj pilel pismo tocno sega]] = 1 iff
Vwe W[we nf(wo) ^ 3w'e W(w'e nf(wc) ^ w' <g(wc)W) - he writes a letter
right now is true in w]
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The evidential sentence Toj pidel pismo todno sega, 'He is apparently writing a letter
right now', is true just in case in all the worlds that are ranked higher with respect to the
speaker's actual beliefs among those where what counts as indirect evidence in the actual
world is true, it is true that he writes a letter right now.
According to Izvorski, the difference between a perfect of evidentiality sentence
and an epistemic sentence lies in the nature of thef function: in an epistemic sentence like
(32), f(w) is what is known in w, whereas in a perfect of evidentiality sentence like the
one whose truth-conditions we gave above, f(w) is what is indirect evidence in w, which -
according to Izvorski - is more restricted that the former one since it is not sufficient for
a proposition to be known for it to be considered (indirect) evidence for the core
proposition. This distinction was based on one of the examples we gave above (repeated
in (33)), where what was known was not sufficient to felicitously utter a perfect of
evidentiality.
(32) He must be writing a letter right now.
(33) Knowing how much John likes wine...
a.... toj triabva da e izpil vsikkoto vino vcera.
he must is drunk all-the wine yesterday
'he must have drunk all the wine yesterday'
b. #... toj izpil vsitkoto vino viera.
he drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday
'#he apparently drank all the wine yesterday'
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In the same spirit as Iatridou (2000), Izvorski's core idea is that the perfect has a core
meaning which can either be interpreted temporally or modally. How Izvorski actually
derives this from the semantics of the perfect is not clear to me and I will not go over the
details of her proposal here. Notice that in her analysis the notion of indirect evidence is
not derived but assumed to be part of the content of the function f. Moreover, she claims
that the difference between the report and the inference readings is a difference in
quantificational force and that this variability comes from the context: if the kind of
(indirect) evidence in question is regarded as very reliable for the truth of some
proposition (e.g. seeing empty bottles in John's living room), quantification will be close
to universal; if the evidence is not regarded as very reliable (e.g. the rumor that John got
drunk), quantification will be closer to existential. In what follows, I will develop a
different analysis of the perfect of evidentiality without going through a detailed analysis
of Izvorski's proposal. I will show that the properties of the perfect of evidentiality
follow from the proposal that I have developed above: the perfect will be interpreted as
constructing an interval of time, as usual, and the notion of indirect evidence will be
derived.
II.1 Do you trust your evidence?
Suppose I hear from Sally that yesterday Charlie drunk all the wine that she had bought
for her birthday party this coming week. When you ask me why Sally no longer talks to
Charlie, I utter the sentence below.
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(34) Toj izpil vsi'koto vino vcera.
he drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday
'Apparently he drank all the wine yesterday'
I may continue saying, "...that's crazy! He would never do anything like that", or I may
continue saying, "I never trusted that guy". But, in both cases, my utterance conveys the
meaning that I am not endorsing the proposition the Charlie drank all the wine yesterday,
even though I am entertaining the possibility the p in light of some available evidence
(that is, the fact that Sally told me so). Izvorski's (and our) hypothesis is that this
meaning is constructed by using the perfect. But how is it compositionally derived and
what is exactly the role of the perfect? My proposal is that the perfect is interpreted in the
way I suggested in the preceding sections of this chapter: it contributes to the meaning of
the accessibility relation, by building an interval (whose right boundary is the utterance
time, by default) such that the worlds in the domain of quantification will be worlds









By now, we should be familiar with the work of the perfect operator, the present tense
and the 3, operator and R. As for yf, this is the bare proposition that Charlie drank all the
wine yesterday. The variable P plays the same role as the antecedent of a conditional
statement, it is of type <s,t> and its value depends on the context: it is some proposition
that establishes the appropriate justification relation between two other propositions. For
example, in the scenario described above, P may be the proposition that-Sally says that p
only if p, i.e. the set of worlds where Sally says that p only if p is true.
Given the structure above, the truth-conditions for the sentence Toj izpil vsifkoto
vino vJera, 'He apparently drank all the wine yesterday' will be as follows. The sentence
is true just in case there is an interval t3 such that all the worlds w epistemically
accessible from the actual world at some subinterval of t3 such that the fact that Sally says
p is justification (direct evidence) for believing that p in w and such that she says that
Charlie drank all the wine yesterday in w, are worlds where Charlie drank all the wine
yesterday.
(36) [[Toj izpil vsickoto vino viera]]g"' = 1 iff 3t3VweW[3tlct 3: W is
epistemically accessible from w@ at t, and such that in w Sally says that p
only if p and such that in w Sally said that Charlie drank all the wine -4
Charlie drank all the wine yesterday is true in w].
I will assume that the same felicity requirement at work in subjunctive conditionals is at
work in perfect of evidentiality sentences, that is to say, the requirement that the
intersection between R and P not be empty (in other words, that P be compatible with the
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set of worlds epistemically accessible): for this to be true, then, there must be at least
some time during the interval at which some epistemically accessible worlds where P-
worlds. And as we did before, we may view this requirement as one instantiation of the
requirement that quantifiers not have empty domains. Now, the universal quantification
in (36) is restricted to P-worlds that are epistemically accessible at any time during the
interval built by the perfect operator. This interval includes the utterance time, but it is
perfectly compatible with the truth-conditions above that no world epistemically
accessible at the utterance time is a P-world, i.e. a world in which Sally says p only if p.
Thus, it is felicitous to utter (34) even though the speaker does not take the fact the Sally
says p as justification for believing that p. In what follows we will see that not only is it
possible to utter (34) when no world epistemically accessible at the utterance time is a P-
world, but that for a perfect of evidentiality sentence to be felicitous the speaker must not
take the actual world to be a P-world, i.e. the speaker does not believe that Sally says that
p only if p is true.
Consider the epistemic counterpart of the evidential sentence we considered
above.
(37) Toj triabva da e izpil vsiikoto vino viera.
'He must have drunk all the wine yesterday'
Perfect of evidentiality sentences have the same structure as subjunctive conditionals
(and modal sentences with would). On the other hand, regular epistemic sentences like
the one above have the same structure as indicative conditionals (and modal sentences
164
without would): here, because no past or perfect operator takes scope over the modal, the
time of the accessibility relation for indicative sentences is always the utterance time (see
section X for more details). Since the utterance time is included in the interval introduced
by the perfect operator, in indicative epistemic sentences such as (37) where there is no
perfect operator, the set of accessible P-worlds is a subset of the set of accessible P-
worlds in perfect of evidentiality sentences like (34), where a perfect operator occurs
above the modal. It follows that the felicity condition for perfect of evidentiality
sentences (Pnc,~0, where t3 is the interval introduced by the perfect operator)
asymmetrically entails the felicity conditions for indicative epistemic sentences
(Pnc,••). Thus, when the speaker chooses to utter the perfect of evidentiality sentence
instead of its indicative epistemic counterpart, she is presupposing something weaker,
and, as we explained in chapter 2, her interlocutors will draw the implicature that she was
not in a position to make the stronger presupposition, i.e. she was not in a position to
presuppose that P (Sally says p only if p is true) is compatible with what she knows at the
utterance time. In other words, when uttering the perfect of evidentiality sentence, the
speaker is suggesting that given what she knows it would be wrong of her to take what
Sally says as justification. Is this correct? Consider the English equivalent of the perfect
of evidentiality Toj izpil vsiJkoto vino vdera, uttered in the same scenario.
(38) Apparently Charlie drank all the wine yesterday.
When she utters (38), the speaker is not endorsing the proposition that Charlie drank all
the wine yesterday: the speaker has Some evidence for believing that proposition, i.e. the
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fact that Sally said so, but given the current epistemic state of the speaker this evidence is
not good enough to justify the belief that Charlie drank all the wine yesterday. To use
Izvorski's terminology, an utterance of (38) suggests that the evidence the speaker has is
indirect (i.e. insufficient to justify a certain belief), which is precisely one of the
properties of the perfect of evidentiality, as the following example will remind the reader.
(39) Maria celunala Ivan.
Maria kiss-PE Ivan
'Maria apparently kissed Ivan'
#(Actually) I witnessed it./#(Actually) I know that for a fact.
If the speaker believed that the evidence she has is in fact good enough to justify
believing p, then she would be forced to use the indicative epistemic sentence in (37),
which is true just in case in all the worlds epistemically accessible from w now that are
most similar to what is normally the case in w, Charlie drank all the wine yesterday (see
Kratzer 1991). Moreover, if the speaker does not believe that Charlie drank all the wine
yesterday, it would be inconsistent to utter the indicative epistemic sentence. However, it
would be perfectly appropriate to utter the perfect of evidentiality sentence in (34). This
is because for a perfect of evidentiality sentence to be true, it is enough that there be some
worlds epistemically accessible at some point in the interval in which Sally says that p
only if p is true (for example, these may have been worlds accessible before I learned that
what people say can be wrong; that they may be deceitful; that Sally is a liar; that Charlie
does not like wine; etc.).
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Recall the contrast Izvorski points out, exemplified in the examples given above
and repeated below: just knowing something does not make a perfect of evidentiality
sentence appropriate.
(40) Knowing how much John likes wine...
a.... toj triabva da e izpil vsiikoto vino viera.
he must is drunk all-the wine yesterday
'he must have drunk all the wine yesterday'
b. #... toj izpil vsickoto vino vEera.
he drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday
'#he apparently drank all the wine yesterday'
The clause knowing how much John likes wine restricts the domain of quantification to
what the speaker knows now. Thus, the use of a perfect of evidentiality which quantifies
over worlds epistemically accessible during an interval of time which properly includes
the utterance time is not allowed: the set of worlds epistemically accessible now is a
subset of the set of worlds epistemically accessible during the interval introduced by the
perfect, and in the course of a discourse, it is not a good practice to first utter p and then q
if p entails q.38 In other worlds, the infelicity of the (b) sentence below is due to a clash
38 In an analogous way, while it is appropriate to say Every man is a bachelor, it is odd to say Every
bachelor is a man (Heim, p.c.). Similarly, it is inappropriate to say I have twvo children after I have said I
have three children. von Fintel 2000 discusses a pair of examples that I think are related to the point I have
just made. The first is due to Lewis, the second is due to Heim.
(i) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be war; but if all the
nuclear powers threw their wapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be peace.
(ii) ??If all the nuclear powers threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be
peace; but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be war.
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between the size of the background context and the size of the set of worlds quantified
over by the modal operator. This difference in size follows from the way these two sets
are constructed.
Because the perfect is not interpreted inside the proposition expressed by the
sentence, the eventuality talked about by the sentence does not have to be located in the
past. I repeat here the relevant example: differently from the past and the regular
interpretation of the perfect, the perfect of evidentiality can co-occur with the present
adverb right now.
(41) a. Toj e pisel pismo (*toino sega)/ (*to'no v toozi moment).
He is written-PP letter right now/ right in this moment
'*He has written a letter right now/right in this moment'
b. Toj pigel pismo tocno sega/ tocno v toozi moment.
He written-PE letter right now/ right in this moment
'He is apparently writing a letter right now/ at this very moment'
Finally, let me spend a few words on the inferential reading. I have followed Izvorski's
assumption that the two readings do not represent a case of ambiguity. Izvorski draws a
distinction between the two readings: while in the report interpretation, the speaker does
If the order of the two counterfactuals that occur in (i) are reversed, the sequence does not longer work. If
you have considered the possibility that the USA disarm, then you can go on considering the possibility
that all the nuclear powers do, because worlds in which the USA disarm are not all worlds where all
nuclear powers do. However, if you have considered the possibility that all nuclear powers disarm, then
you cannot go on considering the possibility that the USA disarm because worlds where all the nuclear
powers disarm are worlds where the USA do. The only way to utter (ii) felicitously is to explicitly prevent
the entailment relation, for example by adding only to the second antecedent, so that the worlds where the
USA disarm will not be members of the set of worlds where all nuclear powers do.
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not have to come to believe that p, in the inference reading she does come to believe that
p even though still lacks justification. The difference is said to be a difference in
quantificational force (universal versus existential). In my proposal, both readings receive
the same analysis (universal quantification) and in both reading there is an implicature
that whatever evidence the speaker has for a certain proposition, she cannot take it to be
justification for believing that proposition.
Before concluding this chapter, let me mention an additional fact that seems to
support our analysis. Recall the proposal I argued for at the beginning of this chapter: the
hallmark of subjunctive conditionals is a perfect operator, which in English appears in
disguise as a past for morphological reasons. In Bulgarian, however, subjunctive
conditionals did show the perfect participle morphology, and in this section I have
discussed the evidential use of the perfect in Bulgarian which was argued to be another
instance of the mechanisms at work in subjunctive conditionals. In what follows, I would
like to show that one way in which English expresses evidentiality surfaces with the same
morphology employed in subjunctive conditionals. If my analysis of Bulgarian is correct,
(at least some) evidential sentences employ a perfect operator. Moreover, I suggested that
whether the perfect operator that occurs in subjunctive conditionals is actually realized
with the perfect morphology depends on language-specific constraints: thus, whereas this
is possible in Bulgarian, in English the perfect must be realized by a past morpheme.
Now, if (at least some) English evidential sentences employ a perfect operator, we expect
it to be realized as a past morpheme too, due to the same morphological constraints at
work in subjunctive conditionals. I believe this is correct.
Suppose somebody (a lawyer, for example) uttered the following sentence.
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(42) According to the defendant, Mr. Jones would have called his boss at 4pm on
March 23.
If she did, she would not be endorsing the proposition that Mr. Jones called his boss at
4pm on March 23, but she would be just reporting some piece of evidence that he did so,
i.e. the defendant's testimony. Using the terminology we used above, the defendant's
testimony constitutes a piece of evidence: in worlds where the defendant says that p only
if p is true, Mr. Jones called his boss at 4pm on March 23. Normally, however, we do not
believe things like that.
As we expected, the morphology used to express evidentiality in the example
above is the same morphology that is employed in subjunctive conditionals. If the
situation that the proposition is about is future, the morphology is that of a one-past
subjunctive conditional. Suppose you are a spy reporting on what you have found out.
(43) According to the CIA, Mr. Jones would leave tomorrow at 9pm.
The same is true for Italian, where the same morphology that appears in subjunctive
conditionals is used in the evidential sentences we are considering.
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(44) EVIDENTIAL SENTENCE
Secondo l'imputato, il Sig. Luini avrebbe telefonato al suo capo alle 4pm del
23 marzo.
'According to the defendant, Mr. Jones would have called his boss at 4pm on
March 23'
(45) SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL
Se Carlo fosse arrivato in tempo, avrebbe telefonato al suo capo alle 4pm del
23 marzo.
'If Carlo had arrived in time, he would have called his boss at 4pm on March
23'
The same true is true for the Italian equivalent of (43).
III. Conclusion
We discussed the occurrence of the past morphology in one-past subjunctive morphology
in chapter 2. There I proposed that the piece of past morphology that we see is in fact a
perfect operator in disguise. In this chapter, I speculated that the reason why the perfect
in English or Italian must be morphologically realized in different ways has to do with
the morphological restrictions at work in each language. However, we did find a
language, Bulgarian, where subjunctive conditionals are marked by an occurrence of the
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perfect participle. As in the previous case, what we have is a temporal operator
interpreted as the time argument of the accessibility relation, in the way explained above.
Finally, Bulgarian being a language that allows the perfect to be realized as such
in modal contexts, we expected to find other modal uses which could be accounted for in
the way suggested here. Indeed, in the last sections of this chapter, I tried to relate the use
of the perfect participle in Bulgarian with the perfect of evidentiality. This part was more
tentative. More work is required before all the puzzles having to do with the perfect of
evidentiality construction are solved.
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CHAPTER 6
REMARKS ON INVERTED CONDITIONALS
AND CONCLUSION
I. Inverted Conditionals
English shows subject-verb inversion in conditionals. As pointed out by den Besten
(1963), Holmberg (1986) and Pesetsky (1989), the complementarity between the
inversion with the conditional complementizer if suggests that the subject-verb inversion
in conditional is in fact movement of the verb up to the complementizer position Comp.
One important property of this phenomenon is that subject-verb inversion is only possible
in subjunctive conditionals. If inversion takes place in indicative, the result is
ungrammatical.
(1) Had Charlie played last night, his team would have lost.
(2) *Did Charlie play last night, his team lost.
The fact that indicative conditionals are ungrammatical when subject-verb inversion takes
place could be reduced to the fact that, in general, do does not undergo the conditional
inversion. The example in (3) shows that even in subjunctive conditionals, do cannot
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move to the complementizer position. However, inversion is out in indicative
conditionals regardless of what type of verb moves to the complementizer position. In the
example in (4), it is the modal verb may that moves to the complementizer position, and
the sentence is ungrammatical.
(3) *Did Charlie play, his team would lose.
(4) a. *May Charlie play, he will.
b. *Will they pay him more, Charlie will work for them.
In other words, although the ungrammaticality of the example in (3) may be due to the
fact that do cannot undergo movement to Comp, the examples in (4) show that verb
movement to Comp is always disallowed in indicative conditionals, regardless of what
moves to Comp. The correct generalization seems to be that only subjunctive
conditionals can invert, and whether a conditional can or cannot be inverted is not a
function of whether the conditional is counterfactual, as frequently put in the literature. In
the discussion that follows I will only consider English, although conditional inversion is
a phenomenon found in several Germanic and Romance languages as well.
The second important property of inverted conditionals is that subject-verb
inversion correlates with counterfactuality in two-past subjunctive conditionals but not in
one-past subjunctive conditionals. As we explained in chapter 2, non-inverted
conditionals are also normally understood to be counterfactuals but this component of
their meaning was shown to be an implicature, and as such cancelable in the right
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contexts (Anderson 1951). However, the implicature of falsity does not seem defeasible
in inverted conditionals. Iatridou and Embick (1994: 201) report the following pair.
(5) If he had broken his leg in his childhood, which in fact he did, he would have
exactly this type of scar.
(6) #Had he broken his leg in his childhood, which in fact he did, he would have
exactly this type of scar.
Whereas it is possible to cancel the implicature that he did not break his leg in his
childhood in a regular subjunctive conditional, the counterfactuality of the inverted
conditional resists the cancelability test above. However, someone could utter the one-
past subjunctive conditional below if she does not know whether Charlie is in his office
or not, and in fact she could continue by saying, "Let's go find out".
(7) Were Charlie in his office, we could invite him for lunch.
To recapitulate, in this chapter, we will focus on these three properties of inverted
subjunctive conditionals: (A) inverted conditionals can only be subjunctive conditionals;
(B) two-pasts inverted conditionals are counterfactuals; but (C) one-past inverted
conditionals are not. We will pursue an account that relates these properties to the
subject-verb inversion. But how is the meaning of these subjunctive conditionals affected
by the tensed auxiliary's movement to (or base-generation in) the complementizer
position? In this chapter, we will present the beginning of an analysis that tries to relate
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the semantic properties of inverted conditionals to the syntactic subject-verb inversion in
light of the proposal that I developed in chapter 2 and 3. Little is known about the relation
between the syntactic and the semantic structures of a conditional sentence, and in
particular about (i) how the antecedent ends up being interpreted in the restriction of the
modal operator, and (ii) where precisely the modal operator is located syntactically. I will
not address these questions in the following discussion, which may at times be
annoyingly vague.
The hallmark of "subjunctive" conditionals is the perfect. A perfect operator
introduces an interval of time which will be interpreted as the time argument of the
accessibility relation in the way I proposed in chapter 2. The past morphology that we see
in subjunctive conditionals is the morphological realization of this perfect operator
interpreted in the modal domain. The right boundary of the interval introduced by the
perfect is determined by the tense that occurs above the perfect operator. In one-past
subjunctive conditionals, the one layer of past that we see is precisely (the morphological
realization of) the perfect operator: since no other tense is present, the right boundary of
the interval will be the utterance time by default. On the other hand, in two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals, we have precisely the structure of a past perfect, where a past
tense occurs above the perfect operator. As a result, the right boundary of the interval will
be a past time. The simplified structures below show that, although the one or two layers
of past are spelled out within the antecedent and the consequent clause, they are
interpreted outside either proposition. y is the consequent, b the antecedent, R the
accessibility relation.
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(8) If Charlie played tomorrow, his team would win.
(9) ONE-PAST SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
tc CP
[perf] TP
y (that-his team wins)
f (that-Charlie plays tomorrow)
Modal R
(10) If Charlie had played tomorrow, his team would have won.




v (that-his team wins)
q (that-Charlie plays tomorrow)
Modal R
As we explained in chapter 2 and chapter 3, despite the fact that temporal and aspectual
heads appear inside the antecedent and the consequent clause, the perfect operator and the
past are in fact interpreted outside these propositions, and above the modal operator.
Interpreting the past outside the proposition in mismatched past subjunctive conditionals
such as (12) below is forced by the presence of the future adverb tomorrow which would
clash with the past, were the past to be interpreted in the same clause.
(12) If they had played the last game tomorrow, they would have won.
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Assuming that woll is the modal in English, in the previous chapter we speculated that the
reason why the perfect and the past cannot be spelled out above the modal (where they
are actually interpreted) has to do with the nature of modal verbs in English, i.e. with the
fact that English modal verbs are not main verbs. Recall that we are assuming that the
morphology we see in the antecedent is semantically redundant, just the consequence of
the antecedent clause being governed by the consequent clause: however, because there is
no modal in the antecedent clause, if the perfect and the past are interpreted in some
higher position, they should be able to be spelled out in the antecedent where they are
interpreted. In a mismatched subjunctive conditional, whose structure was given in (11),
both the perfect operator and the past occur above the modal. As in a past perfect, we
expect the perfect to be realized by the auxiliary have and the past to be realized by past
morphology on the auxiliary itself. Inverted conditionals meet this expectation. Consider
the inverted version of the mismatched subjunctive conditional above. The past auxiliary
had is in the complementizer position.
(13) Had they played the last game tomorrow, they would have won.
As I explained in chapter 2, interpreting the past as contributing to the definition of an
accessible world triggers the implicature that the antecedent is false. In the case of
mismatched past subjunctive conditionals, inverted and non-inverted conditionals will not
be different because the past must always be interpreted outside the proposition expressed
by the antecedent in order not to conflict with the future temporal adverb (tomorrow in
our examples). Thus, the counterfactuality of the inverted conditional in (13) is expected.
However, in non-mismatched past subjunctive conditionals, the (second layer of) past
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does not have to be interpreted above the modal. If it does, however, we expect the
implicature of falsity to arise. In other words, we expect inverted and non-inverted past
subjunctive conditionals with no temporal mismatch to be different with respect to the
falsity of their antecedents. This is correct. Two-pasts inverted conditionals are
counterfactuals. Consider the pair below.
(14) If he had broken his leg in his childhood, which in fact he did, he would have
exactly this type of scar.
(15) #Had he broken his leg in his childhood, which in fact he did, he would have
exactly this type of scar.
Both subjunctive conditionals talk about a past hypothetical situation, i.e. one in which
some contextually salient male individual broke his leg in his childhood, but whereas in
the non-inverted one the counterfactuality is canceled by the phrase which he did, the
counterfactuality of the inverted conditional is not canceled and the co-occurrence with
the phrase which he did causes the infelicity of the whole conditional. This fact, which
had remained mysterious up to now, follows from the proposal developed in this
dissertation if we assume that, where there is no temporal mismatch between the past and
the temporal adverbial phrase, interpreting the past above the modal is optional. Thus,
(15), where the inversion in the antecedent tells us that the past occurs above the modal in
the matrix clause, is counterfactual.
Let us consider the non-mismatched non-inverted conditional such as (14). So far
we have discovered that (i) interpreting the past above the modal is possible in non-
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mismatched past subjunctive conditionals too, as we have just shown; and that (ii) for the
past to be interpreted above the modal, it does not have to occur overtly above the modal,
as shown by the mismatched past subjunctive conditionals. Therefore, it follows that the
past can be interpreted above the modal even in non-mismatched past subjunctive
conditionals such as (14). Hence, (14) could in fact be ambiguous: it could have the












The structure in (16) is like the structure of a one-past subjunctive conditional where only
a perfect operator occurs above the modal, and consequently there is no counterfactual
implicature. On the other hand, the structure in (17) is precisely the structure of a
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mismatched past subjunctive conditional, and like for mismatched past subjunctive
conditionals, the counterfactual implicature is triggered.
Recall that, traditionally, the counterfactuality of a subjunctive conditional like
(14) is said to be an implicature exactly because, although two-pasts subjunctive
conditionals are generally understood as being counterfactual, they can sometimes be
uttered even if they are known to be true (Anderson 1951). But, in light of the
speculations above, subjunctive conditionals like (14) fall into a new perspective. What
seemed to be a cancelable implicature may be a case of ambiguity.
Two questions arise. First, if the structure in (17) is possible, where q is about a
past situation but there is no past in 0, why is it not possible to have a a one-past
subjunctive conditional whose antecedent is about the past, i.e. where 0 is about a past
situation but is not marked as past? In other words, why can a one-past subjunctive
conditional only be about non-past (present or future) hypothetical situations? Why is the
following impossible?
(18) #If they played yesterday, his team would win.
The generalization is that if the proposition expressed by the antecedent is not marked as
past, it will be interpreted as non-past relative to the evaluation time, which, in the case of
a one-past subjunctive conditional, is an interval whose right boundary is the utterance
time. This means that in a one-past subjunctive conditional, the time of the supposition
will be interpreted as non-past relative to the interval's right boundary, unless marked
otherwise, i.e. unless the proposition is past. This captures (18): because the proposition
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is not past, the time of the supposition is required to be future to or simultaneous with the
utterance time, which conflicts with the fact that the time of the supposition is said to be
yesterday. However, the structure in (16) for the two-past subjunctive conditional If he
had broken his leg in his childhood, he would have exactly this type of scar does not face
this problem because the antecedent is marked as past. As for the structure in (17), the
antecedent is not marked as past but this is not a problem here because, although the
proposition is about a past time (someone's past childhood), we do not want the time of
the supposition to precede the evaluation time: in fact, the evaluation time in this case is a
past interval (the right boundary is a past time) and, as I argued for in chapter 4, uttering
now a past subjunctive conditional with the structure in (17) is like uttering at some past
time a one-past subjunctive conditional whose antecedent will then have to be interpreted
as non-past relative to that past time. Thus, in (17) the time of the supposition will be
interpreted as non-past relative to the past evaluation time, which is exactly what we
need. However, why this generalization holds is not clear.
The second question is the following. Why are inverted one-past subjunctive
conditionals not counterfactuals in the way that inverted two-pasts subjunctive
conditionals are? Below is the example we considered above.
(19) Were Charlie in his office, we could invite him for lunch.
As we already pointed out, someone who uttered this conditional would not have to
believe that Charlie is not in his office. Similarly, someone who uttered the following
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conditional does not have to believe that Charlie will never find out that they played
without him. Quite the contrary: the speaker must believe that Charlie might find out.
(20) Were Charlie to find out that they played without him, he would be upset.
The reason why only inverted two-pasts subjunctive conditionals are counterfactuals in
the way that mismatched past subjunctive conditionals are follows from our proposal: the
tensed auxiliary that moves to the complementizer position in inverted one-past
subjunctive conditionals such (20) is not a past tense but the perfect operator. Hence, the
implicature of counterfactuality that we talked about in chapter 2 cannot arise because
there is no past. As I explained in chapter 2, the perfect operator is always - that is, in
non-inverted as well as in inverted conditionals, in one-past as well as in two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals - interpreted above the modal. Therefore, both inverted and non-
inverted one-past subjunctive conditionals have the same truth and felicity conditions.
II. Is the morphology in the antecedent semantically redundant?
One point before I conclude needs some clarification. As I said above, I have not
addressed the question of how exactly the syntactic structure of a conditional sentence is
mapped into the structure we have been assuming, i.e. a modal operator taking the
antecedent as its restriction and the consequent as its nuclear scope. We have not
addressed the question of whether the modal operator of a subjunctive conditional
sentence is woll. See von Fintel (1994) for a discussion of these problems. Moreover,
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throughout this work, I have been vague about whether the temporal and aspectual pieces
that get interpreted are those in the antecedent or those in the consequent. Actually, I
have been assuming with Heim (1992), von Fintel (1998) and others, that the tense
marking that we see in an antecedent clause is semantically redundant and what is
interpreted is the tense marking in the consequent clause (the main clause). However,
although this is an appealing view, it raises some questions. Consider the conditional
below. Suppose Charlie arrived today.
(21) If Charlie had arrived tomorrow, Sue would not be having dinner with him
now.
This conditional has all the properties of a mismatched past subjunctive conditional, i.e. it
is counterfactual and its counterfactuality resists the cancelability test.
(22) #If Charlie had arrived tomorrow, which he will, he would not be having
dinner with Sue now.
However, the consequent does not force counterfactuality in itself: when the consequent
is part of a one-past subjunctive conditional, the conditional could be uttered whether the
speaker knows it to be false or not. In the example below, the speaker does not know
whether Charlie is having dinner with Sue, so for all she knows it may be possible that
Charlie will actually arrive tomorrow.
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(23) All we know is that if Charlie arrived tomorrow, he would not be having
dinner with Sue tonight. Let us find out whether he is, and will know
whether he has already arrived or not.
Therefore, in (21) it is only the antecedent that carries the elements that force the
counterfactual reading. In this case at least, it is not true that the type of the conditional is
determined by the consequent clause. However, if the time of the supposition that the
consequent is about follows the time of the antecedent's supposition, the sentence seems
odd.
(24) #If Charlie had arrived tomorrow, he would have dinner with Sally.
But if the time of the consequent's supposition is future relative to the utterance time but
precedes the time of the antecedent's supposition, the sentence is better.
(25) If Charlie had left in a week, he would have dinner with us tomorrow.
Hence, the generalization seems to be that if the antecedent is that of a mismatched past
subjunctive conditional and the consequent that of a one-past subjunctive conditional, the
conditional is felicitous if the time of the consequent's supposition precedes the time of
the antecedent's presupposition. Why this is so, I do not know, and I have to leave this
question open for the future.
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One question that arises is what happens in the reverse case, that is to say, when
all the elements necessary to construe the counterfactual meaning (the perfect and the
past) occur in the consequent but not in the antecedent: according to the view that the
morphology in the antecedent is semantically redundant, the conditional should be good
and counterfactual. However, the example below shows that the outcome is infelicitous.
The intended reading is one in which Sally's picking Charlie up at the station occurs
tomorrow.
(26) #If Charlie took the train tomorrow, Sally would have picked him up at the
station.
The hypothesis that sentences like this are ruled out by some independent morphological
constraint requiring the two clauses to match morphologically in their tense marking is
excluded by the example discussed above, which are good even though the two clauses
do not match morphologically.
If the time of the consequent's supposition precedes the time of the antecedent's
supposition, conditionals that are mismatched only in their consequent improve and are
fully counterfactual.
(27) If Charlie left in a week, he would have had dinner with Lucy tomorrow.
The tentative generalization is that in subjunctive conditionals where either the
antecedent or the consequent (but not both) has the morphology of a mismatched past
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subjunctive conditional, the time of the consequent's supposition must precede the time
of the antecedent's presupposition. 39,40 However, I believe the sentence in (27) is
different from (21) and (25): whereas (21) and (25) feel like normal counterfactual, the
conditional in (27) seems to have the structure and meaning of the kind of conditionals
that Anderson discusses, in which the falsity of the antecedent is not presupposed but
only inferred from the fact that the consequent is false: the antecedent does not have to be
understood counterfactually but the mismatch in the consequent forces us to understand
the consequent clause counterfactually; therefore, for the whole conditional to be true, the
antecedent must be false too.
The remarks in this section were meant to highlight the complexity involved in
accounting for the relation between the two clauses of a conditional sentence. I started
form the view that I have adopted in this work, i.e. that what drives the interpretation of a
conditional is the consequent clause. However, the examples I mentioned suggest that
more factors have to be taken into account. I will stop here, then, hoping to have at least
laid down some interesting facts.
39 In Navajo subjunctive conditionals only the consequent clause shows tense morphology. Krause (2001)
has argued that there are syntactic reasons why the antecedent clause lacks tense morphology: the
antecedent clause in Navajo conditionals is not a full clause but a participial clause. And participial clauses
are smaller than CP.
40 There exist conditionals that are problematic in a theory in which the temporal contribution of the
antecedent is semantically redundant. As mentioned in von Fintel (1998), McCawley (1996: 91, Fn. 7)
points out that examples such as the following (attributed to Johnson-Laird) are problematic unless the
antecedent is being interpreted. See also latridou (1990).
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III. Conclusion of the Dissertation
In this dissertation I have argued that accessibility relations are complex relations
involving not only a world but also a time of evaluation. The truth-conditions and
felicity-conditions of modal sentences depend on the time of the accessibility relation. In
indicative conditionals and indicative modal sentences, the time of the accessibility
relation is the utterance time, in that no temporal element occurs above the modal at
logical form. However, in subjunctive conditionals and non-indicative modal sentences
where a past tense obligatorily occurs, a perfect operator occurs above the modal operator
at logical form: the perfect creates an interval of time such that the modal operator
quantifies over worlds accessible at some time during the interval.41 In subjunctive
conditional and modal sentences where only one layer of past occurs, the right boundary
of this interval is the utterance time, by default. However, in subjunctive conditionals and
non-indicative modal sentences with two layers of past morphology, the role of the
second layer of past is to shift the right boundary of the interval to some time earlier than
the utterance time, so that the whole interval is past relative to the utterance time. Thus,
temporal and aspectual operators can occur low or high in a structure. Low occurrences of
the perfect and the past are occurrences below the modal: they are the "normal" uses of
perfect and past like in the sentences Charlie has been to Boston once and Charlie came
to Boston once, respectively. High occurrences of perfect and past are what we
sometimes called "modal" occurrences: they occur above the modal operator, and are
used to construct the relevant domain of quantification for the operator. Temporal
(i) If you had needed money, there was plenty in my bank account.
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mismatches force these temporal elements to be interpreted high so as not to clash with
the temporal adverb that occurs inside the relevant proposition.
This proposal offered an account of the systematic difference between indicative
and subjunctive conditionals, as well as of the difference between indicative and non-
indicative modal sentences. While explaining what is the common element to all
"subjunctive" conditionals, it also allowed us to account for the difference among
subjunctive conditionals, i.e. between one-past subjunctive conditionals and two-pasts
subjunctive conditionals with respect to their felicity conditions.
The notion of accessibility that I showed to be necessary is time-dependent, and I
argued that the notion of overall similarity that Lewis proposed does not account for the
cases studied in this dissertation.
Finally, in my analysis of conditionals I have chosen to follow Stalnaker (1975)
and Heim (1992) in taking the notion of context set to be central, even though I departed
from their views in substantial ways. Furthermore, I discussed both analyses discussed in
Lewis (1979) - Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 - and I argued that neither of them is able to
account for the differences in truth and felicity conditions between one-past subjunctive
conditional and mismatched two-pasts subjunctive conditional. However, our analysis
which employs a time-dependent notion of accessibility can.
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